I remember in the 1980s, a senior Israeli politician—perhaps the prime minister or defense minister—remarked that Israel’s security borders extended from Mecca to Pakistan. The mention of Mecca implied that Islam itself was a threat, while Pakistan’s inclusion was not about religion but rather its nuclear ambitions, rumored at the time to have been developed with the expertise of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani physicist who was also believed to have played a role in the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programs.
In reality, after peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s strategic concerns were largely confined to the Palestinian issue until the second intifada and the subsequent prolonged wars in Gaza. Over time, however, alongside the Iranian nuclear program, the threat of Iranian proxies emerged, most notably Hezbollah. Then came Iran’s direct presence in Syria, the involvement of pro-Iranian Iraqi militias such as the Popular Mobilization Forces, and finally Yemen, where the conflict with the Houthis is now escalating.
Israel’s relationship with Hamas, and whether the group constitutes an existential threat, has always been complicated. Israel viewed Mahmoud Abbas as its primary adversary while at the same time negotiating ceasefires with Hamas, engaging in wars against it, and even facilitating financial aid in exchange for temporary truces.
The October 7, 2023, attack unleashed a brutal war, escalating Israeli security concerns on multiple fronts. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he was fighting on seven different fronts, most of them against Iranian-backed militias advocating for a united resistance. Since most of these fronts lay along Israel’s borders, its military campaign was not only about eliminating militants but also preventing their rearmament and, by extension, discouraging the countries harboring them from continuing their support.
But the Israeli security- and politically minded right was not content with this approach alone. It began contemplating broader geopolitical shifts, considering how neighboring states might be weakened or even fragmented. This could be pursued in two ways: first, through direct military strikes under the justification that these nations harbored terrorist groups; second, by exploiting internal divisions, encouraging ethnic and sectarian minorities to seek independence, instigate armed conflicts with central governments, or stage localized uprisings.
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Israel had attempted a version of this strategy in Lebanon during the 1950s and sought to weaken Egypt in a different manner during the same period. Distinguishing between conspiracy theories and actual strategic plans is often difficult, especially as normalization efforts continue to be framed as a more effective alternative to war and coercion. The Trump administration, for instance, insisted that its multilateral peace deals were preferable to military action. Yet, in the wake of the wars in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, normalization has become increasingly challenging, no matter how dependent or vulnerable certain states may be.
What remains unknown, however, is the true origin of the forced displacement rhetoric and how any rational leader could openly endorse it. Donald Trump floated the idea regarding Gaza, and Netanyahu quickly embraced it, extending the concept to the West Bank and even Palestinian citizens of Israel. But where could 7 or 8 million people go, and who would be willing to accept them? Even if the forced displacement of half a million Gazans were somehow orchestrated, what about the rest? Would they not continue to be a persistent challenge for Israel?
These are unrealistic notions, yet they reveal two fundamental truths: an overwhelming sense of Israeli impunity, bolstered by unwavering American support, and the deeply ingrained belief that Israel can only achieve security if Arabs and Muslims are absent from the region.
However, behind closed doors, ongoing negotiations suggest that Trump’s proposal was more of a bargaining chip, whereas for Israel, displacement remains an ideological objective. Trump now appears to be retreating in favor of an Egyptian-backed settlement endorsed by Arab and Muslim states. Ironically, the renewed Israeli assault on Gaza may, contrary to Israeli expectations, end up reinforcing the Egyptian solution rather than undermining it.
Lately, discussions have centered on Turkish power and its military presence in Syria, with reports of negotiations involving Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa regarding the establishment of a Turkish military base near Palmyra. Hard-line Israeli voices are warning that war with Turkey over Syria is inevitable, signaling an ever-expanding theater of conflict.
While these extreme views remain limited in influence for now, Israel is unwavering in its belief that an attack on Iran’s nuclear program is imperative before the opportunity slips away. Israeli officials were caught off guard when, despite his harsh sanctions on Iran, Trump secretly reached out to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei with an offer to negotiate—albeit on American terms. This was something Israel categorically opposed, insisting that military action, not diplomacy, was the only viable course.
A permanent war in Gaza. A looming conflict in Syria. Ongoing hostilities with Hezbollah in Lebanon. A military campaign against the Houthis. And the possibility of direct confrontations with Iran and Turkey. This is the reality of Israel’s regional strategy—a comprehensive war on multiple fronts. But can such a war be won? And if, as Netanyahu claims, Israel seeks to reshape the Middle East, when will it finally achieve the security it so desperately seeks?
Radwan al-Sayed (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)