Analysts, however, suspect that Ankara is seeking concessions from Washington on Iranian sanctions, and needs U.S. support as its spat with Saudi Arabia over the Khashoggi affair intensifies
Political and economic reasons were the driving forces behind the release of a U.S. pastor from Turkey, whose detention sparked a major diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Washington, a former Turkish ambassador to the U.S. told The Media Line.
“I think this was a weak calculation of cost and benefits from Turkey and that’s why Brunson was released,” said Faruk Logoglu, a member of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) who served as ambassador to Washington from 2001 to 2005.
The U.S. slapped sanctions on Turkey and increased tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum after the pastor Andrew Brunson, a U.S. citizen, was sent to house arrest in July instead of being released and allowed to return to the U.S.
The crisis led to the Turkish currency, the lira, plummeting in value by 40 percent this year and drastically rising inflation.
Brunson, who was first detained in October 2016 and was facing up to 35 years in prison on terrorism charges, was sentenced to over three years in prison. In the last few days, however, the court released him, saying he had already served enough time.
Soon after being placed on house arrest, the U.S. asserted the charges were baseless and demanded Brunson’s release, but Turkish authorities insisted the country’s judiciary was independent and that the case was not politically motivated.
Logoglu did not believe there was a quid pro quo arrangement between the two sides in which the U.S. offered Turkey something in exchange for Brunson’s release. Nevertheless, his release, Logoglu contended, likely improves Ankara’s position in negotiating other issues.
The former ambassador said Turkey would try to push for some kind of immunity on Iranian sanctions. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated last month that his country would continue to buy gas from Iran despite the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
Other significant disagreements between the two countries are the U.S.’ alliance with Kurdish forces in Syria. Ankara claims the forces are linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, which it classifies as a terrorist organization, as does the U.S. and the European Union.
Another major roadblock in relations is the U.S.’ refusal to extradite Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom Turkey has accused of masterminding the 2016 failed coup, a charge Gulen denies. Last year, Erdogan had implied that Brunson could be released if Gulen would be extradited back to Turkey.
Selim Sazak, a Washington-based Turkish analyst, told The Media Line that Ankara probably realized that its requested extradition of Gulen was a tall order and should focus on something more realistic.
He explained that people close to the negotiations between Ankara and Washington revealed that Turkey is instead primarily hoping to get concessions on a case involving an executive at a Turkish state-owned bank, who was found guilty of helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions. He speculated that the U.S. could agree to limit fines on the bank or the prison sentence against the banker.
U.S. President Donald Trump denied a deal was made with Turkey, despite a report the night before Brunson’s hearing from NBC News stating an agreement was reached to release the pastor.
Erdogan tweeted that the Turkish court made the decision on its own. Immediately after the court announced Brunson’s release, the Turkish presidency’s communications director Fahrettin Altun stated: “Like the Turkish courts, the Republic of Turkey does not receive instructions from any body, authority, office or person. We make our own rules and make our own decisions that reflect our will.”
The disappearance earlier this month of Saudi writer Jamal Khashoggi from the Saudi consulate in Istanbul adds another dimension to shifting Turkish-U.S. relations, Sazak said. “At this point, the calculation has changed again because now you have the Khashoggi affair,” he said. “Having U.S. backing became more important for Turkey than it was two weeks ago.”
Sazak explained that Turkey would rather cooperate with Saudi Arabia over the writer’s disappearance to avoid a greater crisis. However, if such cooperation proves difficult, he speculated, Ankara might be willing to lash out against Riyadh and support some kind of sanction or punishment for the kingdom currently being mulled by the U.S. and other countries. In the latter case, support from the U.S. would be valuable.
Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, told The Media Line that Turkey would likely not seek a confrontation with the Saudis.
“I think Turkey is trying to avoid a drawn-out battle with the Saudis and the latter’s rich Gulf allies. This is especially important for Ankara at a time when Turkey’s economy is very brittle. Such a conflict could significantly destabilize the Turkish economy.”
If the U.S. does end up putting pressure on Riyadh, Cagaptay concluded, then Turkey might feel more comfortable in escalating tensions. “I think this is probably a sign of the most severe Turkey-Saudi crisis in recent memory.”