‘It’s a Puppet Theater’: How Hamas Shapes Gaza’s Technocratic Government
Israeli analysts warn that Gaza’s postwar governing committee, presented as technocratic and neutral, lacks real authority as Hamas retains military, ideological, and organizational control on the ground
“It is not a government. It is barely a committee.” The description, offered by Dr. Harel Chorev, is not a rhetorical flourish but analytical shorthand.
Speaking with The Media Line, Chorev framed Gaza’s newly established National Committee for the Administration of Gaza as a structure designed to manage appearances rather than power. “They are supposed to be the band-aid,” he said, “to a continuous Hamas control behind the scenes.” In that assessment lies the central contradiction of Gaza’s postwar experiment: a technocratic body tasked with civilian governance while the decisive levers of authority remain firmly in other hands.
They are supposed to be the band-aid to a continuous Hamas control behind the scenes
The committee was announced in mid-January and introduced internationally as a neutral framework focused on reconstruction, stability, and the restoration of basic services after more than two years of war.
Its mandate is broad, encompassing security, electricity, water, healthcare, education, housing, finance, justice, religious affairs, municipal services, and tribal affairs. On paper, its architecture resembles that of a fully developed civilian government. On the ground, Israeli analysts argue, that breadth only sharpens the disconnect between administrative ambition and political reality.
Chorev, a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, stressed that the committee has no realistic prospect of operating independently in a territory where Hamas remains the dominant military, political, and social force. “They have no chance to run the Gaza Strip in a way that would be independent,” he told The Media Line. “They would be controlled by Hamas.” That control, he explained, is not abstract or theoretical. It is embedded in Gaza’s security environment, its civil institutions, and the social networks that underpin them.
They have no chance to run the Gaza Strip in a way that would be independent. They would be controlled by Hamas.
The limits of the committee’s authority became visible almost immediately. Hamas has reportedly demanded that at least 10,000 of its operatives be incorporated into the new policing force. “It means that the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades will be integrated legally into the policing force,” Chorev said, describing a scenario in which Hamas’ military wing becomes part of a civilian security framework without being dismantled.
In parallel, Hamas prevented the designated interior security official from entering Gaza, forcing him to operate remotely. For Chorev, this was not a logistical hiccup but a defining signal. “That is to say, there is no chance that Hamas will withdraw from power,” he said. “It’s all really a puppet theater.”
That assessment was reinforced by documents revealed by Israel’s public broadcaster Kan, which published internal Hamas instructions ordering Palestinian civil servants to comply with directives issued by the movement. The documents outlined expectations of discipline, loyalty, and coordination, emphasizing that any administrative body operating in Gaza would remain subordinated to Hamas’ command structure, regardless of its formal title or international backing.
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Symbols quickly became another point of friction. When the committee unveiled a logo resembling that of the Palestinian Authority, Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office issued a public statement rejecting the use of Palestinian Authority symbols and stressing that the Authority would have no role in Gaza’s administration.
Chorev noted that in Palestinian political culture, symbols are inseparable from claims of legitimacy. “Such a symbol reflects very clearly the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority,” he said. At the same time, he acknowledged that for Gaza’s population today, symbolism competes with a more immediate reality. “People are much more interested in their livelihood,” he said, “but everywhere they look, they still see Hamas.”
If Chorev dissects the committee through the lens of narrative, symbolism, and dependency, Kobi Michael approaches it as a strategic problem with limited degrees of freedom. Speaking with The Media Line, Michael described the technocratic government as “an empty, hollow entity” as long as Hamas remains intact. Michael is a senior fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security and a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.
“They can do nothing which is substantial as long as Hamas is there as an organized military and governmental entity,” Michael said. “Eventually Hamas will make the last call, and Hamas will determine what this government can do and what this government cannot do.” In his view, the committee is operating in a declarative phase, marked by announcements, meetings, and organizational charts that signal intent but lack enforcement power.
Michael pointed to Hamas’ continued reconstitution as the decisive factor. Despite the war, the organization is rebuilding its military capabilities, maintaining command structures, and issuing internal directives. He cited instructions circulated within Hamas regulating how members should interact with representatives of the technocratic committee as evidence that the group is preparing to manage the process rather than surrender authority. “Of course, Hamas will control who controls who,” he said.
The committee’s dependence on Gaza’s existing professional workforce further complicates the picture. Reconstruction requires engineers, doctors, teachers, and municipal staff, yet those systems are already embedded in Hamas’ organizational environment. “They are not going to bring people from India to be doctors or engineers,” Michael said. “They are going to use the same people that are already there.” As a result, he argued, “all of these systems in the Gaza Strip will be operated by people who are affiliated or influenced or controlled by Hamas.”
Speculation about alternative Palestinian power centers has done little to alter that assessment. One name that repeatedly surfaces in discussions about Gaza’s future is Mohammed Dahlan, a former Fatah security chief in Gaza who fell out with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and has since operated from abroad.
Asked about Dahlan, Michael cautioned against overstating his role. “Mohammed Dahlan is not a very significant player at this moment,” he said, acknowledging Dahlan’s local legitimacy and regional connections but emphasizing that he does not currently shape outcomes on the ground. The same, Michael argued, applies to the Palestinian Authority. “The Palestinian Authority is not a player,” he said. “The only influential and significant player here is Hamas.”
They still believe in the armed resistance, and they are very reluctant with regard to the right of the state of Israel to exist at all
Public opinion, he added, reinforces Hamas’ dominance. “Many youngsters in the Gaza Strip are willing to be recruited now to Hamas and to fight,” Michael said. “They still believe in the armed resistance, and they are very reluctant with regard to the right of the state of Israel to exist at all.” In such an environment, he argued, administrative rearrangements alone cannot produce political change.
In April 2025, Ali Shaath sat for a podcast interview and spoke openly about Israel. At the time, there was no talk of him leading any future administration in Gaza. Months later, after his name emerged as chair of the technocratic committee, Palestinian Media Watch (PMW) returned to that recording and flagged it for its content.
Speaking with The Media Line, PMW founder and director Itamar Marcus said Shaath did not moderate his language. In the recording, Shaath described Israel as “a colonialist who was planted by America and Western Europe” following the Balfour Declaration, dismissing Jewish historical ties to the land and treating Israel’s existence as a foreign imposition rather than a legitimate state.
“This colonialist who was planted by America and Western Europe, they planted it in Palestine since the Balfour Promise,” Shaath said in the interview, repeatedly referring to Israel as “the occupation,” a term which, in the Palestinian Authority’s lexicon, defines all of Israel as illegitimate.
Shaath also spoke openly about his past involvement in violent activity. “Like every Palestinian, I did an activity with young people at school, demonstrations against the Israeli occupation,” Shaath said, describing how he organized stone-throwing confrontations near Israeli checkpoints in Khan Yunis. “We set this day ablaze, and I actually was the organizer of this activity or this national act. … I succeeded in awakening all the opinions and feelings of the people, and they set out to the occupation’s positions.”
For Marcus, these statements are not incidental or outdated. “This ideology is so fundamental,” he told The Media Line. “If he is leading this government, that means that we are going to get nothing better in the future. He might be quiet about his ideology now, but he’s certainly not going to be promoting what has to be promoted.”
He argued that no administrative reform can succeed without a profound ideological shift. “The first ideological change is that the Palestinian leadership has to tell their people that the Jews are indigenous to the land with thousands of years of history and have a right to exist beside them,” Marcus said. “If they’re not willing to say that, there’s no point in wasting time on this experiment in Gaza.”
The Palestinian leadership has to tell their people that the Jews are indigenous to the land with thousands of years of history and have a right to exist beside them
Taken together, the documentation, rhetoric, and operational constraints point in the same direction. Whether described as technocratic, administrative, or provisional, the committee operates inside boundaries defined by Hamas. Where the analysts diverge is in their reading of time and intent.
Chorev emphasizes patience and sequencing, arguing that the current phase is being pursued consciously and may yet culminate in decisive action against Hamas. Michael sees the framework as structurally incapable of producing change unless Hamas is dismantled first. Marcus warns that even a post-Hamas administration would reproduce the same conflict dynamics without ideological transformation.
For Israel, the technocratic committee is neither a solution nor an illusion easily dismissed. It is a controlled experiment unfolding in full view, testing whether administration can precede authority or whether, as Chorev put it, Gaza’s postwar framework is destined to remain “a puppet theater” as long as Hamas holds the strings.
