‘Al-Aqsa Storm’ … A War Without a Map?!
An-Nahar, Lebanon, October 10
The wars are like fires, easy to ignite and difficult to extinguish: Those who enter a war without a plan are unlikely to find their way out. Those who start it without clear objectives end up becoming its target.
America entered Iraq with one plan, toppling Saddam Hussein and replacing his Ba’athist regime with a puppet government. But they prepared for war and not for peace, setting major headlines for their goals without detailing plans for achieving them. As a result, they succeeded in entering but failed to stay or leave.
This pattern has been repeated throughout history. Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia and saw his army perish in its freezing cold. Nazi leader Hitler conquered half of Europe and then broke against the walls of Stalingrad. In recent decades, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait followed by Iran, American President George Bush invaded Afghanistan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed parts of Ukraine. Each of them got entangled, drained their strength, and found no way out.
The Arab conqueror Amr ibn al-As once said to the Caliph Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, may Allah be pleased with them, “By Allah, I have never entered into something without finding a way out of it.” He said this after he had gone as a leader of a delegation to negotiate with the Romans in a fortified castle. When he sensed that their leader intended treachery, he told him: “Now that I have heard from you, I think I should return with my army leaders to consult with them.” He hesitated, allowing him and his delegation to leave safely. Amr had studied the fortifications and saw what could be penetrated. When he returned, he planned an attack on the fortress and captured it. When he presented this plan, Muawiya rejected it, saying: “I have not entered into something without wanting to leave it.”
Comparing Al-Aqsa Storm with the Ramadan War requires examination, despite the timing which coincides with the 50th anniversary of the Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973. Perhaps a more relevant comparison is with the 1947 war, the 1967 war, or the 2006 war in Lebanon, with differences.
In any case, the truth is clear. Who denies that the Zionists aggressed and oppressed the Palestinian people, desecrating the holy sites of Muslims and Christians, with blind support from the West?! Who denies the Palestinians’ right to defend their land, wealth, and honor?! Who ignores Israel’s rejection of fair peace initiatives?!
The difference and disagreement lie in the plan of the war and its goals. In the first war, which ended with Nakba (catastrophe), the second ending with Naksa (setback), and the third causing destruction in Lebanon, there was no roadmap defining the details of the action and its response, the stages of the project, and the tools and equipment prepared for it. Also, the ultimate goals were unclear: Victory was the only goal without detailing alternatives or choices.
Expelling the Jews from Palestine was not a realistic goal in 1948, throwing Israel into the sea was impossible in 1967, and subduing it during its strength and arrogance in 2006 was unachievable. The Ramadan War had reasonable and achievable goals: reclaiming Sinai, Gaza, and the Golan Heights.
If the Egyptian Third Army had not been surrounded, if there had been no mistakes by the Syrian army on the eastern front, and if some confrontation and support states had not betrayed and faltered, perhaps complete victory could have been achieved. Israel was on the verge of collapse, to the point where Prime Minister Golda Meir considered using nuclear weapons and the United States established an air bridge and declared a state of emergency for its fleet in the Mediterranean and its bases in the region.
In the end, several strategic objectives were achieved, most notably the recovery of Sinai and the Suez Canal. Egypt and its Arab allies, who coordinated roles with them, and received their support and backing, led by the “Hero of the Crossing” and the “Martyr of Jerusalem,” Saudi King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, had the right to call it a victory.
Today, history repeats itself. Our mujahideen brothers in Gaza launched a surprise war on the Zionist entity with intelligence and military capabilities that astonished the world and confused the enemy. As always, Israel’s response was swift, stormy and harsh.
Because our brothers did not differentiate between civilian and military targets, they gave their enemy the justification to bomb cities, camps, and infrastructure, just as they did in Lebanon nearly twenty years ago. And because Hamas uses gang warfare tactics, and in the absence of military sites, the focus of Israeli airstrikes and the army was on civilian areas.
The planners of the July War neglected coordination with Arab countries or even the Lebanese state under whose umbrella they were supposed to be. They settled for receiving Iranian support and guidance, repeating the same method, bypassing the Palestinian Authority, hiding their plans from Arab governments, and when the axe fell on their heads, they demanded support and intervention from them, while undermining those who do not declare war with them.
When asked, the official spokespersons of the Hamas movement about their goals in this escalation, they put the liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque at the top of the list. But while they promise victory or call on armies and Arab peoples to fight with them, they do not provide a plan beyond slogans and passionate speeches, nor do they present demands that can be negotiated with the international community with Arab support. They do not prepare for a diplomatic campaign to convince the world of the justice of their position.
Here, the political analyst has the right to question the timing of this storm, considering the political efforts being made to resolve the Palestinian issue based on the establishment of their state and its capital, East Jerusalem, and the restoration of Al-Aqsa Mosque. What is the connection between this and those who trade in this eternal issue for their political and financial interests, and those who justify and market all their destructive projects for the Arab region as stations on the road to liberating Jerusalem? What about those parties and leaders who have built their political agendas on the existence of a legitimate cause that ignites the passions of the masses, postponing all development programs (for no voice is louder than the voice of battle)?
Immediately, all parties must stop the escalation, and return to the path of peace. The Arab Peace Initiative is still on the table, and the Israeli government must clearly state its position, either the path of a comprehensive solution that opens the doors for normalization with both the Islamic and Arab nations, or the quagmire of violence and extremism and the fate of turning into a more isolated and rejected state.
And the jihadist brothers must redraw the map of the conflict to achieve more Arab and Islamic solidarity, and international sympathy, and define legitimate and realistic goals that enhance the chances of success on the ground and at the negotiating table. —Dr. Khaled M. Batarfi (translated by Lana Ikelan)
