Analysis: Hussein al-Sheikh, the Unenviable Rising Star in Palestinian Politics
No matter what his people expect him to do, al-Sheikh is not the Superman whose arm wave can change the world. He needs everybody and every country to help him lead his people to the safe shore
International demands for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to reform itself are as old as the PA itself. The PA held its first presidential and legislative elections in 1996, two years after its formation. The newly elected Legislative Council began examining whether corruption existed. The motive was clear: Palestinians had long been seen as pioneering educators sent to Arab countries—especially in the Gulf—to teach in schools. The motto among many Palestinian Legislative Council members was simple: “If we managed to help build countries around us, we can certainly build our own.”
Calls for deeper reform re-emerged after the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000 and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. Leading those calls was the US administration under President George W. Bush, who developed a peculiar hostility toward the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The trajectory of the Second Intifada, especially the wave of Hamas suicide attacks inside Israel, severely damaged the Palestinian national cause like nothing before. Hamas is still seen by many—not only in Israel but among Palestinians—as an existential threat to Palestinian statehood, not to Israel, as many Israelis believe or were told to believe.
I recall an argument with an Israeli colleague when I was a producer at a foreign television news agency. He insisted Hamas’ attacks posed an existential threat to Israel. I countered that Israel was too strong to be destroyed by such attacks, however brutal they were. But for the Palestinian national movement, each suicide bombing by Hamas was a serious blow to our aspirations for statehood through peaceful means. And so it remains.
One deeply unfortunate development was the loss of the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s legacy. Rabin once said, “Israel will continue with the peace process as if there is no terror and will fight terror as if there is no peace process.” Most of his successors abandoned this principle, allowing Hamas to shape the peace process. After every Hamas attack, Israel would suspend scheduled negotiations.
In the late 1990s, the Palestinian Preventive Security arrested a senior Hamas field operative. When asked about the timing of suicide bombings, his answer was short, brief and accurate: “We were told to be ready and send any suicide bomber to wherever the target inside Israel, the day a meeting is scheduled for the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators. Our goal was to disrupt the peace process. Those attacks were designed to convince the Israelis they had no peace partners and thus, to skip the peace hallucination in which they lived.”
Why bring this up now? Because history is repeating itself. The past three decades have shown how extremists on both sides have sustained each other in an unholy alliance, costing countless Israeli and Palestinian lives. No wonder, then, that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saw Hamas’ continued control of Gaza as a convenient tool to advance his agenda: dismantling the Oslo Accords and burying any prospect of peace. Sadly, he succeeded—with help from Hamas and its implicit collaboration with every Israeli government Netanyahu led, from the mid-1990s through his return to office in 2009.
We also killed their people, and this is exactly why we are talking to them. This killing spree has to come to an end.
To his credit, Rabin found a sincere peace partner in Arafat. I once heard the following from one of Arafat’s aides: When still in Tunis, Arafat summoned him and said, “I want you to wait at the Tunis International Airport tomorrow morning to receive [IDF Chief of Staff] Amnon Shahak and [Foreign Ministry Director General] Uri Savir.” Perplexed and somewhat angered, the aide objected, “Excuse me, brother Abu Ammar. I cannot shake hands with killers of my people.” Arafat glared at him and responded, “And have we circulated sweets among them? We also killed their people, and this is exactly why we are talking to them. This killing spree has to come to an end.”
Years later, the same aide told me in Ramallah that the encounter transformed him into a dedicated supporter of peace—provided it was a peace of the brave, between equals.
Leaders like Arafat and Rabin are sorely missing today, especially in Israel. The rise of the New Guard in Palestine—symbolized by the appointment of PLO Executive Committee Secretary General Hussein al-Sheikh—should be recognized by Israelis and the West as a positive step. Still, no matter how constructive this appointment may be for Palestinians, the key to real change lies in Israel. Only when Israel elects a leader committed to a two-state solution will someone like al-Sheikh have a real chance. President Mahmoud Abbas tried, but had no partner. There is no reason to believe that Abbas’ successor will be less committed to a two-state vision grounded in the 1967 borders.
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Israeli officials—especially in the security sector—know al-Sheikh well. Over the years, he met regularly with Israeli counterparts in his capacity as chief commissioner of civil affairs in the PA. His responsibilities included coordinating on daily Palestinian needs: health care, work and travel permits, and the validation of PA-issued identity cards, which must be entered into Israel’s population registry.
Who is Hussein al-Sheikh?
Al-Sheikh, also known as Abu Jihad, is part of a new generation of Palestinian leaders raised in the Israeli-occupied territories after the 1967 war. He rose quickly through the ranks of Fatah and the PLO, and today stands one step away from the presidency.
Born on December 14, 1960, in Ramallah, Abu Jihad hails from a refugee family originally from Deir Tarif in the Ramleh district. Their village was destroyed in 1948, forcing the family to relocate to Ramallah. He joined Fatah early and was arrested in 1978 for resistance activities. An Israeli military court sentenced him to 11 years. While in prison, he learned Hebrew fluently. After his release in 1989, he joined the Unified Command of the Intifada—a clandestine PLO umbrella body that coordinated popular resistance during the First Intifada, which began in December 1987.
After the establishment of the PA following the Oslo Accords, al-Sheikh served in Preventive Security with the rank of colonel.
In 2007, he was appointed minister of civil affairs and head of the Higher Civic Coordination Committee, overseeing official PA coordination with Israel. Two years later, he was elected to Fatah’s Central Committee during its sixth congress in Bethlehem.
In 2017, he joined the Fatah delegation in national reconciliation talks with Hamas. On February 7, 2022, the Central Committee nominated him to the PLO Executive Committee, which then selected him as secretary general. He succeeded the late Saeb Erekat in that role, bringing him deeper into the PLO’s decision-making circles.
Over the past two years, al-Sheikh has become President Abbas’ closest confidant. He has led key dialogues with Israeli, American, and Arab officials. Last February, he stepped down as head of civil affairs but retained his other roles, including chair of the Al-Bireh Youth Club in Ramallah.
What is the alternative to the Palestinian Authority? Chaos and violence!
Al-Sheikh is widely seen—both in Israel and abroad—as pragmatic and someone with whom agreements can be reached. He supports President Abbas’ strategy: diplomacy, negotiation, and popular resistance. In an interview with Foreign Policy before October 7, 2023, he said, “The PA is unable to offer the people a political horizon, or solve their financial and economic problems resulting from the occupation. But what is the alternative to the Palestinian Authority? Chaos and violence!”
Personally, I’m not inclined to celebrate anyone ascending to such a burdensome position. It’s not a prize—it’s a heavy responsibility. Al-Sheikh will face enormous challenges, which I will outline below:
Ending the war in Gaza: This is not in the hands of the PA, nor in the hands of the Egyptian, Qatari, or American mediators, who have worked relentlessly—but so far fruitlessly—to bring the war to an end and secure the release of all Israeli captives held in Gaza. The outcome lies with Prime Minister Netanyahu and his hard-line, far-right coalition. Israel’s foot-dragging in the ceasefire talks, coupled with Netanyahu’s repeated declarations about achieving “ultimate victory,” point to one conclusion: this war will continue for as long as Netanyahu needs it to preserve his political survival.
Opposition from within: It’s no secret that many senior Fatah leaders aspired to al-Sheikh’s position. However, the movement’s internal code remains unchanged. Its leaders—especially those on the Central Committee—compete fiercely for top posts. They criticize and discredit each other behind closed doors and during internal primaries. But once a decision is made, they rally behind the chosen figure. This has been the norm since the days of Yasser Arafat and remains so today. I see no reason to expect it to change.
A clear example of this rivalry was the congratulatory statement issued by Fatah Central Committee Secretary General Jibril Rajoub after al-Sheikh’s appointment as deputy to President Abbas. The two men have long been reported as political rivals, frequently at odds. But now, that rivalry appears to have been put aside—at least publicly.
Stability and quiet in the West Bank: This is one of the toughest challenges. Israeli settlers, often protected by the Israeli army, continue to attack Palestinian farmers, vandalize homes and properties in villages, and even detain civilians as if they were law enforcement officials. In parallel, near-daily incursions by the Israeli military into refugee camps, villages, and cities across the West Bank further destabilize the situation. If Israel truly seeks quiet and stability in the West Bank, it must stop fueling unrest. The incursions must end, allowing the PA to function without the constant disruption of soldiers and settlers.
Winning the Palestinians’ hearts: This is a near-impossible task—not just for al-Sheikh, but for anyone in charge—so long as Israel continues its financial and economic stranglehold on the PA. The Palestinian people want a leader who will bring them to a safe shore, who can lead them from occupation to freedom. No Palestinian official can do that while Israel’s government is led by far-right ministers—some of whom were once investigated by Israel’s own Shin Bet for inciting violence against Palestinians. What might help al-Sheikh is the growing public recognition that he is not a superhero. Change cannot come from one side. It takes two to tango. Al-Sheikh needs a willing partner on the Israeli side to lead Palestinians out of endless cycles of conflict.
Arab and international support: The flood of congratulatory messages from Arab and Western governments following al-Sheikh’s appointment speaks volumes. Many had waited for President Abbas to take tangible steps toward reform—and now that he has, more are expected. But well-wishes alone aren’t enough. If not backed by real action, they will ring hollow. What the PA needs now is urgent political and financial support. Israel must be pressured to release the full tax revenues it collects on the PA’s behalf—funds it has repeatedly withheld. Without them, the PA cannot survive its worsening financial crisis.
Furthermore, the 1995 Paris Economic Protocol—signed between Israel and the PLO—must be revisited. As long as this agreement binds the Palestinian economy to Israel’s, the PA will lack the economic sovereignty needed to enact independent policy. Unless that changes, the crisis will persist indefinitely.
The two-state solution: This remains the greatest challenge facing Palestinian leaders—al-Sheikh included. The violence and political developments of the past year and a half have pushed the goal of a two-state solution further out of reach. But this vision must not be allowed to die. Immediate and decisive intervention by the international community—especially by the US under President Trump—is urgently needed. What can be done today must not be postponed until tomorrow.
