‘Genuine Autonomy Under Moroccan Sovereignty’: UN Renewal Points Talks Toward Rabat’s Plan
The Security Council’s 11–0 vote with three abstentions and Algeria absent reflects a sharper US line that channels negotiations toward Morocco’s 2007 proposal while keeping MINURSO in place
The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2797 on Oct. 31, renewing the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for one year and stating that “genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty” could be the most feasible solution. The vote was 11 in favor, none against, with Russia, China, and Pakistan abstaining; Algeria did not participate. In practical terms, the remaining members—the US, UK, France, Denmark, Greece, Guyana, Panama, South Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and Somalia—voted yes.
Earlier this year, Washington moved from cautious signaling to overt agenda-setting. In April, the US said talks on Western Sahara should proceed solely based on Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty; on Oct. 22, a US-backed draft began circulating to center autonomy language in this year’s renewal. Following the Oct. 31 vote, Council language now points negotiations toward Morocco’s autonomy plan while extending MINURSO.
Across the region, the political context remains tense. Algeria severed relations with Morocco in August 2021 and closed its airspace to Moroccan aircraft the following month; in September 2024, Algiers also reimposed visas on Moroccan nationals. In Europe, the legal landscape is still contested: in October 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union upheld annulments affecting EU-Morocco deals that covered Western Sahara, complicating trade until the territory’s status is clarified. Politically, momentum has tilted toward Rabat, with France in July 2024 and the UK in June 2025 aligning with Washington in backing autonomy as the preferred path.
Along the frontier, the land border has been shut since 1994, and there are still no ambassadors in place. Neither capital has outlined a reopening roadmap beyond exploratory back-channels, and any change would likely begin with low-visibility technical steps rather than headline gestures.
So far, what we know is that the US has brokered direct talks between Algeria and Morocco. There is no indication of specific requests by Washington to Algeria, nor of any exchanges or offers.
Against that backdrop, two seasoned observers describe both the limits of US leverage over Algiers and the narrowing diplomatic space for Sahrawi aspirations. “So far, what we know is that the US has brokered direct talks between Algeria and Morocco. There is no indication of specific requests by Washington to Algeria, nor of any exchanges or offers,” said Riccardo Fabiani, interim program director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, speaking to The Media Line.
From Washington’s vantage point, the strategy is now explicit. In April, the State Department said Morocco’s autonomy plan is the “only basis” for negotiations, confirming that the 2020 US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty remains policy. At the UN, a US-backed draft circulated on Oct. 22 sought to center autonomy language in this year’s MINURSO renewal—an approach that faced objections from Algiers and the Polisario Front, the Sahrawi independence movement. (Following the Oct. 31 vote, Council language now points negotiations toward Morocco’s autonomy plan while extending MINURSO.)
Washington’s leverage mixes practical incentives with measured pressure. Among the incentives are expanded intelligence sharing on Sahel and Libya security issues, as well as financing from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) for energy-efficiency upgrades and pilot green-hydrogen projects. At the UN level, procedural steps are designed to keep humanitarian and liaison efforts—such as family visits, de-escalation channels, and limited confidence-building activities—going without forcing a decision on sovereignty.
The pressure component relies on export-control scrutiny and the potential reach of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) over large Russian defense transactions, for which exemptions remain a political decision. None of these mechanisms compels a policy shift on Western Sahara, but together they define the boundaries of US influence.
Still, Algeria’s calculus is rooted at home. Fabiani argued any visible softening in tone “is more likely to be an adaptation strategy vis-à-vis the new administration in Washington,” adding that “Algeria demands that Morocco officially apologize for its alleged involvement in the Pegasus spyware and letting an Israeli official accuse Algeria from its own territory. Neither event is likely to happen.” He added that the latter refers to public criticism of Algeria voiced in Rabat by Israel’s foreign minister in 2021—one of several flashpoints that preceded the rupture.
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Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and program director for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, cautioned that American pressure has not historically moved Algiers on first-order principles. “The United States seems to be taking the Moroccan line that the Polisario is simply an arm of the Algerian government, effectively denying agency to this national liberation movement and including the largely nonviolent resistance to the occupation within Western Sahara,” he told The Media Line.
He continued: “Obviously, the United States has a fair amount of leverage over most countries in light of its economic, military, and diplomatic power. But Algiers has always taken a strong nationalist position in its foreign policy, regardless of pressure from the United States, France, or anyone else. As a major supplier of natural gas, it has some leverage, particularly with the limited supplies due to the sanctions on Russia. I’m afraid I do not know the inside story about what kind of pressure Washington is giving,” he added.
Overall, however, I don’t see them compromising on Western Sahara. … All the factions seem to be pretty much united in their support for the independence struggle.
On internal constraints, Zunes saw tactical diversity but strategic unity. “I don’t know much about the internal workings of the Algerian government. … Some factions may be open to some softening of relations. Overall, however, I don’t see them compromising on Western Sahara. … For decades, people have been speculating that at some point Algiers will abandon the Polisario, but they never have, and there is no indication they will. All the factions seem to be pretty much united in their support for the independence struggle.”
Fabiani was equally skeptical that a rhetorical thaw would quickly translate into concrete steps such as airspace access, visas, border coordination, or UN roundtables. “While a change in attitude is a welcome change, it is not enough to modify the current bilateral dynamic,” he said.
In Rabat, sovereignty is treated as nonnegotiable. The state has poured sustained investment into Laayoune–Dakhla infrastructure and frames the autonomy plan as the only “realistic” basis for talks. That political consensus—across palace, government, and security services—limits space for concessions on any referendum framing.
A practical map of decision-making helps explain why. A tone shift in Algiers would require at least tacit alignment across the presidency, the ANP high command, and the Foreign Affairs apparatus—each attuned to nationalist red lines after years of Hirak-era sensitivities. Even pragmatists risk domestic costs if any softening is framed as backtracking on Western Sahara. Energy leverage and longstanding defense ties with Moscow further stiffen the posture, as diversification carries political and financial costs; any recalibration will be gradual and tightly messaged.
Regarding Western Sahara being incorporated by Morocco, outcomes hinge less on legal form than on Algerian consent. “If the incorporation happens with Algeria’s consent, that would pave the way to a new security architecture in the region. … If it happens without Algeria’s consent, there is a risk of indirect escalation related to the Polisario continuing to target Moroccan troops, but from Algerian territory,” said Fabiani.
Even a UN-blessed autonomy deal, according to Zunes, would not soften Algiers’ stance. “So, I assume your question is regarding whether the United Nations accepts Morocco’s so-called autonomy plan. In that event, I still don’t see Algeria shifting because they would still recognize that, even with the okay of the UN, it is an illegal action and an illegitimate recognition of Moroccan expansionism,” he noted.
Regional and multilateral dimensions also loom. “If the UN recognized it, the European Court would no longer block the trade agreements. … I’m not sure how the African Union would deal with it. … There would probably be some withdrawals of recognition. There have already been some. Some countries would hold on in principle, but others would give in.”
Diplomacy is not an option, given the likely resolution’s language that tries to put the Polisario into a corner
Both experts also see a narrowing space for diplomacy. “The Polisario faces a dilemma: reacting to the next resolution simply by refusing diplomacy or by escalating violence. … Diplomacy is not an option, given the likely resolution’s language that tries to put the Polisario into a corner,” noted Fabiani.
The professor added that the armed struggle remains low-intensity and stalemated. “The armed struggle is more propaganda of the deed. … Even while resuming the armed struggle, the Polisario has been working consistently on diplomacy, but Morocco, emboldened by US recognition, refuses to have any talks that don’t assume there’s already Moroccan sovereignty, so it continues to be a stalemate there,” he said.
Near-term confidence-building measures look remote if the Council’s language hardens. “In light of the current resolution language, no confidence-building measure is likely. The Polisario simply cannot accept a resolution that presents autonomy as the only option and does not include any reference to self-determination,” said Fabiani.
Zunes sketched steps that could matter, even if unlikely. “Morocco could allow the civilian elements of MINURSO, which they expelled a few years ago, to return. … They could release some political prisoners and lessen political repression in the occupied territories, but I don’t think that’s realistic. And again, I don’t see Algeria changing its position at all,” he explained.
Third parties are also involved in this scenario, aside from the US and Europe, such as the United Arab Emirates. “The UAE is very active in influencing external actors and pushing them to support Morocco. But the reality is that the current dynamic is really shaped by the US, with the Europeans following Washington’s lead and the other actors not daring to oppose it,” Fabiani concluded.
Zunes added a broader lineup. “The Arab monarchies have always backed Morocco, and the French and Spaniards are increasingly doing so as well, and they haven’t shifted the Algerian position. The Russians will likely continue providing arms and other support for the Algerians. … With its hydrocarbon resources, Algeria is better positioned to purchase sophisticated weapons than Morocco,” he concluded.
