What is most striking is that the very parties that dragged Lebanon into repeated defeats at the hands of Israel are now the loudest in their demands, declaring, “We reject any peace agreement with Israel unless it is forced to accept our terms.”
In principle, they are not wrong, but reality is far more complex. Do these self-styled champions, who led Lebanon into these losses, possess any real means of compelling Israel to comply? More importantly, do they understand that Israel has no genuine interest in signing a peace agreement with Lebanon in the foreseeable future, and that its overriding obsession today is to alter facts on the ground so thoroughly that any future peace would amount to little more than surrender? Do they grasp that a peace agreement with Israel today, were it somehow to materialize, would spare Lebanon far more crises and catastrophes than an agreement reached a year or two from now, after Israel has already imposed new realities on the terrain?
The Americans are acutely aware of Benjamin Netanyahu’s thinking concerning Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, the West Bank, and Iran. While they do not oppose Israel on many strategic objectives, they see clear benefit in calming conflicts, opening channels of negotiation, and constructing a future rooted in shared economic interests. Put differently, they seek to entice Israel by granting it a leading role in the Middle Eastern–European market. This is precisely why President Donald Trump invited Israel’s prime minister to Washington.
Netanyahu, however, is not currently prepared for de-escalation or for the conclusion of peace agreements. He seeks subjugation first; the forces opposed to Israel, particularly Hezbollah and Hamas, must be militarily defeated, or at the very least effectively stripped of their capabilities. Netanyahu believes previous agreements failed because they were not grounded in a decisive balance of power, and that concluding new peace deals now would be a grave mistake unless they are preceded by the imposition of absolute military and security dominance. This logic explains the ongoing escalation in Lebanon, as well as in Syria and Gaza. Netanyahu benefits from Hezbollah’s insistence on refusing to surrender its weapons and from the repeated statements of its officials, most recently by its representative in Tehran, claiming that the party has managed to restore its capabilities, even if only partially.
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The American perspective diverges on the tactical level. Trump views stability in the Middle East as essential to safeguarding the flow of oil, maintaining markets, and securing diplomatic achievements that can be sold to the American electorate. He is therefore working to avoid a regional war that would derail his agenda and impose enormous military costs on the United States, as he seeks to reduce direct American military involvement and minimize expenditures. Trump believes that political arrangements between Lebanon and Israel would be advantageous, even if they are tilted in Israel’s favor. He fears that Netanyahu’s unchecked escalation could trigger a broad Iranian response, dragging Washington into an unwanted military confrontation. In short, Trump favors de-escalation to secure a swift and inexpensive peace that serves American interests, whereas Netanyahu rejects any de-escalation unless it follows costly military campaigns that advance Israel’s long-term security objectives.
The question, then, is whether Netanyahu can refuse Washington’s request. Most likely, at their meeting on the 29th, Netanyahu will maneuver tactically, agreeing to a superficial and temporary freeze in hostilities while offering vague assurances of restraint. At the same time, he will leave the door open to “limited” operations, biding his time for the right moment to strike Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran. This approach serves the broader ambitions of Israel’s nationalist and religious right, whose vision ultimately revolves around the idea of “Greater Israel” as an inalienable goal.
Netanyahu will attempt to persuade Trump that every previous peace process involving territorial withdrawal, from Sinai to Gaza, has merely laid the ground for new security threats. Accordingly, he will promote the notion that peace is impossible without the complete and irreversible elimination of the opposing side’s military capabilities. The true objective extends beyond border security to the redefinition of the borders themselves. Israel is therefore determined to entrench a presence and expand its influence into Lebanese territory, seize strategic high ground such as Mount Hermon, and establish security buffer zones extending into neighboring countries. This expansion is not purely geographic; it is also demographic, and the prospect of displacement is very real.
Meanwhile, attention is being deliberately diverted from a dangerous acceleration in settlement construction in the West Bank, a pace that will render the idea of a viable Palestinian state virtually unattainable. Through negotiations, Netanyahu is simply buying time. It would thus be extraordinarily naive for the Lebanese to fall into the trap of stagnating at any particular stage of the talks. It borders on the trivial to debate whether civilian negotiations should be expanded by adding members to the Lebanese delegation in the name of sectarian balance, or whether talks should be conducted directly between delegations or via the American mediator when all parties are effectively seated in the same room.
Worse still is for Lebanon to become mired in arguments over what it should accept or reject, while Israel has no genuine desire for negotiations or an agreement in the first place, and while its machinery relentlessly advances its bets outside the negotiating halls, beginning with the Naqoura–Shebaa Farms line. Recent leaks suggest the possibility of several additional weeks of truce, perhaps eight, allowing the Lebanese army to announce the completion of the first phase of its plan south of the Litani River. Such a development would expose to all that the Lebanese state is wholly unprepared for the perilous gamble of disarmament north of the Litani.
At that point, Netanyahu will declare that the justification for a major war is now unmistakable and that the United States must stand firmly by its Middle Eastern ally in trying times. Consequently, while a large-scale Israeli war may not erupt in the immediate weeks ahead, it is far more likely to break out in the spring, unless Israel achieves its objectives through negotiations. Since Lebanon is unlikely to concede something so momentous, war in the spring appears all but inevitable, and spring has long been a season that evokes, for the Lebanese, memories of wars, invasions, and hardship.
Toni Issa (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)