Our Public Debates Reveal a Serious Lack of Political Understanding of the World

Maariv, Israel, September 14

It is entirely legitimate to engage in discussions about different goals and strategies. One can argue that, after failing to protect its citizens, the state’s primary duty is to secure the release of the hostages. While this may not align with the opinion of the High Court, one could also contend that following the strategic losses inflicted on Israel on October 7 and considering the hundreds of Israelis killed in the conflict, restoring the state’s strategic position should take precedence over the immediate rescue of hostages. What is not acceptable, however, is an overemphasis on one or two arguments to the detriment of seeing the bigger picture. Those advocating for the continuation of the offensive in Gaza must address a pivotal question: How do they plan to end the depletion of resources in other areas without falling into the traps set by Yahya Sinwar, aimed at regionalizing the conflict, or by Iran, designed to weaken Israel? Consider the real conditions on the ground today—assessments of the army’s capabilities, levels of international support, legitimacy, and economic stability. They must also elucidate how they intend to ensure that the ongoing conflict does not incur costs that outweigh its strategic importance. These costs include a potential erosion of Israel’s military and political readiness across multiple fronts, particularly concerning Iran and its potential nuclear advancements. Additionally, Israel is enduring a severe multidisciplinary strain. Following several credit rating downgrades and a ballooning deficit now at 8%, Israeli government dollar bonds are trading at yields indicative of a nation confronting substantial economic challenges. The cost of credit default swaps on Israel’s debt has surged by 390%. Under these circumstances, it will be increasingly difficult for the state to secure financing in the long term. Those fixated on the next raid in Gaza while neglecting broader questions or relegating them to economists display a lack of seriousness. A nation functions as a singular, multidisciplinary entity, and it is impossible to manage only one aspect of it in isolation. Nations do not disintegrate solely from failing to end a conflict successfully; they collapse when they can no longer finance future wars. Even those proposing to cease hostilities in exchange for the return of hostages must address substantial concerns. The events of October 7 and subsequent war efforts have weakened Israel. If, despite Israel’s apparent resolve to dismantle Hamas’ rule, the group retains control over Gaza, the ramifications for Israel’s strategic position could be profound. Such an exhibition of vulnerability may invite further confrontations and diminish the incentive for potential allies to form alliances with Israel. Those advocating for an end to the war must articulate a strategy for how Israel can rehabilitate its damaged deterrence and reassure its allies. However, a more sobering reality may be emerging. The repercussions of the flawed execution of the war over the past 11 months have exhausted the military through relentless operations and strained international support, legitimacy, and the economy. It may be that the most pragmatic option is to “cut losses” in this conflict, initiate a comprehensive reconstruction effort for the nation, its leadership, and its military, and prepare for a potentially more significant multifront war by 2026. There is no shortage of examples highlighting the difficulty in understanding how the world functions. Consider, for instance, the decision to halt law enforcement proceedings against settlers and soldiers suspected of violating the law. The international legal system operates based on the principle of complementarity; intervening only when the local legal system fails to adequately address the issue. Therefore, any attempt to prevent legal proceedings against settlers and soldiers ironically lays the groundwork for international actions against senior government and military officials. Discussing the Philadelphi Corridor in isolation from a comprehensive plan for managing the Gaza Strip post-war is equally shortsighted. Control over the corridor is merely one element of the broader security framework required for the region’s stability after the conflict. Furthermore, seizing the Rafah border crossing without establishing a new governmental structure in Gaza and securing an international agreement effectively alters Israel’s legal status in Gaza from a combatant to an occupying power. This transition is not trivial; while combatants have limited obligations, occupying powers face extensive legal responsibilities, including providing nutrition, medical care, housing, and security for the population. They must also establish a military government to fulfill these duties. This leaves Israel with two unfavorable options: either to set up a military government, thereby assuming full responsibility under international law, or to ignore international legal standards, risking severe diplomatic and legal repercussions. Supporters of a military government in Gaza must explain how they intend to finance the enormous costs imposed on the occupying power, estimated at tens of billions of shekels annually. A significant portion of the IDF budget would be redirected to the operation and security of such a government. As yet, no serious financial plan has been presented. Some, however, claim that international law concerns only ivory-tower lawyers and can be disregarded. Such statements reveal a misunderstanding of global politics, whether naively or deliberately. In reality, governments are influenced by these issues, and a determination that Israel is violating international law could lead to policy shifts and trigger automatic legal mechanisms that sever cooperation. Moreover, international corporations increasingly adopt norms influencing their operations alongside business considerations. Should Israel fail to adhere to these international standards, it could disrupt supply chains. These supply chains are crucial for both military and economic operations, and the notion that Israel can independently produce weapons is untenable. The Merkava tank, for instance, features an MTU engine, RENK transmission, and Motorola Communications Systems technology. Semiconductors, operating systems, production equipment, and raw materials must be imported. No nation, not even the United States, is entirely self-sufficient in weapons manufacturing. The F-35 aircraft, for example, involves 11 partner countries, with supply chains stretching from Japan to Canada and from Australia to Norway. The primary weapon of the air force, the JDAM, has been utilized in quantities equal to three years’ total production by Boeing. The partial solution has been to purchase JDAMs from stockpiles of the US and its allies. Local production lines in Israel remain minuscule compared to those of Boeing. The lesson here may not be to strive for self-sufficiency in weapon production but rather to align with the technologies common in the West. The notion of “fighting with our nails” in crisis scenarios is absurd. The IDF has eliminated around 17,000 terrorists, achieving an impressive kill ratio of 1:50 between terrorists and Israeli soldiers since the maneuver began, largely due to advanced weaponry and technological superiority. What does this advocate of nail-biting tactics anticipate? A 1:1 kill ratio or worse? Are they prepared to combat Iran and intercept missiles with their bare hands? Strategy can be effectively illustrated through the metaphor of an imaginary battle between a crocodile and a polar bear, each possessing unique strengths and weaknesses. The crocodile thrives in short skirmishes within rivers and can only traverse short distances on land. It is cold-blooded and adapted to warm environments. In contrast, the polar bear excels in long-distance endurance, capable of migrating thousands of kilometers. It is warm-blooded and suited to the Arctic climate. Advising a crocodile to engage a polar bear in a prolonged journey across Arctic ice reveals a flawed understanding of the crocodile’s inherent limitations; such a strategy would inevitably lead to its demise. Israel’s strength lies in four key centers of power: its high-tech export industry, a technologically advanced Western-style military, cutting-edge applied academic research, and strategic proximity to the United States. All these elements are interdependent on global integration. An effective Israeli strategy must acknowledge these power centers’ limitations and ensure their protection. Emulating Putin’s approach of international isolation is infeasible for Israel, given the stark differences in conditions. Russia’s economic situation—with soaring interest rates at 18%, a 50% drop in currency value, and an 80% depletion of foreign exchange reserves—highlights a scenario that Israel cannot replicate. Pursuing an agenda that alienates the US is not sustainable for Israel, and attempting to do so would jeopardize its position. Understanding this dynamic is crucial for grasping how international relations truly works. —Ron Tira  (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)