In the weeks leading up to the Milano Cortina Winter Olympics, being held at multiple sites across northern Italy, security took shape along two parallel tracks—one on the ground, defined by deployments, coordination, and prevention, and another in the public arena, driven by symbolism, interpretation, and rapidly circulating claims.
That second track was fueled by a steady flow of reports—protests, claims about foreign agents, alleged incidents involving delegations, and opening-ceremony reactions. Many were rooted in real events, but once stripped of context, they blended into a broader narrative of insecurity.
The most visible controversy centered on claims that US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel were operating in Italy. Much of the debate treated “presence” as equivalent to enforcement authority, with several demonstrations in Milan framed publicly as protests against “ICE security at the Olympics.”
For critics, the agency’s name carried baggage linked to ICE actions in the United States, including recent reports of deaths and detentions. In Italy, however, any ICE presence would be limited to operational support coordinated with Italian authorities; ICE has no immigration-enforcement or arrest powers on Italian soil.
ICE or any other foreign police force can do absolutely nothing on Italian soil
Dr. Massimiliano Mancini, an expert in geopolitical and security studies and director of Ethica Societas, an Italian nonprofit human and social sciences review, outlined the legal distinction. “ICE or any other foreign police force can do absolutely nothing on Italian soil. Any gesture they made, even if it was that of personal protection, would be impossible because they have no qualifications. Let’s not forget that the foreign security forces only operate in areas that are extraterritorial in Italy. For example, within the American Embassy,” he told The Media Line.
“Public order and prevention of crimes remain entirely in the hands of the Italian state. Cooperation does not mean delegation of authority, and the presence of foreign personnel cannot translate into autonomous police activity on the territory. In general, I haven’t seen proof of these agents on the ground, so this needs to be further investigated to reach the truth,” Mancini added.
He also distinguished between liaison activity and policing. “This doesn’t exclude the fact that there can be intelligence services, but intelligence acquires information and performs activities that are in no way translated into policing. It seems quite normal that there are the intelligence services of all the delegations of all the countries, as always happens during big international events, such as the G7.”
Claims of unpreparedness from the Italian side are not accurate
Simone Ressi, director of coordination of logistics and security at S.S. Security and Bodyguard, which provides services for the 2026 Olympics, described the same gap from the operational side. “The information circulating in the media does not really mirror the reality on the ground. Claims of unpreparedness from the Italian side are not accurate,” he told The Media Line.
Counterterrorism and radical-groups analyst Daniele Garofalo framed the situation as standard international practice, noting that Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is the investigative arm within US Homeland Security and distinct from immigration enforcement as it is often portrayed in public debate.
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“Components linked to ICE, particularly HSI, have a circumscribed role connected to diplomatic security and protection of US figures only. Meanwhile, the arrival of Qatari security personnel is in a framework of support and cooperation,” Garofalo told The Media Line.
More than 100 personnel from Qatar’s elite security forces have been deployed under a bilateral agreement with Italy to monitor event locations, manage crowds, and provide rapid-response capabilities, drawing on experience from major events such as the 2022 FIFA World Cup.
Mancini described the scale of Italian forces planned for the event. “We are talking about 6,000 Italian units, a high number. These units include police forces, special units, anti-terrorism units, and teams of vigilance, because there is also private vigilance that presides over the sites. So there is a security system that is there for every event, and in Italy we are very used to managing these kinds of situations,” he told The Media Line. He added, “Italy is highly skilled for historical reasons related to domestic and foreign terrorism in prevention—monitoring signals, controlling access points, and neutralizing risks before they materialize.”
Garofalo described the threat landscape as overlapping rather than singular. “The realistic risk for an event of this kind in Italy is not a single monolithic threat but a mix of vectors of low and high complexity that overlap. Jihadist lone-actor attacks against soft targets remain the most plausible. Right-wing extremism can target symbolic objectives. Anarchist sabotage creates public-order risks. Cyber and hybrid threats affect infrastructure. Opportunistic crime targets athletes and staff.” He added, “During a high-visibility event, three levels coexist: real risk, public perception, and media narrative, and they rarely coincide.”
Mancini evaluated preparedness through outcomes rather than threat counts. “The capacity of a state to manage great events is not measured in the quantity of threats but in the capacity to neutralize them. Italy is one of the most skilled countries in doing so, since most of the time offenders make the news after already being detained.”
Accommodation arrangements became another area of speculation.
Garofalo explained the distinction. “The village is a closed system with controlled access and procedures. Private apartments are an open system—wider attack surface, non-standardized security, and more opportunities for information collection. Real tools to guarantee 24/7 security to fully autonomous athletes do not exist. It is impossible.”
Ressi emphasized what private providers can do. “Private companies like ours operate 24/7 during major events. Most teams stay inside the official facilities. Some athletes may choose private accommodation, and in those cases, they can hire private security services, or their delegations can provide extra protection.”
Reports also circulated about a robbery involving the Israeli delegation ahead of the competitions. What began as a report of a theft became tied to the Games’ location, blending into a simplified narrative.
Israeli team representatives later clarified that the apartment was not in Italy and that the delegation had been training elsewhere in Europe, declining to disclose the exact site. One team member spoke from Italy during an interview, contributing to confusion about the incident’s location. Despite the clarification, some coverage continued to place the episode in Milan.
Garofalo cautioned against premature conclusions. “We do not have verification of whether a theft really occurred and how. If true, it must be evaluated as a potentially multi-cause event until facts reduce it to an ordinary crime. Investigations must be made to determine whether the robbery was opportunistic theft, data theft, a hate crime, recon, or insider facilitation.”
Ressi said there were no security issues involving delegations on Italian soil. “No incidents occurred against any specific delegation. Everything is under control.”
Saturday’s demonstrations in Milan also raised local economic and housing concerns unrelated to security arrangements, including claims about rising costs and the environmental impact of infrastructure construction. A peaceful march involving thousands took place during the day, but it turned more violent at night, when six arrests were made after clashes with police.
Intense media attention, observers noted, can slide into narration rather than reporting. That dynamic appeared in coverage of alleged “booing” of the Israeli and American delegations at the opening ceremony, which many attendees said was not clearly audible and lasted only seconds.
Freedom of information is not freedom of disinformation
Mancini addressed the episode directly. “Freedom of information is not freedom of disinformation. The public should be informed properly on current events, and the media should avoid pursuing only catchy headlines or narratives.” He added, “Even if the boos occurred, it is indeed despicable that people keep blaming citizens of a specific country for the actions of its government; this has to stop.”
Garofalo described how the cycle escalates. “An informational hype is created: ordinary events such as protests, thefts, or logistical disruptions are read as indicators of systemic threat, while technical cooperation measures become political symbols. This media technique helps to build up polarizations and selective amplification of fears despite reporting the same events.”
During high-visibility events, perception can shape public confidence and resource prioritization even when threat levels remain unchanged.
The Milano Cortina Olympics thus operated as both a logistical undertaking and a narrative battleground. Security was managed operationally but frequently misread in public discourse.
Mancini concluded, “In the moment when no real threat can be identified, what remains is disinformation. And disinformation can damage people as much as the event itself.”