Russia has finally put forth what it sees as a compelling response to one of the most damning criticisms it has faced in recent months: that it enabled the success of a historic attack on its airbases, which resulted in the destruction of several of its most critical aircraft, including those configured for nuclear missions.
Ukraine, for its part, has acknowledged responsibility for the strike, claiming it deployed domestically developed drones. Critics have focused on Russia’s vulnerability, specifically, its decision to position these valuable assets in open view, making them easy to track not only by military-grade satellites but also by civilian aircraft or even rudimentary observation tools like balloons or blimps equipped with cameras.
Russia’s defense, as articulated by Western analysts, is that this exposure was not a security lapse but a deliberate move in accordance with longstanding arms control agreements—namely SALT and START—signed with the United States. These treaties mandate that both nations keep certain aircraft, particularly those outfitted for strategic nuclear operations, visible and accessible for mutual surveillance, ostensibly to foster transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation.
The logic is that both parties maintain the right and obligation to observe one another’s compliance, cultivating a fragile but necessary atmosphere of trust between the world’s two dominant nuclear powers. It follows, then, that the United States is likewise obligated to expose its own comparable aircraft to similar observation.
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The spirit and letter of these agreements are clear: the data gathered through this transparency is not to be weaponized—neither by the signatories against each other, nor via support to third parties for military gain. Any such breach would violate not just the terms of the agreements but their entire underlying philosophy of deterrence and mutual restraint.
The type of intelligence required for Ukraine to have successfully executed this strike, including the precise coordinates of Russia’s nuclear-capable aircraft and the configuration of its airfields, is widely considered to be beyond Ukraine’s native capabilities. Some of the targeted airbases are located more than 4,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, deep within Russian territory.
Moreover, Ukraine would not possess detailed knowledge of Russia’s ground-based aircraft alignment systems—sophisticated infrastructure that would be essential for programming drones to hit such specific targets. This strongly suggests the presence of external intelligence support.
Still, this dimension of external facilitation does not absolve Russia of its own strategic missteps. The Kremlin failed to account for the possibility that its adversaries—either state actors or proxies—might disregard the unwritten rules that underpin strategic arms control. In this case, it did not anticipate that transparency could be turned into tactical vulnerability.
A response from Russia is expected, though what form it will take and when it might come remains a question laden with uncertainty and global consequence.
Ahmed Abdel-Tawwab (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)