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(Moti Milrod/Maan News)
Less than two weeks passed with relative calm after Israel completed its withdrawal from Gaza.
Now, the situation is close to spiraling out of control.
While Israeli and Palestinian officials are exchanging accusations regarding the recent escalation, many are reviewing the pros and cons of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, wondering what, if anything, improved after the pullout.
The escalation has so far resulted in armed Palestinian factions launching dozens of missiles on Israeli communities in pre-1967 territories. Israel, in the meantime, resumed its policy of targeted killings, restarted military operations in Gaza, and has arrested more than 350 Palestinians.
Israel’s evacuation of civilians and troops from Gaza was meticulously planned for nearly two years. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon claimed that the measure, which he called the ‘Disengagement Plan,’ would bring peace, prosperity and security to both sides.
But now, even supporters of the pullout are having doubts about its prospects, and wondering whether the Gaza withdrawal plan was nothing more than a calamitous plan doomed to failure.
Nabil Abu Rudeina, the longtime right-hand man of late Palestinian Authority (P.A.) Chairman Yassir Arafat and now the spokesman for incumbent leader Mahmoud ‘Abbas, said he does not believe the withdrawal plan has failed. At least not entirely.
“We consider the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a step forward but it’s not enough, especially while Gaza is like a big prison and the borders are still closed,” Abu Rudeina said. “It seems the Israelis are trying to make Gaza first and last which cannot be accepted by us or the Americans or the Quartet.”
Presenting the official Palestinian view, Abu Rudeina said that while the Palestinians want to go forward with the peace process, the Israelis are reluctant to implement the agreement and are hampering the process with incursions and targeted killings.
“The escalation is due to the fact that the Israelis are facing domestic problems and we have nothing to do with that,” he said.
But Mark Regev, a spokesman for Israel’s Foreign Ministry, sees things in a different light. He claims that it is armed groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who reject a two-state solution, that are impeding the process.
“We urge the Palestinian Authority to act now to take the gun away from Hamas, to prevent them from having the ability to torpedo the peace process whenever they see fit,” Regev said.
But this is easier said than done, Abu Rudeina implied.
“We are against any attacks, especially if it’s against civilians, whether Israeli or Palestinian,” he said. “Israelis for the last five years have ruined all our security branches. They ruined all our capabilities. We’re in a process of rebuilding all these branches so that we can follow up our commitments, but the Israelis aren’t helping us enough to rebuild our forces.”
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Palestinians search wreckage after an Israeli air strike kills an Islamic Jihad leader in Gaza (Wesam Saleh/Maan News)
The basic argument over the past few months as to why the P.A. is not dismantling armed factions boils down to whether the Palestinian leadership is incapable of doing so, or unwilling.
Abu Rudeina said this is a near to impossible task, due to the inadequate security system. “We’re doing our best and our policy is clear: we want to see one authority and one gun,” he said. But he added that the Israeli government should not place obstacles in their way. “We cannot face Israel and the fanatics at the same time.”
Israel contends that in the current situation there is a way, but not a will.
“We think it’s not a matter of capability,” Regev said. “It’s a question of political determination. We understand that they can’t do everything but they’re not doing what they can do.”
As is often the case, the reality probably lies somewhere in between.
“It can’t be easy for [the Palestinian Authority] to control the situation,” said Professor Yoram Peri, head of the Chaim Herzog Institute for Media, Politics and Society at Tel Aviv University. “But in any case, they don’t have enough evidence to prove to the general public that this is a worthwhile move.”
Israel, he said, should give the Palestinian leadership more incentives, such as economic investments. These will enable the Palestinian leadership to convince the public that an agreement with Israel is to its benefit.
They probably can clamp down on Hamas to some extent, Peri said, but no one can guarantee that it will pay off.
Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by Israel and the United States, but beyond its armed activities, it is gaining considerable political power. In January, Hamas will participate in the Palestinian parliamentary elections for the first time.
Peri suggests that it is plausible to assume that the P.A. is reluctant to clamp down on Hamas because disarming a popular political group might work in Hamas’s favor in the election.
In the months leading up to the withdrawal, a number of security experts expressed concern that the pullout will increase terror rather than quell it, and that Gaza will become a safe haven for terrorists.
“We never ignored such fears,” Regev said. “Everyone was aware that leaving Gaza involved certain risks and we were aware of them from the beginning.”
From an analytical standpoint, a continuation of the violence was even anticipated, according to Peri. “The fact that Palestinians are up for parliamentary elections, and that Israel might also be facing elections in the aftermath of the withdrawal will no doubt have an impact on what is happening on the ground,” he said.
“Everyone estimated that the year after the disengagement will be a year of diplomatic stagnation. It’s a year of elections and during an election year there is no diplomatic progress.”
“The question is,” Peri concluded, “will the lack of advancement immediately cause the situation to deteriorate into violence or will it be kept on low boil so that after the elections a new move will begin?”