‘Hamas Cares More About Its Own Survival’: Why the Future of the War May Hinge on One Decision
Jonathan Conricus, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former IDF international spokesperson, outlines what rejection of the American president’s proposal would mean for Gaza, Israel, and the region
The world waits as Hamas weighs President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan. Accepted by Israel, endorsed by the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and cautiously welcomed by most international actors, the proposal hinges on one question: Will Hamas comply?
For Jonathan Conricus, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former international spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces, the answer is painfully clear. “Hamas cares more about its own survival than the interests of the Palestinian people or civilians in Gaza,” he told The Media Line, adding that “the chances are much higher that they will not accept it.”
I would, of course, prefer for our hostages to be released. But I think in the big picture of things, Hamas, sadly, will not agree.
He did not disguise his frustration. “I say that with great regret because what that means is it puts our hostages at significant risk. And I would, of course, prefer for our hostages to be released. But I think in the big picture of things, Hamas, sadly, will not agree.”
Conricus laid out, in a measured but stark sequence, what rejection would trigger on the ground. “Immediately in terms of military operations, it means that the IDF will enhance and intensify military operations in Gaza City and apply more military pressure and do things that so far the IDF has refrained from doing when it comes to the fighting in Gaza City.”
The second consequence, he said, is even more direct for the families of hostages. “The IDF will try to conduct operations to extract hostages based on the understanding that Hamas is not going to agree to a deal. And therefore, the only way of getting hostages out will be to use force. And I think there will be a larger likelihood that the Cabinet will order the IDF, special forces, Shabak, etc., to take military action in order to get hostages out, even if it means that there’s additional risk for the hostages.”
A third potential outcome, he argued, lies beyond the battlefield. “I hope—I think it’s a very reasonable outcome—that for the first time in two years of war, there will be enhanced American pressure, American and global, but mostly American pressure on Egypt to open the gate at Rafah and to allow Gazans to flee the war zone and to seek temporary shelter outside of the Gaza Strip. What that will do is tip the scale and really be a game changer in terms of the war, because that will deprive Hamas of its main asset—or its secondary asset. The main asset are the hostages. Secondary assets are civilians in Gaza that Hamas uses as human shields and that they leverage for pressure over Israel.”
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That scenario, he said, must already be coordinated with Washington. “I think that should be the focus of Israeli diplomatic efforts now, already preparing that and having that ready and coordinated with the Trump administration and confirming that if Hamas refuses a deal, then Egypt is forced to open the gate.”
Nobody can justifiably claim that it is Israel’s responsibility. And that’s perhaps the first thing that we should focus on
But for Conricus, the most consequential dimension is not military or humanitarian but political. “In the battle of narratives and global diplomacy, I think it will be a very revealing moment, a defining moment, whereby all of the most important countries in the world have voiced their support for the plan. Israel supports the plan and has said clearly for the first time, we are willing to end the war if we get hostages back. If Hamas doesn’t agree, then the responsibility is on Hamas for all the suffering, for all the deaths that will follow, and for delaying rebuilding efforts in Gaza and all of the things that are a consequence. Nobody can justifiably claim that it is Israel’s responsibility. And that’s perhaps the first thing that we should focus on.”
His forecast for the months ahead was grim. “The war will continue, and we have months ahead of fighting—fighting where there will be casualties, sadly, for the IDF. Of course, there will be lots of Hamas combatants killed. I assume that there will also be noncombatants killed in Gaza, and the suffering in Gaza will continue. All of that will be the responsibility of Hamas.”
That responsibility, however, could extend beyond Gaza’s borders. “Regionally speaking, I think that a negative outcome could be that we could have a halo effect, a spillover effect on Judea and Samaria. It’s already quite restive there. There’s lots of instability and early signs of instability and intentions by various organizations to destabilize the area. And it might be that the Palestinian Authority will pull out the plug and allow those terror organizations to attack Israel more.”
He cautioned that the political calculus in Ramallah could shift. “Up until now, this has not happened because of successful Israeli counterterrorism operations, and also because the PA didn’t have a political motive to do so, because they were still waiting for the world to pave the way for the PA to take control over Gaza. And if that’s not going to happen, then maybe the PA, out of desperation, will allow that to happen. And then, of course, that would be not a positive thing.”
The potential regional freeze is broader. “It’s difficult to assess the Abraham Accords, Saudi, Indonesia, all of the other good things that will follow. I assume that the other countries still will not feel comfortable enough to go ahead and make peace deals with Israel while fighting is ongoing and intensifying in the Gaza Strip. So that will be on hold as well, regretfully.”
Iran, too, loomed in his analysis. “I think they will try to do whatever they can to destabilize the situation in Israel and with the Palestinians in order to deflect from themselves and in order to keep Israel busy. I think they are now starting—they will start—to suffer the consequences of their erratic and miscalculated strategy when it comes to the nuclear weapons. They were warned multiple times that they cannot enrich on Iranian soil. They persisted, and I think totally misread the room in terms of European willingness to allow them to enrich. And now they’re going to face the consequences of the snapback of sanctions, and I think they will seek to escalate the situation.”
Pressed on Hamas’s public claim that the plan “ignores Palestinian interests,” Conricus was categorical. “I think it’s a false statement by Hamas. Sadly, this deal does very much represent Palestinian interests. It clearly says in clear words that it paves the way for Palestinian statehood, and it reflects Palestinian interests mostly in the sense that it helps Palestinians stop suffering from the consequences of the war that Hamas started and it can free Palestinians in Gaza from Hamas. So, of course, it promotes very significantly. It promotes Palestinian interests—some of them which I am not happy with. Palestinian statehood under PA is not something that I think is a good thing, but nevertheless, the deal pretty much paves the way—or the concept of the deal paves the way—for that.”
His distinction was sharp. “It doesn’t support the interest of the terrorist organization Hamas. That is true. If a Hamas official would have said, ‘Yes, it doesn’t support our interest of Hamas,’ then yes, they are the losing side in a war that they started, and they are being forced to agree to terms that they do not like. And, of course, the terms are not favorable toward Hamas because they’re losing the war. But for Palestinian interests, I think I very much disagree, and there’s a very strong—perhaps too strong—positive representation of Palestinian interest in this deal.”
As for Qatar, the state that has mediated between Washington, Israel, and Hamas, Conricus expressed deep skepticism. “I think Qatar is really—for the first time—they actually have skin in the game, and I think that they’re going to lose diplomatic standing and diplomatic credibility because President Trump has put his personal political prestige on the line here with the deal. I think he did that based on the assessment that the Qataris would be able to influence Hamas and get Hamas to sign the deal and agree to it. If Qatar fails—and I think he made that assessment based on what the Qataris told him, that they do indeed have this influence—and if the Qataris fail, then that will, I think, diminish their standing in Trump’s eyes and in global eyes as someone who promises but doesn’t deliver.”
If the Qataris fail, then that will, I think, diminish their standing in Trump’s eyes and in global eyes as someone who promises but doesn’t deliver
He did not spare Doha from direct criticism. “If we take stock of Qatari activities, they have not facilitated the release of any hostages for a very, very long time. There’s a lot of reports, which I don’t know the exact veracity of, that they have actually been the ones that obfuscated and caused negotiations for the return of 10 live hostages and 18 dead ones. They caused those negotiations to fail. And they have not been successful. They got Edan Alexander out as a personal gesture to President Trump before he visited last time. But other than that, they’ve done very little at all to promote stability in the situation. So that will be exposed. And the Qataris, I think, are in—for the first time—a position where they have to actually deliver. And I think the chances of them actually delivering are not good. And they will be exposed for being terror sympathizers without real influence over the terror organization that they sponsor.”
For Conricus, the verdict is as stark as his opening words: If Hamas rejects, the war will deepen, hostages will remain in peril, and the diplomatic map of the region will stall. “If Hamas doesn’t agree, then the responsibility is on Hamas for all the suffering, for all the deaths that will follow, and for delaying rebuilding efforts in Gaza and all of the things that are a consequence.”
