Israel has unmistakably crossed the red lines in its confrontation with the Resistance Front by assassinating Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political bureau of the Hamas movement. Haniyeh was in Tehran to participate in the inauguration ceremony of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. While previous operations like the assassination of Fuad Shukr, a leader of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, in Beirut had not yet tested Iran’s boundaries, Israel’s latest actions mark a more severe provocation. Hezbollah issued a statement just two hours after the deadly attack. This communiqué included a request from Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, to Sheikh Naim Qassem and Hassan Fadlallah of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, urging the resistance to maintain its “wise path,” especially since the onset of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Had Israel only assassinated Shukr in Lebanon, it could have been interpreted as an act of retribution for the victims of the missile strike on Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights—a retaliation Israel could manage. However, the subsequent assassination of Haniyeh at his Tehran residence during the inauguration ceremony, following the provocative death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter incident near the Azerbaijani border, shifts the context from revenge to outright provocation. This remains true even if Haniyeh and other Hamas leaders were already on Israel’s target list for their role in the October 7 attack. Globally, the narrative now inescapably ties Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran to Israel’s implicit desire for a broader conflict. Observers from the Far East to the Western world see this act as a clarion call for war. The backdrop to this situation includes an array of internal, regional, and international factors: Israelis are currently more focused on internal discord than external threats and might need a return to a “circle of fear.” The resistance front shows signs of weakening. For instance, negotiations over a prisoner exchange have highlighted Hamas’s exhaustion despite its ongoing resistance. Hezbollah has lost qualitative advantages, such as effective drone confrontation. Its accuracy in missile strikes has diminished alongside the loss of skilled fighters. The Houthi reaction to the attack on Al Hudaydah’s port remains mired in rhetoric. Khamenei’s decision to approve the ascendancy of a figure like Pezeshkian, who faces rejection from Iran’s hard-line current, signals internal and external strife in Iran. Additionally, pro-Iranian groups in Iraq have abstained from targeting American bases for months, indicating that considerable threats can restrain them. The United States, entrenched in a tumultuous presidential election cycle involving candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, has afforded Israel a strategic upper hand. This was evident both in the enthusiastic reception for the Israeli prime minister in the US Congress and in the bipartisan support to “finish the job” through coordinated plans drawn up by American and Israeli military, security, and political figures. How might Iran react to these developments? Since the beginning of Al-Aqsa Flood, Iran has demonstrated a reluctance to engage in a war involving the United States. Following the October 7 attack, the US enhanced its military presence in the region, causing Iran to backtrack on promises made to Hamas to vigorously open all resistance fronts against Israel. Iran swiftly imposed restrained responses on Hezbollah following Israeli strikes, such as the January 2 attack in the southern suburbs of Beirut that killed Hamas commander Saleh al-Arouri near Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s supposed residence. When Israel targeted the Quds Force headquarters in the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Tehran’s calculated yet ineffective response contrasted sharply with Israel’s high-value target hit in Tehran through a single missile, resulting in Haniyeh’s assassination. In contrast, Iran’s April 13 offensive involving three hundred drones and various missiles failed to hit any significant Israeli targets. The assassination of Haniyeh is a significant blow to Iran, potentially necessitating a change in strategy. On paper, Iran has the firepower and the capacity to mobilize the entire Resistance Front, including Hezbollah. However, real-world constraints loom large, such as the US pledge to aid Israel and the Israeli military’s demonstrated operational prowess, exemplified by their detailed knowledge of Haniyeh’s sleeping arrangements and the precise location of Hezbollah’s military leader, Shukr. Given these complexities, Iran is likely to carefully weigh its options before escalating the conflict with Israel. Repeating a calculated, minimal response akin to the aftermath of the Damascus consulate bombing might emerge as the only viable strategy. —Fares Khachan (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)
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