Israel: What Happens Following the Iran War?
Al-Ittihad, UAE, June 28
It is too early to confirm that Israeli society has fully accepted the results of the recent confrontation with Iran, or that what was achieved represents a historic victory, as Prime Minister Netanyahu is currently promoting. The fragile national consensus that emerged may persist for several reasons, chief among them the continued presence of the Iranian threat regardless of the confrontation that took place. This issue will provoke intense disagreement within the government and across the political and military establishment in the coming period, especially as the war on Gaza resumes.
What occurred with Iran could well repeat itself in Gaza, while the current situation might be exploited politically and strategically to pursue a long-term truce. All parties involved in managing the Gaza conflict know that the matter is in the hands of President Trump, who, if he chooses, could replicate what he did between Iran and Israel rather than allowing the process to slip back into a vicious cycle of pointless negotiations.
Within this context, the stability of the government itself may need to be reassessed, based on the fact that—contrary to some perceptions—Netanyahu’s government is not in a political deadlock, neither domestically, thanks to a relatively solid majority in the Knesset, nor internationally, especially given support from the United States and major European powers, which reached its peak when the United States joined the war effort and then pressed for a ceasefire under Trump’s influence. Although the Netanyahu government continues to hold a clear parliamentary majority—officially resting on 65 out of 120 seats—in practice, its backing is closer to 69 members of parliament. These dynamics were reflected in two recent polls, by Channel 13 and Maariv, which showed the Likud party gaining around four seats compared to surveys conducted before the conflict.
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The point is that despite the appearance of broad political consensus and a near-popular alignment, certain reservations have arisen about the timing of the war, its results, and Israel’s ability to achieve its stated objectives of completely dismantling Iran’s nuclear program or toppling the Iranian regime. The military establishment will continue to play a decisive role on these matters, especially given recent shifts within the army’s leadership and intelligence circles, and considering the scale of the recent confrontation with Iran.
It is expected that the current governing coalition will continue a policy of preserving unnecessary ministries, advancing the tax evasion law, alienating the ultra-Orthodox from military service and broader Israeli society, supporting education budgets for the ultra-Orthodox who do not participate in the liberal state education system, ignoring the high cost of living, and avoiding structural reforms that do not support sustained economic growth—trends that could once again deepen societal divides and return Israel to the state it was in before the Iran clash. This concern has already driven the Knesset to raise the defense budget by 3.6 billion shekels [$1.1 billion] for 2025, an increase that includes 699 million shekels [$208 million] to fund food shipments to Gaza residents and 2.953 billion shekels [$877.4 million] to cover expanded military costs from the resumption of the war on Gaza.
One can stress that Israel’s political future will depend on the degree to which the public accepts the outcome of the present circumstances and on whether the Hezbollah-Israel agreement and the Iran-Israel agreement can hold up over the medium term. Added to this are the massive losses the government will be forced to absorb, which public opinion will bear and the opposition will spotlight among voters, constantly repeating warnings about the persistent Iranian threat in the region, particularly with its ongoing missile and nuclear program. This is likely to become a central argument for the opposition and fuel continued tensions over Israel’s national priorities, which in turn could lead to more fragmentation.
Here lies the danger to the broader political stability that Netanyahu claims, even as he seeks to highlight Israel’s successive victories and the supposed total neutralization of the Iranian threat, despite the severe costs to the Israeli home front. Overall, disagreements will inevitably surface between political and military leaders about the post-conflict phase with Iran and the renewed war with Hamas, which may expose the realities of many details previously kept under wraps. Netanyahu will remain a dominant figure in politics and party circles, maneuvering skillfully and emphasizing the strategic options he still has to counter those calling for early elections, in light of Israel’s ongoing existential threats and the reality that the confrontation with Iran has not truly ended—an argument his supporters may well accept as the opposition struggles to present a coherent, workable alternative.
Tarek Fahmy (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)
