The March of Folly on the Road to Conquering Gaza
Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel, August 9
Ostensibly, every Israeli can agree with the goals set out in the government’s newly approved plan: the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, continued Israeli security control, the establishment of a new governing authority in the region, and—above all—the release of the hostages.
The problem, as with many government decisions since the start of the war, lies in the staggering gap between what is presented as a coherent strategy and the reality on the ground, a gap so wide it has led much of the world to suspect that Israel is no longer acting with prudence or clarity of purpose. Every element of the plan invites serious questions about its feasibility: how will the evacuation of nearly a million Palestinians from Gaza City actually be carried out, and what if some refuse to leave; has it not yet been accepted that one cannot simultaneously dismantle Hamas and secure the hostages’ release; who exactly is the undefined authority meant to govern Gaza afterward; and why expand the failed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which has already proven ineffective and is likely to falter even more if its scope is increased as planned.
This decision marks the latest chapter in a recurring cycle of unrealistic schemes—announced, implemented poorly, and abandoned without introspection—ensuring that the same mistakes are repeated. The occupation plan reflects the same flawed logic that underpinned the “humanitarian city” concept and earlier adherence to the Trump vision: a misplaced belief that reality and public perception can be engineered mechanically, that economic incentives alone can reshape existence, and that these are reliable foundations for policy—a belief that was one of the core failures exposed on October 7.
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Many in the government, particularly Netanyahu, pride themselves on their command of history yet seem determined to repeat its errors, including those of their own making, such as fostering armed militias and tribal factions—a practice with a long and troubled record in Israeli policy. Netanyahu is now attempting to persuade the international community, in carefully crafted messages aimed abroad, that he is “liberating Gazans from Hamas”—a narrative deliberately avoided at home because it would provoke public backlash. Such rhetoric has failed before: in the US wars in Vietnam and Iraq, in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and in Israel’s own 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Occupying forces are rarely, if ever, embraced as liberators, and there is no reason to believe Gazans—whose hostility toward Israel has deepened to record levels during this war—will be any different.
The so-called “intermediate” option chosen over a full occupation—seizing only Gaza City and emptying it—is another manifestation of the government’s chronic preference for half-measures over decisive action, a tendency reflected in raid-based operations instead of territorial control, or in the creation of the GHF as an indirect means to topple Hamas. This approach betrays an internal reluctance to take responsibility for governing two million Palestinians, resulting in policies that extend and entrench the war rather than resolve it.
Even before implementation, the plan is already exacting a cost: it is accelerating the looming wave of international recognition of a Palestinian state, expected to peak within a month, and fueling mounting diplomatic criticism. Tellingly, even Germany—one of Israel’s staunchest allies—has now declined to sell weapons that could be used in Gaza. The government appears unwilling to accept that the global sympathy and latitude it enjoyed after October 7 are dissipating, and that much of the world no longer accepts its actions as legitimate, suspecting instead that the only true objective is to prolong the war.
Netanyahu is thus emerging as an outlier among Israeli prime ministers who have grappled with the Gaza dilemma since the state’s founding: while most desired control over the territory, they recoiled at the burden of ruling over its largely refugee population—what Levi Eshkol once called “a problematic bride that comes with the dowry of the Land of Israel.” After painful deliberations, some opted to withdraw from Gaza altogether (Rabin, Sharon), while others avoided occupation entirely (Ben-Gurion, Olmert, and Netanyahu himself during Operation Protective Edge, when a leaked IDF presentation—likely intended to block an invasion—helped avert it). Those now pushing for occupation, and dismissing ceasefire proposals as “perverse,” fail to speak plainly to the public about its costs: the effective abandonment of the hostages’ cause, years of military entanglement in Gaza, unprecedented strain on the reserves, and deepening international isolation. They also avoid acknowledging the deeper flaw—that the very leadership responsible for the October 7 disaster, possibly representing only a minority of the public, is imposing a momentous course of action with far-reaching consequences for Israeli society and the country’s global standing. Some even cloak their ideological drive for occupation in the language of “strategic security,” knowing that messianic slogans about redemption would find little broad support.
The decision to proceed reinforces the sense that Israel is squandering the gains it achieved earlier in the war, suffering mounting strategic setbacks, and losing stature both abroad and at home. Rarely in history has a nation marched toward the abyss with such deliberate confidence, ignoring flashing warning lights and bypassing numerous opportunities to alter course. If historian Barbara Tuchman were alive today, she might well dedicate a chapter—if not an entire book—to chronicling Israel’s current march of folly into Gaza.
Michael Milshtein (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)
