After three battles against Israel in the last decade, are the conditions ripe for another conflict?
“If there is a confrontation, we will crush [Israel],” affirmed Hamas’ chief in Gaza Yahya Sinwar on Wednesday, in his first statements to journalists since assuming power in the Strip in February. He then qualified the comment, making clear that the Palestinian Islamist movement was presently not interested in renewed conflict.
Hamas and Israel have fought three battles over the past decade, culminating with the fifty-day war in the summer of 2014. Since then, the border with Gaza has remained relatively quiet, with only intermittent rockets being fired from the Strip, an act which, according to Israeli military doctrine, is responded to with targeted air strikes on Hamas assets. The prevailing calm, however, is potentially deceiving and may, as the adage suggests, simply be a prelude to a coming storm.
The Israel Defense Forces estimates that Hamas has restored its arsenal to pre-2014 levels, when the group had approximately 12,000 missiles.Hamas has been able to resupply by shifting the production of its rockets locally, as many of the group’s smuggling tunnels, emanating from the Sinai Peninsula, have been destroyed by Egypt. Additionally, the blockade on the Strip enforced by Jerusalem and Cairo makes it difficult for Hamas to import weapons from abroad.
The movement has also been actively reconstructing its network of subterranean attack tunnels, which have been used to infiltrate Israel, while investing in a naval force with the aim of breaching Israeli territory by sea in the future. Overall, Hamas has about 40,000 combatants led by the notorious Mohammad Deif, who, despite repeated assassination attempts, reportedly continues to run the organization’s military operations and has been instrumental in rebuilding related infrastructure.
According to Brig. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Nuriel, the former director of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau at the Israeli Prime Minster’s Office (2007-2012), Hamas thus continues to pose a strategic threat to Israel. “The tunnels are the most immediate and serious problem,” he explained to The Media Line, “but this does not [minimize the potential damage] that can be caused by rockets and mortars; rather, Israel has measures to contend with these. There are also Hamas sleeper cells within the West Bank and even within Israel which can be called upon to take action.”
Nevertheless, Nuriel, an Associate at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, believes the IDF has achieved a significant level of deterrence. “[After the last war,] Hamas understood that it would pay a high price in a future conflict. However, at some point this will no longer be relevant.” Therefore, he outlined two potential courses of action—”Hamas can keep doing what it has always done and achieve nothing, or look for another formula involving a long-term ceasefire. Israel continues to offer Hamas relief in exchange for its demilitarization and is working with moderate Sunni states to find a solution.
“But Hamas needs to make a decision,” Nuriel concluded, “it can set fire to the region in a matter of one week, or accept the concept of a [durable] truce—and ten years, for example, in the Middle East is a long time and many things can be changed.”
Speaking to The Media Line, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, the former Director-General of Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs and previously the head of the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence, agreed that “the good relations Israel has with the Gulf States works to its advantage, as it has the effect of putting pressure on Hamas to not renew hostilities.” He highlighted a push by the United Arab Emirates to neutralize Hamas—and nullify Qatari influence in Gaza—through its support of Mohammad Dahlan, a former Fatah strongman who is popular in the Strip.
As per claims that Hamas has moderated its positions, especially in the wake of the drafting of its new charter, Kuperwasser explained this away as a mere marketing tool. “While there is a bit more of a realistic approach, there has been no ideological change. It may simply help sell some goods in the west.” Moreover, he highlighted Sinwar’s “hawkish” background in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ radical military wing, “which is committed to the jihad.” Sinwar spent twenty-two years in Israeli prison prior to his release in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner-exchange deal.
Gaza’s rulers currently face other significant obstacles which make renewed conflict with Israel unlikely for the moment. Internally, there remains a deep divide between the Islamist movement and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who recently imposed a number of punitive measures on Hamas, including appealing to Israel to reduce the amount of electricity provided to the Strip (in the result, Gazans presently receive only 2-6 hours of power per day). Abbas also moved to cut payments to Hamas-affiliated workers; this, amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Palestinian enclave that is putting additional pressure on the leadership there.
In response, Hamas has, not surprisingly, been wooing Abbas and sent a delegation to Ramallah this week to meet with PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah. Two days later, in his press conference with journalists, Sinwar expressed a willingness to dissolve an administrative committee set up in March that essentially governs Gaza in place of the PA.
Externally, Hamas has become relatively isolated and is thus taking measures to enhance its regional status. While Gaza retains the backing of Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’ recent disassociation from the Muslim Brotherhood risks straining these ties. Doha is also currently under fire from Gulf states for supporting the Palestinian group.
Hamas is therefore again turning towards Tehran, with which relations soured in 2011 after Hamas refused to support the Iranian-backed Assad regime at the outbreak of the Syrian war. Earlier this month a Hamas delegation attended President Hassan Rouhani’s inauguration, with consultations reportedly having included meetings with representatives of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is responsible for devising and executing the Islamic Republic’s military strategy abroad. According to a statement by Hamas, “the visit opened [up] a new page in bilateral relations aimed at confronting the common enemy [Israel] and supporting Palestine.”
For its part, Iran signaled a willingness to reconcile with Hamas following the removal from power of Khaled Meshaal, who was replaced by Ismail Haniyeh as head of Hamas’ political bureau. In this respect, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reaffirmed to the Hamas delegation his country’s “principled” and “unchangeable commitment to the Palestinian cause. Along with Sinwar, who assumed Haniyeh’s prior role in Gaza, they are viewed by Tehran as more accommodating.
Hamas’ ties with Egypt are also on the mend, with Sinwar claiming to the press that “breakthroughs” have been made. Previously, Egyptian President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi waged a concerted campaign to weaken Hamas, which he accuses of supporting the Islamist insurrection against Cairo that has persisted since the fall of Mohammad Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood-backed government in July 2013. Yet Hamas members have reportedly travelled to Cairo on multiple occasions this year and tangible results are seemingly in the offing. For example, the Rafah border crossing between the Egyptian-controlled Sinai and Gaza was opened for exits this month for the first time in half a year. Moreover, Sinwar claimed that Sisi agreed to open the border to further movement for the Eid al-Adha holiday in two weeks’ time.
Hamas’ improving standing could spell trouble for Israel, which is therefore taking its own counter-measures. The IDF is currently building a potentially game-changing barrier around Gaza, aimed at neutralizing the threat from Hamas’ tunnels. The project includes the construction of a concrete wall, fitted with sensors, that extends dozens of meters into the ground.
Yossi Kuperwasser, who currently directs the Project on Regional Middle East Developments at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, told The Media Line that “while Israel has apparently accepted Hamas’ de facto rule in Gaza, the IDF nonetheless makes a concerted attempt to prevent Hamas from smuggling weapons into the enclave and to destroy its capabilities.
“The fewer options Hamas has,” he concluded, “the less likely there will be renewed hostilities.”
But the back-and-forth maneuvering can obfuscate a stark—and dangerous—reality; namely, that one wrong move by either side, however little or perhaps unintentional, can easily set off a chain of events that leads to the next unwanted confrontation.