[DAMASCUS] Syrian government forces and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters engaged in heavy clashes on Monday around key detention facilities in northeastern Syria, underscoring the fragility of a ceasefire deal signed the previous day to integrate the SDF into Syrian state institutions. The fighting erupted near prisons holding thousands of Islamic State detainees, prompting curfews and search operations for escapees after several inmates fled amid the unrest.
Twenty-four hours earlier, the Syrian government had signed a ceasefire agreement with the SDF in the absence of the group’s general commander, Mazloum Abdi, at the signing ceremony—setting the stage for this sudden breakdown. The agreement had been promoted by Damascus as a pathway toward political and security reunification after more than a decade of war.
The Damascus meeting between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi was not positive, and Mazloum Abdi returned to Al-Hasakah
SDF leader and member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Union Party Fawza Yusuf told The Media Line that “the Damascus meeting between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi was not positive, and Mazloum Abdi returned to Al-Hasakah.”
A private source in Damascus told The Media Line that the meeting between al-Sharaa and Abdi, in the presence of Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, lasted five hours. During the talks, al-Sharaa offered Abdi the post of deputy minister of defense and the chance to nominate a governor for Al-Hasakah in exchange for keeping the SDF detached from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and completing the agreement.
The source, who requested anonymity, said Abdi insisted that Al-Hasakah remain entirely under SDF administration and its civilian wing, a condition that al-Sharaa rejected. He stipulated that, for the agreement to proceed, Interior Ministry forces must enter Al-Hasakah.
According to the same source, Abdi sought a five-day period to consult with his leadership, but al-Sharaa refused and demanded a final answer by the end of the day; otherwise, international parties would be notified of his withdrawal from the agreement, and the Syrian state would resolve the Al-Hasakah file by force.
This proposed settlement came amid intensive international contacts, including a phone call between al-Sharaa and US President Donald Trump, during which both emphasized Syria’s territorial unity, its independence, and the protection of Kurdish rights within the state framework. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to preserving Syrian territorial integrity and continuing cooperation to combat terrorism in the country.
The Syrian government views this understanding, which the SDF rejects, as a crucial step toward restoring national sovereignty and unifying state institutions. It includes a comprehensive ceasefire, the withdrawal of SDF forces to east of the Euphrates as a preliminary step, and the administrative and military handover of Deir ez-Zur and Raqqa to the government.
By contrast, SDF leaders say their initial acceptance of parts of the agreement was aimed at preventing further civilian and combatant losses and that SDF fighters would only be integrated after thorough security vetting—a step they later rejected under the terms proposed.
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Sources within the SDF told The Media Line that agreeing to the deal came “at a critical moment to prevent an open war in the region” and was intended to maintain stability and prevent a security collapse that extremist forces could exploit.
Recent field developments help explain this approach. Areas east of the Euphrates have seen rising economic pressure, growing tribal unrest, and declining external political and military support for the SDF. At the same time, movements by Syrian forces and their allies, along with indirect military pressure, have convinced SDF leaders that the balance of power no longer favors the status quo.
Field researcher Saad al-Din al-Ahmad told The Media Line that the agreement emerged after both sides realized that open confrontation would be costly and that a middle-ground solution had become less damaging than continued attrition.
At the same time, international relations professor Hassan Said Hassan told The Media Line that integrating the SDF, despite the complexities, could help rebuild a more cohesive military institution, reduce competing centers of power, and remove a key lever used by foreign states that have benefited from Syria’s fragmentation.
Despite the agreement’s significance, Abdi’s absence from the official signing raised questions. Although his approval was confirmed, observers interpreted his absence as a sign of internal sensitivity within the SDF. Abdi, who gained legitimacy as a leader in the fight against ISIS, faces a difficult choice: Signing could be seen as abandoning the self-administration project, while rejecting the deal risks military confrontation with unpredictable consequences.
Analysts say his absence was tactical, aimed at absorbing internal reactions and preserving room for maneuver during the implementation phase.
In addition, Kurdish political analyst Farhad Said told The Media Line that the agreement addresses form rather than substance, warning that the lack of clear guarantees for political and administrative rights could lead to internal fragmentation or the emergence of unorganized local resistance. He said the deal effectively reproduces pre-2011 centralization through new means.
Separately, conflict researcher Khaled Drish told The Media Line that the agreement resembles a forced settlement more than a genuine reconciliation and that its success depends on three factors: the mechanism of military integration, the shape of local administration, and the state’s ability to quickly fill service gaps.
…imposing complete surrender
Meanwhile, the Syrian political scene has been marked by tension over international engagement. Talks between the SDF and al-Sharaa collapsed after the government insisted on demands described as coercive and non-negotiable, including the full dissolution of the SDF and a return to the pre-2011 order. A security source within the SDF told The Media Line this amounted to “imposing complete surrender.”
In the past 24 hours, clashes have intensified around detention facilities holding Islamic State detainees as government forces push deeper into formerly SDF‑controlled areas. SDF media offices said repeated assaults by Damascus‑aligned troops on the prison at Ash Shaddadi, which holds thousands of IS prisoners, have prompted efforts by the SDF to defend the facility, with “dozens killed or wounded” in battles at Ash Shaddadi and al‑Aqtan near Raqqa.
The Syrian Defense Ministry denied the SDF’s account of the clashes, saying army forces advanced into the vicinity of al‑Aqtan prison and began securing it and its surroundings despite the presence of SDF fighters. The government said it also established control over the city of Ash Shaddadi and that it was offering aid to remaining SDF units inside.
Local reports confirm that several Islamic State detainees have escaped amid the fighting around the prisons, prompting curfews and search operations as authorities attempt to recapture escapees.
These developments coincide with continued international contacts, including the call between al-Sharaa and President Trump, during which both reaffirmed support for Syria’s territorial unity, state sovereignty, and the fight against terrorism. Al-Sharaa has also met with other international figures, including US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack, stressing the need for inclusive dialogue and full restoration of state authority.
The agreement between Damascus and the SDF is part of a broader reshaping of Syria’s political landscape, marking a shift from parallel governance toward centralized rule. Implementation would involve integrating thousands of fighters into state institutions and managing sensitive issues such as prisons and ISIS detainees.
Politically and on the ground, this represents a move from military confrontation to political bargaining, where details rather than declarations will determine success. While the agreement offers a rare chance to reunify Syria without a large-scale war, it requires careful balancing between state authority, local demands, and international constraints.
Recent failures in negotiations and shifting international positions show that the SDF can no longer rely on unconditional external backing. Damascus, by contrast, appears to be benefiting from broader international tolerance for restoring state control, giving it greater leverage.
Seen in this light, the agreement is best understood as a first step toward restructuring the Syrian state. It is not a full reconciliation and offers no guarantee of lasting cohesion. What it does represent is a transition from battlefield conflict to political struggle, where implementation will test Syria’s ability to manage its long, unfinished transformation.

