Opinion – Hamas, Incapacitated, Can’t Negotiate an End to the Gaza War
Israel’s war in Gaza weakened Hamas to the extent that no one in the movement can decide what’s next
A video of a man in Gaza in his early 70s captured my attention no less than all the horrible scenes that the war in Gaza has been feeding us since October 7 last year. “God, we thank you every year for your generous rain that kept our land green and our bodies safe from dehydration. This year, we ask you to hold on to your rain, for we’d rather die from thirst than drown along with our tents,” the man in the video said.
This man, reduced to living in a makeshift tent along with the 1.7 million other Palestinians displaced by the war, told the story of Gaza’s plight in such honest, straightforward, painful words that need no explanation. Most displaced Palestinians live in tents—some makeshift and others brought into the Gaza Strip as part of the international humanitarian aid effort.
Much has been said about what happened before, during, and after October 7 last year. Yet, the question at hand is not about the past as much as about what must be done tomorrow to bring an end to this war, for Palestinians and Israelis alike.
Both sides face a severe crisis, and both are sick and tired of this ugly war. Palestinians want this war to end ASAP to return to normal life, or whatever normalcy can be regained in Gaza. Israelis want to see their captives held in Gaza released and returned safely to Israel. Family members of hostages who died or were killed during their captivity want to bring their bodies back to Israel for adequate burials.
The only way to address the fundamental and righteous desire on both sides is to reach a deal that not only ends the war in Gaza but shapes the post-war Gaza Strip based on international law and UN resolutions. Anything less than that cannot move the cart out of the Gaza quagmire.
It is no secret that Hamas has faced an almost deadly blow over the past 14 months of war. Many cease-fire parameters were unacceptable to Hamas immediately after October 7 last year because of the group’s false sense of victory brought on by the attacks. Hamas initially disregarded the war’s aftermath, including the skyrocketing death toll among Palestinian civilians and the destruction that the war brought to the Gaza Strip.
Today, Hamas has neither a charismatic leader who can convince his followers of his capability nor a local commander in Gaza who can make decisions on crucial issues. Numerous Hamas members in Gaza feel they can no longer trust their leadership abroad. Some have even published their resignations on social media platforms or distanced themselves from the movement.
This holiday season, give to:
Truth and understanding
The Media Line's intrepid correspondents are in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Pakistan providing first-person reporting.
They all said they cover it.
We see it.
We report with just one agenda: the truth.


Living in five-star hotels paid by Qatar or other parties is no place to decide the fate of Gaza under war
I asked one former Hamas supporter why he is no longer associating himself with the movement. “Living in five-star hotels paid by Qatar or other parties is no place to decide the fate of Gaza under war,” he said, referring to Hamas leaders abroad. His statement was sharp enough to cut through every debate about who should or shouldn’t decide Gaza’s future.
While a strong Hamas was probably a nut too hard to crack, a weak Hamas is clearly unable to make decisions. Israel’s unilateral war over the past few months in Gaza has faced very little resistance, turning Gazan civilians into almost the sole target of Israeli attacks. This fact has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hamas is almost finished, except for pockets of armed men who sporadically return fire or launch attacks against Israeli army positions in the Gaza Strip. The one or two rockets they manage to fire from Gaza serve mostly to remind the outside world that they are still there, alive and kicking.
The disappearance of Hamas’ pre-October 7 military power is indicative of the new reality in Gaza, where there are no decision-makers at the local level. There must be a way to solve this puzzle, and the successful cease-fire in Lebanon is a good example of how things ought to be done.
Hezbollah felt it couldn’t continue the war when the death toll among Lebanese civilians reached 2,000 and the destruction caused by Israeli air raids became too much to tolerate. Unlike Hamas under Yahya Sinwar, Hezbollah decided to avoid being pulled into a suicidal track. The new Hezbollah leadership that took over after Israel assassinated Hassan Nasrallah decided to solicit Amal, another Shiite movement in Lebanon, to negotiate on its behalf alongside the Lebanese government.
Today, Hamas must do the same or something very similar. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is the overriding authority among the Palestinian people, including the Palestinian Authority itself. The PLO had engaged in fruitful talks with Israel long before the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, such as the prisoner exchanges that occurred after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The PLO can still play a positive role in negotiating a deal to end the war and secure the return of the Israeli captives once Hamas understands that it can no longer veto a solution that can end the war in Gaza. That understanding will not necessarily come from the PLO alone, but also from the mediating Arab countries of Egypt and Qatar.
Those who claim the PLO is no partner must look back to 1993 when the Oslo process started secretly between the PLO and Israel. Some say that those talks were launched without the Americans’ knowledge at the time. The PLO was and continues to be ready for genuine and tangible talks with Israel led by leaders who believe in their country’s interests and not just in their personal interests.
There were leaders like these in the past, including David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Olmert, and even Ariel Sharon, who took the daring decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and who admitted that the Palestinians could never accept living under occupation for the rest of their lives. Benjamin Netanyahu is a different breed, unfortunately. This difference underscores the importance of the new US administration under President Donald Trump, who needs to know that today’s Netanyahu is not the same one he knew eight or four years ago.
Only a concerted effort between the Arab mediators, the PLO, and the US can hopefully bring Netanyahu back to the negotiating table to end the Gaza war.
An article published in Hebrew by former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin provides important testimony about how risky Netanyahu has become for Israel itself. The article was first published late last year, but its contents still apply today.
Netanyahu created and signed the coalition agreements that established the most extreme, immoral and, above all, the most harmful and dangerous coalition in the country’s history
“Netanyahu created and signed the coalition agreements that established the most extreme, immoral and, above all, the most harmful and dangerous coalition in the country’s history,” Diskin wrote. He added, “I hereby call on the head of the Shin Bet, the head of the Mossad, the police commissioner, the chief of staff—go into his [Netanyahu’s] office and tell him: That’s it, sir. That’s it.”
I have nothing to add to this except that I admire Diskin’s words as well as the recent statements by former IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon in his rare yet courageous criticism of the way the military has behaved in the Gaza war based on orders from the political echelon.