The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has removed the most powerful figure in Iran’s political system. His absence has created a sudden vacuum at the top of a system built around centralized clerical authority—and it has thrown the question of who truly holds power into immediate focus.
In Iran’s political system, the supreme leader sits above elected institutions and wields ultimate authority over key state bodies, including the security establishment. Under Iran’s constitution, the Assembly of Experts is responsible for selecting the next supreme leader, and analysts have debated how the transition will be handled in the interim.
But Iran expert Beni Sabti, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, said the decisive influence lies elsewhere: within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its affiliated networks, including the Basij.
Sabti, who was born in Iran in 1972 and raised under the Islamic Revolution before escaping to Israel in 1987, said the post-Khamenei power picture will be driven less by any single institution than by overlapping actors with deep ties to the Guard. “Most of these figures always come from the IRGC. They have some roots in the IRGC … and also the IRGC as a whole, as an entity, influences a lot.”
He argued that the Guard’s role today is markedly different from the period following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death in 1989. “It was not like this when Khomeini died, because he kept them limited,” he explained. “But Khamenei was in their alliance, and they were his allies, so they have a kind of symbiotic relationship.”
In practical terms, Sabti said the IRGC is “behind the curtain, for sure.” While the Assembly of Experts remains the constitutional mechanism for selecting a successor, he argued that the process functions largely as a ratifying exercise rather than an independent decision point.
These councils of experts … are also very symbolic
“These councils of experts … are also very symbolic,” he said. “Eighty-eight very old clerics, that they have to decide who can be the next leader. They waited for someone to tell them what to do.” He argued that the Assembly historically followed the guidance of the sitting leader and is structurally dependent on the system it is meant to oversee. “They have been receiving salaries for so many years from the leader, so they are kind of the slaves of the system.”
Sabti said he expects the same dynamic to persist. “They will wait for someone to tell them what to vote for. Maybe the council, or IRGC, all together.”
Give the gift of hope
We practice what we preach:
accurate, fearless journalism. But we can't do it alone.
- On the ground in Gaza, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and more
- Our program trained more than 100 journalists
- Calling out fake news and reporting real facts
- On the ground in Gaza, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and more
- Our program trained more than 100 journalists
- Calling out fake news and reporting real facts
Join us.
Support The Media Line. Save democracy.
Even the presidency, in his assessment, carries limited independent weight in the succession period. “President Pezeshkian is a good puppet for now to do his job, and after that, they can kick him out and give him just a symbolic job, because he’s not a cleric. As you see, he doesn’t have any influence,” he said.
Sabti’s central argument is that the outcome will hinge less on constitutional procedure than on whether the Revolutionary Guard remains cohesive. “Yes, there is a chance that there can be some divisions in the IRGC,” he said. He argued that the depth of any internal split depends heavily on sustained external pressure. “It depends on if US and Israel continue to try to destroy as much as possible of this regime,” he said.
Under that kind of strain, he said, some factions could prioritize self-preservation over ideological rigidity. “Some of them can come out and say, OK, we don’t want to lose our heads, we don’t want to lose Iran as a country, so maybe we can have some compromises,” Sabti explained.
He also raised the possibility of a coup scenario and internal clashes, comparing the potential trajectory to late-stage Soviet instability. “They can make a coup or something, and there can be some clashes inside the IRGC,” he said.
With Khamenei gone, Sabti warned that ambitions within the IRGC and other power centers could intensify as actors recalibrate their interests. “What is the map of the interests of everyone? It can change now, because the leader is not there,” he said. “They have their new interests. So yes, there can be a huge clash inside IRGC or other systems.”
Beyond elite maneuvering, Sabti said the gulf between the regime and parts of the public remains stark. “The people … they came out and they were very happy, many of them,” he said. He argued that the state moved quickly to restrict information. “We see that the regime once again shut down the internet, and we don’t know much what is going on inside.”
He said the leadership’s focus is on regime survival rather than civilian welfare. “They don’t care now about the people. The regime doesn’t care about whether there are supplies in the supermarkets, or the roads are open, or anything like that.” He pointed to what he described as a lack of basic civil defense infrastructure. “You know that there are no sirens in Iran, and no shelters? This is amazing. They don’t care about the people. It’s just like the ’80s.”
Despite public anger and, in his telling, celebration, Sabti said a spontaneous mass uprising is unlikely without external signaling and coordination. “The people cannot act unless President Trump, again, says something or does something,” he said. He did not specify what kind of statement or action he believed would alter the public’s calculus. He added that the regime retains mobilized forces and organizational advantage. “There are many Basij forces outside. They [the citizens] don’t have connection. Someone has to guide them.”
The people cannot act unless President Trump, again, says something or does something
Looking ahead, Sabti said he does not expect a quick stabilization. “In the short term, they [the IRGC] will be more dangerous,” he said. He argued that the next phase will be shaped by further strikes on command infrastructure and senior figures. “But again, in a few days, if enough headquarters, and IRGC generals, and other figures are eliminated, there can be something else there,” he added.
He cautioned that the timeline should be measured in weeks, not days, given Iran’s size and the complexity of its security architecture. “When you talk about Iran, it’s such a huge country, so many divisions, so many units of IRGC and army,” he said.
In the short term, they [the IRGC] will be more dangerous
Asked what might constitute a breaking point, Sabti said rapid collapse is unlikely. “I think not less than two weeks,” he said. “Even Saddam held for three weeks.”
Other analysts note that any successor will still need clerical legitimacy, even if security elites shape the choice. The coming period, Sabti suggested, may be defined less by constitutional procedures than by internal recalculation among security elites—especially inside the IRGC. The decisive test, he argued, is whether the IRGC stays unified.