Territorial aspirations and sectarian feuding may hamper the disparate assault groups
The Islamic State (ISIS) made too many enemies. When its black banners and white Toyota Corollas swept across Iraq’s northwestern plains in an orgy of bloodletting, a lot of different factions paid the price. Two weeks into the battle for the Mosul, as Iraqi troops entered the city for the first time in two and a half years, that abundance of adversaries can be seen in the flesh in the form of the army gaining ISIS territory, meter by meter, street by street.
Often described as soldiers of the Iraqi army fighting with Kurdish allies, the task force involved in the operation to retake Mosul is in fact a kaleidoscope of different ethnic militias, political parties and sectarian agendas.
The factions can be loosely split into around four or five camps: the official Iraqi security forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), viewed as a terrorist organization by Turkey and the United States. Add to this mix a number of smaller local players and the complexity starts to become apparent.
Urban combat operations are about the most dangerous environment for soldiers. Just how serious a challenge Mosul represents can be seen in the difficulty the US military experienced fighting in Fallujah in 2004. If a single unified fighting force, with the technology and training that the US Marine Corps wields, suffered so many casualties there how might a divided army fare in the coming weeks and months in Mosul?
At the head of the operation is the Iraqi army and police, holding territory to the south and north of Mosul. After its 2014 collapse and retreat from a numerically inferior ISIS, the army was castigated as a sham organization of civilians dressed as soldiers merely in uniform for the money. A lot of work has been done to rebuilt the force since then. Most notably in the Counter Terrorism Service’s black clad Golden Division. Given extensive training by the US military, these soldiers are spearheading the entire operation and have been central in punching a foothold into the southeast of the city.
Next there is the Peshmerga, the military of the semi-autonomous Kurdish zone in the north of Iraq, who are mostly deployed to the east of Mosul. Actually split between two separate political organizations, the Peshmerga are experienced fighters and used the collapse of the Iraqi army to expand the territory they held prior to 2014.
Morale among the Peshmerga is high and it is working closely with units of the Iraqi army, Kelesh Shemali, an officer taking rest in Bashiqa away from the front line for a few days, told The Media Line. “It’s a very nice feeling when you are clearing the cities of monsters like ISIS,” Shemali said, before adding that he was still concerned for people held by the jihadist group.
To further cloud the picture, the PKK, a separate Kurdish force are also present on the battlefield around Mosul. These units are located on the western axis, close to Mount Sinjar, and have not taken an active role in the fighting yet, Shemali said.
Mount Sinjar became internationally known when members of the Yazidi community sought refuge and were trapped on the mountain by Islamic State fighters.
Under which banner the PKK are fighting is ambiguous, Akeel Abbas, a political analyst with the American University of Iraq Suliamani, told The Media Line. It is possible the Iraqi government allowed the PKK to become involved as it has support among Iraq’s Yazidi community, Abbas suggested, adding, “there is basically a green light for the PKK to get into the fight,” from Iraqi authorities.
The second suggestion is that the PKK are tied in with the PMU, Abbas said. Sworn enemy of the Turkish government, no matter under which flag it operates the PKK’s involvement is likely to anger Ankara.
The PMU, sometimes referred to as Hashd Al-Sha’abi or simply as Shia militias, are another of the big players on the field. Actually an umbrella organization, the PMU is made up of an array of mostly Shia paramilitary groups, many of which have close ties with Iran and some of which fought against US troops in the previous decade. This force is operating to the southwest of Mosul, moving north towards the satellite town of Tal Afar.
Like the Peshmerga, the PMU have been banned by the Iraqi army from actually entering Mosul, one of the many sticking points that could hamstring the military operation. Of all the militia groups taking place only one, the Nineveh Guards, have been permitted to enter the city and support the Iraqi security forces directly. The Guards are a force of 5,000 fighters closely tied to and trained by the Turkish military, Abbas said. Many of the fighters are local men, Sunni Turkmen, from the city of Mosul.
Such a vast array of groups leads to a number of political problems. The first of which is the danger that the collective operation against ISIS becomes an individualistic grab for land. “Wherever the Peshmerga stick their flags will be the future border of the Kurdistan regional government,” Michael Stephens, a research fellow of Middle East studies with the Royal United Services Institute, explained. Due to the fact that political power extended only so far as the territory held by one’s troops, many of the actors will be out to snatch up what territory they can get, Stephens told The Media Line.
Sensitivities between Sunni and Shia sectarian groups are another landmine for the conglomeration to avoid. The sweeping victory of ISIS and its rush into Iraq in the first place was enabled by the resentment of local Sunnis against a perceived occupation of their cities by the Shia dominated Iraqi army. This is half the reason the PMU have been barred from entering Mosul.
The other half is the long list of accusations of human rights abuses perpetuated against Sunnis in areas the PMU have operated in previously. “Civilians who remain under the rule of ISIS are scared of the PMU, despite the assurances of the faction’s leaders regarding their safety,” Shemali, the Peshmerga captain noted. There is a perception that despite regional leaders declaring that the PMU should not enter Mosul, its commanders still have ambitions to do so, the officer said.
It is for this reason that the PMU movement towards the mostly Sunni Turkman town of Tal Afar is being seen as a possible flash point. The Turkish government has expressed concerns about this already.
But it is there concern over the operations of the PKK that the Turkish government is falling into dispute with Baghdad. The Turkish government is concerned at the prospect of the PKK forming a safe haven for itself in northern Iraq close to the borders with Turkey and Syria. Ankara “made statements that the border would not be considered a barrier to Turkish military operations against the PKK,” Stephens said, noting that the Iraqi government was angered at rhetoric undermining its sovereignty.
US military planners are attempting, so far successfully, to stitch this complex alliance together. Through division of labour, keeping different forces operating in separate parts of the operational space, the US is trying to avoid complications. Although the US cannot necessarily expect its instructions to always be followed by the disparate commanders, it knows that they cannot advance without air support, Stephens said, a process he characterized as, “basically air strike diplomacy.”
The most important question is will all this division add up to a tactical advantage for the Islamic State. Not so, Stephens argued, as all the players are at least united by their desire to see the demise of ISIS.
“The noose is tightening by the day… this is a one-way military process, if not a one way political process,” he suggested.