Riyadh’s New Security Geometry: Pakistan Pact, US Track, and a Yemen Cash Lifeline
Political risk expert Ali Zafar told TML the defense pact is 'reassuring' to Riyadh because it 'hedges against perceived US gaps without undermining US ties'
Jolted by the Sept. 9 strike in Doha, Riyadh has shifted from caution to calibration—inking a strategic mutual defense agreement with Pakistan on Sept. 17, 2025, keeping the US track central even as it diversifies, releasing SR1.38 billion (about $368 million) for Yemen’s Aden-based government, and warning that any West Bank annexation would carry “major implications in all fields”—a sequence designed to tighten day-to-day deterrence (training, intelligence, early warning, procedures) while signaling political resolve across multiple fronts.
The timing of the agreement is somewhat symbolic given that it was signed so soon after Israel’s attack in Doha, but it seems to have been a long time in the making
Naadirah Vali, a GCC policy researcher, said to The Media Line: “The timing of the agreement is somewhat symbolic given that it was signed so soon after Israel’s attack in Doha, but it seems to have been a long time in the making as opposed to it being a direct response to the incident.”
“It certainly demonstrates Riyadh’s efforts to diversify its defense partnerships and perhaps also secure strong security guarantees from partners closer to home. The US has long been a key security guarantor for Saudi Arabia and the region more broadly; Saudi Arabia’s efforts to balance its preference for a US-heavy security relationship with its more eastern-facing connections reflects a certain geopolitical agility amid perceived shifts in the international order, in line with the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 that aims to reshape its global standing,” she added.
That framing sets the context for how the pact will be used—less as a headline and more as a wiring diagram for capability—and from Islamabad’s side, Mohammad Ali Zafar, political risk consultant and research scholar at Oxford University, made the operational logic explicit: “From Islamabad’s perspective, the defense pact answers Saudi Arabia’s pressing need for credible deterrence and stronger air and missile defenses, while also providing reliable training and intelligence support. Vulnerable to missile and drone threats, Riyadh gains political reassurance from Pakistan’s collective-defense pledge,” he said to The Media Line.
“For Pakistan, the real focus is on training, joint drills, and intelligence sharing—building on decades of military cooperation. Although speculation lingers about nuclear dimensions, Islamabad remains cautious, aware of regional sensitivities and its own need to balance ties with multiple partners,” he added.
The pact inevitably carries a nuclear shadow, given Pakistan’s unique status as the Muslim world’s only nuclear power
The specter of nuclear overinterpretation will linger, but Ali Zafar narrowed expectations to the conventional lane and the messaging discipline around it: “The pact inevitably carries a nuclear shadow, given Pakistan’s unique status as the Muslim world’s only nuclear power. Even without nuclear provisions, the collective-defense clause signals strategic reassurance for Riyadh. While this boosts Saudi confidence at little cost to Islamabad, it risks stirring unease among neighbors. To offset this, Pakistan must underline that cooperation is strictly defensive—training, intel sharing, and preparedness—while reaffirming its nonproliferation commitments and framing the pact as continuity, not escalation,” he noted.
This is why the first year is engineered to show tangible competence without inviting miscalculation, as Zafar detailed: “In the first year, deliverables will be practical but limited, designed to show commitment without heightening tensions. Pakistan will prioritize joint training and air-defense exercises, send defense advisers to strengthen Saudi command systems, and establish a secure intel-sharing channel for aerial and maritime threats. Pakistani technicians are also expected to provide maintenance and logistics support. Crucially, no permanent basing is on the table—only rotational trainers and liaison officers—emphasizing the pact’s defensive, nonnuclear character,” he added.
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The economic ballast for Islamabad is equally central—because the pact must pay macro-level dividends if it is to be sustainable at home—so, in Zafar’s words: “Islamabad will seek clear dividends in return. Energy tops the list—preferential oil supplies and deferred payments to ease foreign-exchange stress. It will also push for expanded Saudi investment, especially in infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and mining projects like Reko Diq. Just as important, Pakistan will look for more worker visas and improved labor terms in the Gulf, safeguarding remittances from Saudi Arabia, already one of Pakistan’s largest inflow sources,” he explained.
Regionally, the Doha shock has also reinforced the case for deeper Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) interoperability so that national moves plug neatly into a collective posture. Vali’s assessment is blunt about the integration gap and the speed at which Saudi Arabia is trying to close it: “The attack in Doha shows the importance of more integrated defense between the Gulf states—leveraging their combined financial, security, and military capabilities would lead to a level of defense cooperation in the GCC that would provide added fortification of the region, particularly at a time when regional leaders like Saudi Arabia are actively and adeptly investing so heavily in defense and security diversification,” she noted.
Zafar complemented that with the mechanics to avoid duplication and mixed signals: “To avoid overlap, Saudi–Pakistan defense cooperation must be woven into existing GCC frameworks. Pakistan can place liaison officers in GCC defense councils, coordinate training plans, and adopt shared command protocols. A GCC–Pakistan liaison cell for intelligence and exercises would help manage deconfliction in real-time. Keeping the pact limited to training, intel, and sustainment prevents overlap with Peninsula Shield’s combat role. Tying procurement through GCC mechanisms ensures transparency, reinforcing the defensive—not competitive—nature of the pact,” he said.
None of this subtracts from the American pillar—which remains the long pole for technology access, deterrent credibility, and great-power signaling—and Vali spelled out Riyadh’s long-standing ask on that front: “Riyadh has long sought a formalized defense pact with the US that would be more binding than the informal security guarantee and assurance the Kingdom has had from the UShistorically,” she said.
In the interim, the Pakistan lane is meant to supplement rather than substitute—a point Zafar thread to the broader hedging dynamic: “The Doha episode crystallized Gulf doubts about US security guarantees and sped up Riyadh’s diversification. The Saudi–Pakistan pact reflects this hedging: it gives Riyadh a political deterrent signal and practical training and intel support Washington has sometimes struggled to provide quickly. Frustration with stalled US–Saudi nuclear cooperation also fed distrust. Yet, this move doesn’t replace the US security umbrella; rather, it supplements it. For Riyadh, Pakistan offers short-term reassurance. For Islamabad, it’s a chance to deepen ties without crossing red lines,” he explained.
The southern flank emphasizes how security and economics rhyme: Saudi Arabia’s SR1.38 billion package for Yemen—budget support, petroleum derivatives, and operating funds for the Prince Mohammed bin Salman Hospital in Aden—aims to keep state functions from collapsing under fiscal stress and to shore up maritime stability through the Bab el-Mandeb.
From Islamabad’s vantage point, this is ballast rather than belligerence, and Zafar was explicit: “Islamabad views Riyadh’s $368 million financing for Yemen’s Aden-based government as a stabilizing move, aligned with Pakistan’s preference for political solutions. For Pakistan, the aid helps prevent state collapse, refugee spillovers, and maritime instability that could touch its own interests. Any Pakistani contribution will likely remain low profile—capacity building, training Yemeni forces, bolstering coast guard capacity, and technical support. Financial oversight, if requested, would only be under multilateral frameworks to avoid political risks. Pakistan’s stance remains clear: support stabilization, not combat involvement,” he noted.
On the Israeli issue, signals are equally calibrated: Riyadh has conveyed that any West Bank annexation would redraw the diplomatic map, with “major implications in all fields”—a message widely read as jeopardizing normalization prospects and potentially re-closing Saudi airspace to Israeli flights. It’s another reminder that deterrence messaging and escalation management now run in parallel lanes.
For Pakistan, avoiding entanglement in those flashpoints is a hard constraint, and Zafar put the guardrails beyond doubt: “Pakistan’s red lines are firm. No permanent bases, no expeditionary combat deployments, and no nuclear transfers. Islamabad will confine itself to training, advisory roles, maritime security, and crisis diplomacy. It will avoid any action that risks pulling it into Iran-Israel confrontations, Red Sea escalations, or India-related tensions. Cooperation must run through multilateral frameworks—GCC or U.N.—to provide legitimacy and reduce friction. The guiding principle: protect trade routes and expatriates, contribute to de-escalation, and safeguard Pakistan’s strategic autonomy,” he said.
All of which loops back to domestic calculus on both sides—Riyadh’s push to localize the defense industry and build redundancy into supply chains under Vision 2030, and Islamabad’s need for macro stability and policy headroom—captured in Vali’s strategic arc: “Saudi’s bold investment in military industries falls under the Kingdom’s economic modernization efforts; strategic partnerships, market expansion, and strategies that preempt geopolitical and security developments surrounding it all ensure a more resilient, robust defense outlook for Saudi. The country appears to be seeking more strategic autonomy in an increasingly multipolar world by balancing its relationships with major powers like the US and China, and historical links with countries such as Pakistan (such as through the recent defense agreement between the two),” she concluded.
On the other hand, Ali Zafar focused on Pakistan’s gains: “The pact helps Islamabad balance external relationships with pressing domestic needs. It secures Saudi oil on easy terms and investment that directly supports IMF conditionality and economic stability. Strategically, it hedges against perceived US gaps while reassuring Riyadh, without undermining US ties. It also complements China’s role as Pakistan’s defense-industrial and economic partner. The key is restraint: sticking to training, intel, and sustainment while avoiding basing or nuclear moves. Combined with careful diplomacy toward Washington and Beijing, the pact strengthens Pakistan’s economy while managing regional sensitivities,” he concluded.
