Efforts to disarm armed factions in Lebanon have once again placed the country at the center of regional debate. Beirut’s government has pledged to tackle weapons held by Palestinian groups in refugee camps, while the international community continues to press for compliance with United Nations resolutions that demand the state alone maintain a monopoly on force. For some, this campaign could serve as a pilot for a broader—and far more contentious—attempt to address Hezbollah’s arsenal.
The discussion comes against a volatile regional backdrop. Washington has been pressing to expand the Abraham Accords to include Syria and potentially Lebanon, despite the political impossibility of normalization in Beirut. At the same time, ongoing wars in Gaza, Yemen, and along Israel’s northern border continue to shape the calculus. US pressure on both Israel and Syria reflects a wider effort to recalibrate alliances and reduce tensions, but these moves often collide with Lebanon’s internal fragility.
“The disarmament of Palestinian factions rests on a solid legal foundation,” Patricia Karam, vice president of policy and communications at the American Task Force on Lebanon, told The Media Line. “The 1989 Taif Accord explicitly calls for the dissolution of all militias in Lebanon, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation. This obligation was reinforced by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559, which requires the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese armed groups. UNSCR 1701, adopted after the 2006 war, goes further by stipulating that only the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL may bear arms south of the Litani River.”
The disarmament of Palestinian factions rests on a solid legal foundation
Karam stressed that only one institution can lead this process. “The LAF, as Lebanon’s only cross-sectarian body, is the natural lead agency to oversee the removal and control of weapons. The Internal Security Forces should act as the state’s domestic policing arm—handling raids or prosecutions outside the camps—while General Security should manage vetting and security checks. The current process already reflects this distribution, with the LAF positioned as the primary overseer,” she said.
To anyone who knows Lebanon, this was theater—a screenplay agreed in advance
From Israel’s perspective, recent moves have been more symbolic than substantive. Jacques Neriah, a retired colonel and senior fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, described the recent Burj al-Barajneh operation as little more than theater. “We saw journalists and photographers tipped off, soldiers waiting, and a truck emerging from the camp with a few bags of what were presented as weapons. That was the entire operation. To anyone who knows Lebanon, this was theater—a screenplay agreed in advance. If this model is applied to all the camps, then the government has no intention of truly enforcing disarmament,” he told The Media Line.
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Karam acknowledged that Lebanon’s political and demographic realities require different tools. “Outside the camps, the legal situation is straightforward: all non-state weapons are illegal. The state can pursue seizures, targeted raids, prosecutions, and even limited amnesty programs tied to voluntary handovers. Inside the camps, however, brute force is unworkable. These are dense spaces where any raid risks massive bloodshed. A more realistic approach is a phased DDR—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—where weapons are gradually handed over to the LAF. Amnesty could be extended for possession, though not for major crimes. To build credibility, the destruction of weapons should be witnessed publicly,” she explained.
Neriah countered that such arrangements have little effect when powerful factions remain armed. “The government’s control over the camps is minimal at best. When Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Jama‘a Islamiyya openly declare they reject the disarmament agreements, it’s clear the state has no real authority inside. Burj al-Barajneh was essentially symbolic—and symbols alone won’t change the fact that these groups remain heavily armed,” he said.
International diplomats argue that tackling Palestinian weapons could create a playbook for Hezbollah’s eventual disarmament. Karam agreed. “If the LAF successfully manages the Palestinian track, it will demonstrate that disarmament can be done gradually, under Lebanese leadership, and with international support. This builds confidence at home and abroad, laying the groundwork for the far more difficult issue of Hezbollah’s arsenal. The only way forward for Lebanon’s sovereignty is to restore the state’s monopoly over arms,” she said.
Disarming Hezbollah is an entirely different story. … The precedent from Lebanon’s second civil war is clear—the army disintegrated along sectarian lines.
Neriah, by contrast, painted a far darker picture. “Disarming Hezbollah is an entirely different story. Asking the Lebanese Armed Forces to take on Hezbollah would risk plunging the country into civil war. The LAF itself might fracture along sectarian lines. Around 60 percent of its rank and file are Shiite, with ties to southern Lebanon and the Bekaa. It is unrealistic to believe that Shiite soldiers would turn their weapons on their own communities. The precedent from Lebanon’s second civil war is clear—the army disintegrated along sectarian lines. That danger is still very real today,” he said.
Another focal point is the role of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Karam noted that its mandate has been sharpened in recent years. “The emphasis now is on ensuring freedom of movement and the right to patrol independently, without prior approval from the LAF. Discussions also include shortening the mandate from one year to six months, which would allow for more frequent review. There is a push to realign the force toward intelligence collection and rapid reaction capability. But if UNIFIL’s mandate is not renewed, the burden will fall squarely on the LAF, which lacks the resources to manage southern Lebanon alone,” she said.
For Neriah, the mission has long since lost credibility. “UNIFIL has been in Lebanon since 1978, and what did we get? All the tunnels, fortifications, and Hezbollah positions were built under their noses. In some cases, Hezbollah dug tunnels less than 100 meters from UNIFIL posts, and nothing was done. If the force is not confrontational, why are they there? The latest renewal will likely be the last—one more year until June—and then UNIFIL will leave,” he said.
The debate has also been shaped by Israeli statements suggesting that if Lebanon successfully disarms Hezbollah, Israel may consider withdrawing forces from border outposts. For Karam, the issue must be handled delicately. “A genuine Israeli withdrawal would require dismantling strategic outposts along the border, ending violations of Lebanese airspace, and redeploying the Lebanese Armed Forces across southern Lebanon. Israeli offers to ‘help’ Beirut disarm Hezbollah are counterproductive politically. They reinforce Hezbollah’s narrative of resistance and risk alienating centrist factions. The only viable approach is indirect: linking Israeli steps, such as halting overflights or withdrawing posts, to milestones achieved by the LAF,” she said.
Neriah criticized Netanyahu’s statement as a misstep. “Saying that Israel would ‘help’ Lebanon disarm Hezbollah implies Israel is a partner in fighting one-third of Lebanon’s population—something completely unacceptable to Beirut. The phrasing was conditional and vague: if Hezbollah is disarmed, Israel would ‘gradually’ withdraw. But what does ‘gradual’ mean? One month, one year, ten years? The reality is simple: Israel cannot withdraw while Hezbollah is still armed. Every day there are incidents in southern Lebanon. The moment Israel stops acting against Hezbollah, they will be back on our border,” he said.
For Karam, the success of any disarmament plan depends on how it is presented. “It must never be framed as a sectarian project. Messaging cannot suggest that this is about ‘disarming the Shia,’ or it will fail immediately. The Lebanese Armed Forces must not be disparaged, because it is the only cross-sectarian institution capable of carrying this through. Contentious issues like Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba should be kept out of public bargaining and handled quietly. Messaging has to emphasize one principle: the constitution is clear that only the state can hold arms,” she pointed out.
Neriah was equally blunt on Lebanon’s political limits. “Normalization with Israel is politically impossible. The country’s confessional system would implode under such a move. We saw this in 1983, when a peace treaty was signed but never ratified. Even Bashir Gemayel told Ariel Sharon he could only sign a treaty if Israel stationed paratroopers in Beirut to protect him. That is the reality of Lebanon’s political red lines,” he said.
Lebanon’s attempts to disarm Palestinian factions reveal both the necessity and the fragility of restoring the state’s sovereignty. For Karam, the process can build a national framework that may eventually extend to Hezbollah. For Neriah, the structural realities of Lebanon’s army and politics make such ambitions nearly impossible.