Indonesia has unexpectedly moved to the center of international diplomacy over Gaza’s future, propelled by its long peacekeeping record, Muslim-majority identity, and the rare legitimacy it holds across regions that seldom agree. That shift accelerated after the United Nations Security Council voted 13-0 on Monday to endorse a US-drafted Gaza plan backed by President Donald Trump.
The resolution authorizes an International Stabilization Force for Gaza and creates a “Peace Board” chaired by President Trump to guide reconstruction, according to the official UN vote record. Russia and China abstained but did not veto, signaling broad recognition that many world powers want an actor outside entrenched regional rivalries to take the lead.
For Washington and several Arab governments, that actor is increasingly Indonesia. The world’s fourth most populous country is home to more Muslims than any other nation.
Indonesia began laying the groundwork months ago. The Jakarta Post reported in mid-2024 that officials were studying possible humanitarian or peacekeeping roles in Gaza.
The president’s view is that we should prepare up to 20,000 of our soldiers, with an emphasis on medical and construction capabilities
Indonesia’s defense minister, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, said that President Prabowo Subianto had instructed the military to prepare a force of up to 20,000 soldiers for a potential Gaza mission, with training focused on medical and construction roles. “The president’s view is that we should prepare up to 20,000 of our soldiers, with an emphasis on medical and construction capabilities,” he said on Nov. 14 after meeting the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces in Jakarta.
He emphasized that any deployment would require a clear international mandate, meaning formal UN authorization. The Defense Ministry maintains that Indonesia is ready to contribute a substantial contingent if requested, and the Indonesian National Armed Forces Peacekeeping Center, Indonesia’s military training facility for international missions, continues to train personnel.
Prabowo’s September speech at the UN General Assembly signaled Indonesia’s growing diplomatic ambitions. He called for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would establish an independent Palestinian state while guaranteeing Israel’s security, declaring that “the two descendants of Abraham must live in reconciliation, peace, and harmony.” The reference to Abraham, revered by both Jews and Muslims, was a carefully crafted signal of Indonesia’s willingness to play a bridging role. He has since emerged as a partner in American efforts to end the war.
But the gap between Prabowo’s high-profile diplomacy and Indonesia’s actual readiness is stark and potentially dangerous. “There’s almost no debate happening in Indonesia about the Gaza peacekeeping mission,” Dinna Prapto Raharja, an associate professor of international relations and executive director of the Jakarta-based think tank Synergy Policies, told The Media Line. “Prabowo rules with the support of almost all political parties, including Islamic parties that used to be in opposition, and they keep telling voters he’s got this handled. But no detailed plans have been presented.”
There’s almost no debate happening in Indonesia about the Gaza peacekeeping mission
She said Prabowo’s foreign-policy approach relies more on personal diplomacy and direct leader-to-leader relationships than on institutional preparation such as wargaming scenarios or consulting with military planners. “Gaza’s at the top of the list right now because of the moment, but no detailed plans have been announced.”
Many of Prabowo’s earlier humanitarian ideas revealed similar gaps between announcement and execution. When he proposed transferring injured Palestinians to Indonesia for medical treatment, he never clarified how Indonesia would prevent displacement or guarantee that those patients could actually go back to Gaza. The goal was to ensure those patients wouldn’t become permanent refugees unable to return home. His suggestion of using Galang Island, a former Vietnamese refugee camp site in Indonesia’s Riau Islands province, triggered questions in the Indonesian media about whether the facilities had adequate medical capacity, how it would be funded, and who would coordinate with international health organizations.
The security environment Indonesian troops would face is far riskier than many in Jakarta acknowledge. “The situation is incredibly tricky,” Dinna said. “There are risks involving militias,” meaning armed Palestinian factions beyond Hamas, “risks involving Israeli military operations, and risks involving misunderstandings with US forces or intelligence,” she said, referring to potential friendly-fire incidents or intelligence coordination failures in a crowded operational environment.
Translation: Indonesian soldiers could find themselves caught in crossfire between Israeli forces, rival Palestinian armed groups, and American intelligence operatives, all while trying to deliver aid and keep the peace.
Concerns about Indonesia’s limited internal planning contrast sharply with the growing regional expectation that Jakarta will shoulder a central role. Political demand for an Indonesian deployment is rising faster than Indonesia’s own institutional readiness to actually execute such a mission.
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Indonesia’s room to maneuver is further constrained by domestic politics that could blow up in Prabowo’s face. A recent analysis by Giora Eliraz at the Institute for National Security Studies, an Israeli think tank, notes that widespread negative perceptions of Israel exist among the Indonesian public, who remain almost entirely unfamiliar with the Israeli narrative about the conflict. The Indonesian public largely sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the lens of Palestinian suffering, not Israeli security concerns. Among Indonesia’s dominant Muslim majority (roughly 87% of the country’s 280 million people), identification with the Palestinian struggle resonates with deep pan-Islamic sentiments of solidarity with fellow Muslims.
That domestic pressure was visible in late October when Indonesia refused to issue entry visas for Israeli athletes to participate in the World Artistic Gymnastics Championships in Jakarta. The Indonesian minister of justice cited opposition from the Indonesian Ulama Council, a semi-official body of Islamic scholars that advises the government on religious matters, and the local government of the capital, arguing that allowing Israeli athletes could provoke public outrage and street protests while tensions in Gaza remained high. Indonesia maintained its refusal even after Israeli sports authorities appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the Switzerland-based body that handles international sports disputes.
The incident mirrors Indonesia’s refusal in early 2023 to allow the Israeli national team to participate in the FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) Under-20 World Cup. That decision cost Indonesia the right to host the tournament, a significant economic and prestige loss. The heightened anti-Israel sentiment over the past two years, due to the Gaza war, appears to have strengthened political caution around any perceived softening toward Israel, even on relatively minor issues like sports competitions.
Indonesian officials have consistently maintained that diplomatic relations with Israel will not be established before the creation of an independent Palestinian state. This position is reinforced by the opening line of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, written after the country gained independence from Dutch colonial rule, which declares that “colonialism must be eliminated from the face of the earth as it is contrary to the dictates of human nature and justice.” For many Indonesians, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories is viewed through the same anti-colonial lens as their own struggle for independence.
The Palestinian response to the UN vote illustrates the complexity Indonesia faces in trying to position itself as a neutral broker. Hamas rejected the plan in a statement posted on its official Telegram channel, calling it an attempt to impose “international guardianship” on Gaza—essentially foreign occupation dressed up as peacekeeping. The Palestinian Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank but lost control of Gaza to Hamas in 2007, described the resolution as “a first step,” according to its official news agency WAFA, but said that major issues remain unresolved, including who would actually govern Gaza after the fighting ends.
Arab governments are also shifting their approach, but with clear limits. Egypt’s foreign minister said in a Cairo press conference that Arab and Islamic states now support the idea of a stabilization mission in principle, but Arab militaries do not want to deploy their own troops. Diplomats in the Arab League say several governments fear appearing to legitimize Israeli control or replace Israel’s presence on the ground. That could make them targets for Palestinian fighters and undermine their legitimacy in the broader Arab world.
For Washington, relying on Indonesia fits a broader strategic pattern that has held across multiple administrations. US officials, in multiple off-the-record briefings, have made clear they seek postwar stability in Gaza but will not deploy a large American force, not the kind of massive troop commitment that characterized the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. “Washington hasn’t been willing to deploy large forces abroad for decades,” Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser and senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, told The Media Line. “Bush, Obama, Biden, and Trump were similar in their reluctance. Since Turkey is unacceptable to Israel [due to Turkish President Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric toward Israel and support for Hamas], Jakarta becomes the better option.”
Israeli cooperation, though, hinges on command structure. The question is who actually calls the shots on the ground. “Any stabilization force would ultimately have to be headed by the United States, not US troops, but at least American commanders,” Freilich said. “Israel will not accept a mission led by a Muslim state. Turkey is unacceptable. Indonesia is acceptable, but not as the leader.” In other words, Israel might tolerate Indonesian boots on the ground, but only if Americans are making the operational decisions.
Many observers also misinterpret what the mission would actually require, Freilich added. “This would not be a peacekeeping force.” Not the kind of lightly armed UN troops who monitor ceasefires between parties that have already agreed to stop fighting. “It would be a peace-enforcing mission if the goal is to disarm Hamas. That is essentially a war-fighting mandate,” meaning combat operations to seize weapons and potentially engage armed groups that resist, “and I do not see any country eager to take it on. I’m not optimistic.”
The bottom line: Indonesia could be walking into a shooting war, not a peacekeeping mission.
Inside Gaza, the postwar environment may be the biggest challenge. The war has weakened Hamas militarily, but the group continues to operate and maintains significant popular support in parts of Gaza. Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committees, clan-based armed groups, and other armed factions maintain separate command structures and weapon stockpiles. Humanitarian organizations report that local governance has partially collapsed and traditional family clans, extended kinship networks that predate Hamas, now mediate disputes, control access to aid distribution points, and provide what little security structure remains in many neighborhoods.
“Palestinians in Gaza do not judge an international force simply by its nationality,” Adel al-Ghoul, a Palestinian political analyst and head of the Paris Center for Security Studies and International Relations, told The Media Line. “What matters is the function of that force and its behavior on the ground,” whether it protects Palestinian civilians, facilitates reconstruction, or simply acts as an extension of Israeli security control.
Indonesia begins with a built-in advantage compared to Western or Arab countries. “Indonesia has a very positive image,” al-Ghoul said. “It has no relations with Israel, it has supported Palestine diplomatically for decades, and it is seen by Palestinians as a major Muslim country not aligned with Western agendas.” Unlike Egypt or Jordan, which have peace treaties with Israel, or Gulf states that have normalized relations through the Abraham Accords, Indonesia has maintained consistent rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood without compromising that position.
People in Gaza want aid, reconstruction, and human security, not guardianship. Any mission that appears to serve outside agendas will fail immediately.
But legitimacy is fragile and can be lost quickly. “People in Gaza want aid, reconstruction, and human security, not guardianship. Any mission that appears to serve outside agendas will fail immediately,” al-Ghoul said. If Indonesian troops are perceived as doing Israel’s or America’s bidding, enforcing a blockade, restricting Palestinian movement, or preventing reconstruction, they could quickly become targets.
Indonesia’s potential contribution may extend beyond peacekeeping troops. Eliraz’s analysis notes that Indonesia’s truly distinctive advantage lies in its robust Muslim civil society—networks of Islamic schools, charities, and religious organizations that are independent of government control but cooperate with it. These organizations are highly organized and have already demonstrated a willingness to combat religious extremism within the Muslim world by promoting the values of moderate Islam, what Indonesians call “Islam Nusantara,” a tolerant, pluralistic interpretation of Islam rooted in Indonesian culture. The government has encouraged this as part of a “soft power” diplomacy strategy, and Indonesia assesses it can contribute to combating religious extremism in Gaza by offering an alternative model to Hamas’s Islamist ideology.
Yet realizing that potential may require some form of official relationship and direct cooperation with Israel on security vetting, intelligence sharing, and operational coordination, creating a circular problem: Indonesia cannot establish diplomatic relations without progress on Palestinian statehood, but its most valuable contribution to Gaza, deradicalization programs and civil society building, may depend on working directly with Israel on the ground.
It’s a Catch-22 that nobody’s figured out how to solve.
Israeli officials, in background conversations with Israeli media, say that Israel will insist on strict security controls in any stabilization arrangement, including veto power over who enters Gaza and continued Israeli military authority over the territory’s borders and airspace.
Palestinians want coordination through recognized Palestinian institutions, meaning the Palestinian Authority or other legitimate Palestinian bodies, not Israeli military governors. They insist the mission must protect their sovereignty and path to statehood, not just maintain order. Those contradictions make designing a workable mandate difficult.
Arab League diplomats say the command structure remains the central sticking point in ongoing negotiations. Indonesia wants UN authorization and a multinational chain of command that gives it operational independence, Israel insists on US oversight and effective Israeli veto power over operations, and no one has clarified what role, if any, Palestinian institutions would play in governing Gaza or coordinating with the international force.
Indonesia’s own uncertainties add to the challenge. It has domestic political cohesion, and Prabowo faces little organized opposition; however, it has limited planning for a mission in one of the world’s most complex conflict zones.
Indonesian troops have significant UN peacekeeping experience in relatively stable environments like Lebanon, but nothing approaching the kind of active combat zone and potentially hostile population that Gaza could present. Still, foreign officials increasingly expect Indonesia to play a central role. US and European diplomats say they view Indonesia as the most legitimate Muslim-majority option that is not entangled in Middle Eastern rivalries or compromised by prior relationships with Israel.
“If Washington concludes that no one is truly prepared to join an international force with the responsibilities we’re discussing, the US and Israel will have to start looking at alternatives,” Freilich said. “I honestly don’t see many good ones.”
Israel faces hard choices here, but staying in Gaza long-term likely isn’t one of them. There’s a reason Israel pulled out in 2005, and most Israelis have no appetite for another open-ended occupation, provided security concerns can be addressed. The alternative of allowing Gaza to remain in a state of chaos that could eventually reignite the conflict isn’t appealing either.
Neither option is pretty.
For Dinna, the biggest test is simple: whether Indonesia genuinely consults Palestinians about what they actually want and need, rather than imposing an international solution designed in Washington or Jakarta. “Indonesia must talk more with the Palestinians,” she said. “At the end of the day, we’re supposed to be helping them, so they must be center stage in the defense of their territory.”