The long-anticipated June 30 withdrawal, part of a two-year U.S. withdrawal plan, has prompted heated debate over the accomplishments – or, according to some, lack thereof – of the U.S. Military during the United States’ six-year military presence in Iraq. The primary concern now, however, centers on how Iraqi forces will cope with regaining total control of their violence-plagued country.
Although the task seems onerous, some say the transition will not be as difficult as speculated: Iraqis have been preparing for this event for the last few years.
“Although the U.S. will be keeping combat troops in Iraq until 2010, the visibility of their presence in Iraq’s cities has been diminishing for the past two years – they have not taken on a core peacekeeping role, for example, between opposing sectarian parties,” Dr. Glen Rangwala, author, University Lecturer and fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, told the Media Line.
“That role has been taken by the Iraqi police, the army and the supportive militias, which, for all their flaws, have managed to take on a commanding presence in urban areas.”
A major issue within the Iraqi security forces is cooperation between the different factions. According to Rangwala, the extent and success of collaboration between the security forces will be integral to counterinsurgency efforts after the withdrawal takes place. Failure to cooperate is bound to have dire consequences, he believes.
U.S. Forces set up the Sahwa militia group to aid in combating insurgents, but because the militia is prominently Sunni, there has been much conflict between Sahwa and the Shiite-majority Iraqi police forces. This has meant that the U.S. Army has acted as a buffer between Iraq’s two main security forces, which have been at odds since Sahwa’s inception.
“The core issue for the Iraqi leadership in assessing their security capabilities is the relationship with the Awakening (Sahwa) movement, which has become the major security force in much of western Iraq and large parts of Baghdad,” Dr. Rangwala explained. “If they can be integrated successfully into the official security forces, the challengers to the state can be isolated and contained.”
“The problem, though, is there remains a huge level of mistrust between most of the Sahwa groups and the Maliki government. Members of Maliki’s government still see the Sahwa as groups of insurgents and criminals, but if they don’t manage to co-opt them, they won’t have the ability to govern much of Iraq.”
There were reports in March that Al-Qaeda had been infiltrating the militia, which did little to assuage the already rife distrust leveled at the militia by Iraqi police. Many feared that the animosity between the two groups was so intense that a civil war would be unavoidable.
“These problems may have bad effects for our situation,” Maha Asmail, an Iraqi former translator for the U.S. Army, told The Media Line. “Sahwa has made very good efforts for stability in Iraq, but the officials in Iraq do not want Sahwa to continue their work.”
The translator is, however, optimistic about the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces themselves.
“They are well equipped now, and they have proved their ability to detain many terrorists without Americans – without any help from coalition forces,” Asmail said.
“They are very educated, brave, and well-trained. Of course they have been trained by the coalition forces, but they have done many missions without the coalition forces,” she added.
In addition to the conflicting security factions, the balance of power within Iraqi politics will also inevitably shift with the absence of U.S. forces.
“The autonomy arrangements for the northern Kurdish region have been held in place by two factors: the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 and international guarantees to the Kurds to protect their status,” Dr. Rangwala said. “However, the Maliki government has shown itself to be more than willing to disregard the constitution when it suits its interests.”
“That leaves the Kurds exposed – and the Iraqi government may be tempted to take a more strident position on disputes such as those over control over the oil fields and the status of Kirkuk, with the potential for violent confrontation with the Kurdish peshmerga forces.”
U.S. military sources, however, disagree.
“Any sovereign nation needs control over its natural resources,” insists General Montgomery C. Meigs, Visiting Professor of Strategy and Military Ops at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. “I can’t believe it won’t be a top priority of the current government. They’re going to have to negotiate from a position of hardball to make all that work.”
As for the likelihood of the Kurds’ increased vulnerability, General Meigs denied that their safety would be in peril after the U.S. withdrawal.
When asked if the U.S. military would leave Iraq triumphant or defeated, Meigs replied, “We don’t know yet. It’s not over, so you can’t say yet. So far, they’ve been given the disadvantages they started with.”
“There’s an awful lot to be proud of. But it’s not over – everybody knows that,” he said.