Europe’s capitals—Rome, Berlin, Paris, and even London—lie within Iran’s now-proven 4,000-kilometer missile range, propelled into focus by Tehran’s failed attack on the UK-US base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. As US-European divides deepen over approaches to securing the Strait of Hormuz amid oil supply threats, Europe faces a pivotal question: To what extent is the continent prepared for an Iranian escalation?”
Benjamin Touati, CEO of ELNET-Israel, framed the unsuccessful strike as part of a broader strategic shift. “The Middle East stands at a decisive turning point, even as tensions continue to escalate. The outcome of the conflict is increasingly clear; what remains uncertain is its cost, its duration, and the shape of the new regional order that will emerge,” he told The Media Line.
He argued that the escalation must be understood within a longer trajectory. “This transformation did not begin recently. The region has been evolving since October 7, 2023, and even earlier with the Abraham Accords and the growing Iranian threat—not only to Israel, but to Gulf states as well,” he said.
Touati connected the Diego Garcia incident directly to overarching questions about range and deterrence. “The strike toward Diego Garcia carries implications far beyond its immediate tactical significance,” he said, given that the mid-Indian Ocean atoll, a British overseas territory, is around 3,800 km from the closest Iranian territory, in the Islamic Republic’s southeast tip.
Europe is within range
Given that Paris is approximately 4,200 km from Tehran and less than 3,500 km from northwest Iran, the message, Touati said, is unmistakable: “Europe is within range.”
At the same time, security analysts caution against interpreting range demonstrations as evidence of immediate operational capability.
Daniele Garofalo, a counterterrorism and jihadist group expert, emphasized the need to distinguish between theoretical reach and credible strike capacity. “On the technical level, three layers must be separated: theoretical range, actual operational capability, and political decision to employ,” he told The Media Line.
He added that, despite the symbolic significance of the missile launch, current assessments remain cautious. “There is no evidence that Iran currently possesses a confirmed capability to reliably strike European targets,” he said.
Garofalo stressed that even if long-range vectors exist, additional conditions must be met before a credible threat emerges. “If one assumes a vector in the 4,000 km class that is truly operational, some portions of Europe … fall within a theoretical reachability perimeter. However, theoretical reachability does not equal a credible threat of an imminent strategic strike,” he noted.
Give the gift of hope
We practice what we preach:
accurate, fearless journalism. But we can't do it alone.
- On the ground in Gaza, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and more
- Our program trained more than 100 journalists
- Calling out fake news and reporting real facts
- On the ground in Gaza, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and more
- Our program trained more than 100 journalists
- Calling out fake news and reporting real facts
Join us.
Support The Media Line. Save democracy.
He explained that such a threat would require “vector reliability, penetration capability, targeting, a resilient C2 [command and control] chain, launch preparation, survivability management of launchers, and political willingness to accept a NATO response.”
The debate over missile reach is unfolding alongside growing tensions between Washington and European allies over the Strait of Hormuz. The United States has pressed for stronger security measures to protect maritime routes, while several European governments have expressed reluctance to expand military involvement.
The strait remains one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, with roughly one-fifth of global oil supply and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas passing through it each day. Any disruption to shipping in this corridor has immediate implications for global energy prices and, by extension, European economies heavily dependent on imported energy.
European governments have, therefore, focused primarily on safeguarding economic stability rather than escalating militarily. Discussions in several capitals have centered on reinforcing maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing, and protective escort measures for commercial vessels. Countries responding positively to a call for action to protect the strait include Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, but no specifics on how this action might look in practice—or whether military steps are under consideration—have been released yet.
This cautious approach reflects both political sensitivities and the desire to avoid broadening the conflict geographically. The divergence between Washington’s calls for stronger deterrence and Europe’s emphasis on risk containment has contributed to the perception of growing transatlantic friction over how to manage the Hormuz security challenge.
Garofalo described the European posture as cautious rather than disengaged. “Public signals point in the opposite direction of a rapid Europeanization of the Hormuz theater,” he noted.
In practice, more presence and more prudence, not necessarily more combat
He suggested that the likely trajectory would involve incremental steps. “In practice, more presence and more prudence, not necessarily more combat,” he said. According to his assessment, European governments may increase surveillance, intelligence coordination, and maritime protection measures rather than committing to large-scale deployments.
Touati, however, argued that the evolving situation could require a more decisive approach. “This is no longer a regional issue; it is a strategic challenge with global implications,” he said.
He linked the missile demonstration and maritime tensions to broader geopolitical shifts. “The Iranian regime continues to escalate on multiple fronts—threatening regional stability, targeting moderate Sunni states in the Gulf, disrupting global economic flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and now extending its reach toward Europe itself,” he observed.
The divergence between these assessments reflects broader uncertainty about how Europe should respond. While some analysts emphasize risk containment, others argue that hesitation could encourage further escalation.
Touati suggested that current developments could reshape European defense discussions, demanding urgent reconsideration of previous approaches. “Is this not the moment to move from concept to reality?” he argued. He added that the Diego Garcia strike is widely perceived as both a warning and a provocation aimed at deterring European intervention.
Beyond the possibility of direct missile threats, analysts increasingly highlight hybrid risks. Garofalo noted that indirect actions may represent a more plausible scenario for Europe. “If Iran chose indirect retaliation on European soil, the most likely form would not be a direct missile. It would be a hybrid package,” he asserted.
He detailed the potential possibilities: “cyber operations against energy, healthcare, shipping, logistics, telecoms, finance, and public systems,” as well as “limited sabotage or arson,” and “attacks on Israeli, Jewish, US, or Iranian dissident targets.”
He also warned about operational patterns already observed. “The Iranian threat in Europe does not necessarily pass through ‘classic cells’—it often passes through criminal proxies, facilitators, and opportunistic tasking.”
If I must put it bluntly—the real warning is not the lone fanatic. It is the convergence between gangs, Iranian intelligence, cyber access, and target selection.
According to Garofalo, monitoring should focus on “interfaces between hostile intelligence, organized crime, infiltrated diaspora, pre-operational surveillance, and cyber access.” He summarized the risk succinctly: “If I must put it bluntly—the real warning is not the lone fanatic. It is the convergence between gangs, Iranian intelligence, cyber access, and target selection,” he explained.
The question of Europe’s preparedness is also part of the discussion. Garofalo pointed to existing defense structures while highlighting gaps in civil preparedness using Italy as an example.
“Italy is not exposed. On the military side, Italy is part of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture and ballistic missile defense.” However, he noted that “public doctrine, widespread civil preparedness, alert culture, urban sheltering, population-institution exercises, and crisis communication are not at the level of a country truly preparing for a regular long-range threat.”
Touati framed the broader strategic challenge in geopolitical terms. “Ultimately, Europe faces a deeper structural challenge. For decades, it has lived without war on its soil. This has shaped both its strategic culture and its reflexes,” he said.
The question is no longer theoretical: Will Europe recognize this strategic momentum and prepare for what may be an unavoidable reality? Is Europe ready?” he asked.
The Diego Garcia incident, combined with maritime tensions and diverging transatlantic approaches, underscores how the conflict’s implications are becoming increasingly global. While no direct threat to Europe has yet materialized, the interplay of long-range missile demonstrations, hybrid risk scenarios, and strategic disagreements suggests that the continent is now more closely connected to a conflict once considered distant.