It is far too early to draw firm conclusions about Gaza’s next moves after Israel announced it had recovered the body of Ran Gvili—the last remaining hostage—who was killed in clashes with Hamas fighters in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and whose body was taken into Gaza.
Many expected a shift once the hostage issue was fully closed. Instead, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration that, “after all the hostages are back,” his next step will be to disarm Hamas has darkened the prevailing mood.
Israel spent two years waging a punishing war across the Gaza Strip without achieving that objective. So, what, exactly, would persuade anyone that it could now disarm Hamas within a few months? The more plausible explanation is political timing: Netanyahu appears to be prolonging negotiations with the American administration over implementing phase two of the ceasefire agreement, hoping future developments will produce a US green light to resume the war under the banner of disarmament.
At the same time, US President Donald Trump has issued what amounts to an ultimatum, expected soon to be formalized, warning Hamas that if it does not surrender its weapons to a multinational force in Gaza, Washington would ask Israel to do the job. That is the opening Netanyahu is waiting for—but he is not alone.
On the ground, Hamas commanders seem equally eager for renewed fighting. They insist Israel—the “Zionist enemy,” as they call it—failed to achieve its war aims and argue that the resistance, meaning Hamas and its armed men, still has the capacity to fight and inflict heavy casualties on the Israeli military.
Such rhetoric serves Netanyahu well. He can cite it as justification for restarting operations and as leverage against President Trump’s ceasefire push, arguing that without disarming Hamas, no arrangement in Gaza will hold.
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President Trump, though, has not fully embraced Netanyahu’s pessimism. He uses more diplomatic, forward-looking language, attempting to keep the Israeli prime minister within the ceasefire framework—even if the underlying tensions remain obvious.
Meanwhile, Hamas political figures based abroad—many in Qatar, Lebanon, or Turkey—have recently offered moderate-sounding interviews about reshaping the movement into a political party rather than an armed faction. Mohammad Nazzal, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said he wished the US would listen to Hamas rather than hear about it. He bragged about the intelligence information that Hamas passed to Israel through the mediators about the whereabouts of Gvili’s body. Nevertheless, reports indicated Israel’s intelligence services already knew the burial site from an Islamic Jihad operative detained and questioned by the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency.
Another political bureau member, Mousa Abu Marzouk, argued that Hamas should remain in charge of Gaza. “Hamas is the only Palestinian party that can guarantee that Israel’s southern towns won’t be shelled by mortars or rockets from Gaza,” he said. He warned that removing Hamas could leave Gaza fractured, resembling post-Saddam Iraq, with rival factions competing for control.
A well-connected source said most members of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) believe it will take time before they can meaningfully begin their work. For now, they see Netanyahu as deliberately slowing progress to disrupt President Trump’s plans, because he still wants what he promised years ago: complete victory. In Netanyahu’s terms, that means dismantling Hamas, disarming its military wing, and preventing any Palestinian body linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization from governing Gaza.
On Feb. 2, Israel reopened the Rafah Crossing between Gaza and Egypt under a tightly controlled, pedestrian-only system coordinated with Egypt and the European Union’s border mission, after a pilot run exposed logistical problems. The initial phase prioritizes medical evacuations and a limited number of preapproved returnees, with daily crossings expected to remain small, while commercial goods remain excluded. Israel is not operating the crossing day to day, but it retains decisive security leverage through advance approvals, surveillance, and biometric screening.
Sources close to NCAG described the reopening as political rather than humanitarian, arguing that it preserves Israeli dominance over security decisions, with the Shin Bet maintaining broad oversight of who may enter or exit.
Those same sources said the committee faces a dilemma. It must quickly improve humanitarian conditions and respond to urgent needs, yet it operates under deep skepticism and shifting Israeli policies that threaten its ability to assume real authority.
Several obstacles cloud NCAG’s prospects. Winning the trust of Palestinian leaders is difficult, and many residents see the committee’s members as technocrats with limited power to govern the territory effectively.
Security poses an even greater question. Who will protect NCAG members inside Gaza? Hamas has offered to hand over civilian control while keeping its fighters responsible for protection. Would the committee accept Hamas security? Certainly not. Would the US or any other country accept such an arrangement? No way.
Looking beyond the immediate crisis, Hamas appears focused on survival. It has moved a significant number of fighters into its police force, which has governed Gaza since 2007, apparently to secure continued salaries under President Trump’s proposed Board of Peace framework. Others may be pushed into early retirement with incentives.
Finances drive much of this calculation. Hamas no longer receives the same level of Qatari funding it once did, and Turkey has reduced support as it positions itself as a stakeholder in maintaining a quieter Gaza and potentially joining a multinational force.
Viewed through that lens, Hamas sees NCAG as a financial lifeline. If Hamas-run police units are folded into an official Palestinian Authority structure, the committee would assume payroll obligations Hamas can no longer sustain. For the movement, integration offers a path to survival—even if its formal control fades.