‘An Assault on Arab Sovereignty’: After Israel’s Doha Strike, ‘Red Lines Are Being Rewritten,’ Egyptian Former General Tells TML
Governments across the region reassess security coordination, normalization, and reliance on American protection after Israel’s September 9 strike in Qatar.
The Israeli airstrike on September 9 that targeted Hamas leaders in Qatar set off a regional diplomatic reset, pushing Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, and the United States to rethink their balancing acts. Israel described it as a “targeted operation against Hamas’ political leadership,” and the fallout has raised questions about Arab security coordination, the credibility of US guarantees, and the durability of normalization deals.
Washington’s reaction has been carefully measured. President Donald Trump quickly spoke with Qatar’s emir and later met with the prime minister in New York, affirming Qatar’s importance as an ally and advancing the US–Qatar Defense Cooperation Agreement. Yet, as Justin Alexander, director of Khalij Economics and Gulf analyst for GlobalSource Partners, observed, the tone was markedly softer than that of other Western capitals.
The episode is now testing three pillars at once: US defense assurances to Gulf partners, Israel’s normalization track, and early talk of a region-wide Arab security framework.
“Compared to the UK, France, or Germany, the US response was much less critical of Israel. Both Trump and US officials framed the killing of Hamas members as a worthy objective, while regretting that it happened in Doha. In the Gulf, this looked like tacit acceptance. The message has been that Israel’s action was unfortunate in its location, but legitimate in its aim. That kind of ambivalence is being read across the region as a green light,” Alexander told The Media Line.
He said this has shaken one of the core assumptions of Gulf security—the implicit US guarantee.
In Gulf capitals, perception is as damaging as fact
“There’s always been a belief in some level of American protection, particularly for Qatar, where Al Udeid Air Base hosts the US Central Command. The idea that Israel could strike there without Washington stopping it undermines that trust. Even if President Trump insists he only found out too late, there is a widespread perception that the US provided cover. In Gulf capitals, perception is as damaging as fact,” he noted.
He added that Washington is underestimating the strike’s symbolic weight.
“This was not simply about Hamas. A Qatari policeman was killed in the attack. For a country with only about 300,000 Qatari citizens, the loss of one national is profoundly felt. That has resonated not just in Doha, but across the Gulf,” he said.
Hasnain Malik, managing director of Emerging Markets Equity & Geopolitics Strategy at Tellimer, noted that US–Qatar defense ties have complicated perceptions. He said the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will face sharper questions about reliance on US defense cover.
“The renewal of the US-Qatar Defense Cooperation Agreement may have had a bearing on what appears to be US complicity in the Israeli airstrike. This event will force the GCC to contend with what reliance on the US for defense cover means in the modern era,” he said to The Media Line.
Analysts say the UAE, the only Arab state to maintain open relations with Israel throughout the Gaza war, now faces intense pressure. Abu Dhabi has already summoned Israel’s deputy ambassador and excluded Israeli companies from the Dubai Airshow.
Malik said the stakes include the future of the Abraham Accords.
“The UAE will be loath to scrap the Abraham Accords, given they have helped support an influx of investment funds, their affluent staff, and US political connections, that has helped the latest wave of non-oil growth. But Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank are jeopardizing this,” he noted.
At the same time, Malik argued that any move toward collective Gulf security would require a fundamental rethink.
“A move to joint GCC forces would require an unlikely sea change to the fiercely guarded independence of each state,” he added.
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Cairo reacted with alarm when intelligence suggested Israel had even contemplated striking Hamas figures in Egypt before the Doha operation. For retired Brig. Gen. Samir Ragheb, president of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies, such a move would have been intolerable.
A violation of sovereignty would ignite hell everywhere
“Israel should think a million times before taking such an action here. Our peace has been the strongest and longest-lasting in the region, and it has endured despite wars, assassinations, and provocations. But peace does not mean total surrender. A violation of sovereignty would ignite hell everywhere. Egypt is not Qatar—any attack on Cairo would be treated as a declaration of war,” he told The Media Line.
Ragheb said the strike set a dangerous precedent.
“The insistence on pursuing Palestinian leaders in any country opens the door to strikes anywhere—Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, and more. This escalation changed the rules. It is no longer a matter of targeted killings in Gaza or elsewhere; it is an assault on Arab and Islamic sovereignty itself. That is why Doha’s strike resonated so strongly across the Arab world, and red lines are being rewritten,” he noted.
He also argued that Israel would miscalculate Egypt’s deterrence.
“War between Egypt and Israel is not possible today—there are no achievable goals. Entering Gaza’s war would mean killing our own children alongside Palestinians. Moreover, Israel’s war in Gaza has shown it is weaker than imagined. The current Israeli army is weaker than the one we fought in 1973, while Egypt’s army is much stronger than it was back then,” he added.
Turkey, another country that hosts some Hamas members, was also considered a potential Israeli target. While alarm spread among commentators, Turkish officialdom remained confident. Dr. Barın Kayaoğlu, assistant professor of American studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBÜ), explained why.
“Ankara is much more relaxed about the possibility of an Israeli strike on Turkish soil. The military has already gamed out such scenarios, especially after the 2016 coup attempt and the purge of disloyal officers. A limited Israeli strike in Syria is conceivable. But an outright attack on Turkey would be insane. Israel may have a strong air force, but Turkey’s naval forces dwarf their Israeli counterparts, and an attack would trigger retaliation that Israel could not absorb,” he told The Media Line.
Kayaoğlu added that Ankara has little faith in NATO’s collective defense provisions, recalling the lack of support during its 2015 confrontation with Russia.
“As for NATO, Ankara has little confidence in Articles 4 or 5. During the Su-24 crisis with Russia, Turkey got little to no help. Worse, allies like the US and the Netherlands withdrew their Patriot air defense batteries from southern Turkey. So while technically protected, Ankara knows the alliance’s commitments are unreliable in practice,” he noted.
He argued that Ankara’s engagement with Hamas has often been misunderstood.
“Western and Israeli media exaggerate Turkey’s ties to Hamas. In reality, only one or two senior leaders are believed to live here. Ankara’s support is limited and rooted in the fact that Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections. The idea was always to convince them to disarm and become a political party in a two-state framework. That was the logic of engagement—not military sponsorship,” he added.
Turkey maintains open political ties with Hamas, which it does not list as a terrorist organization. Senior figures travel there frequently, and some are believed to live in Istanbul, but Ankara denies that the group’s political bureau relocated from Qatar. Current reporting points to a limited, fluid presence—likely just a handful of senior leaders at any given time.
In the immediate aftermath of Israel’s attack, Qatar launched a diplomatic counteroffensive. Doha called for an Arab-Muslim summit on Sunday and Monday (Sept. 14–15) to craft a regional response. Among the proposals, officials said, was the formation of a joint Arab military alliance to defend states—and even Iran—from further Israeli actions.
For Ragheb, the momentum recalls Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s long-standing call for collective security.
“President Sisi has been calling since 2015 for a mechanism of collective Arab security, not just military responses. The Doha strike makes this urgency even greater. For the first time, the idea of Arab armies coordinating like a rapid-response force is being treated as more than a slogan. Whether this becomes reality is another matter, but the political will has shifted,” he said.
Malik also said Gulf states may look beyond the US in their search for protection.
“Shared concerns over an unrestrained Israel and a reliable US may push the GCC states toward closer military cooperation with Turkey, in what would effectively be a trade of investment for defense cover,” he noted.
On Sunday (Sept. 14), US Senator Marco Rubio arrived in Israel, signaling Washington’s desire to defuse the crisis, even as questions remain about America’s role. Markets stayed calm even as political trust eroded, Alexander said.
“Financial markets barely blinked. Qatari equities and debt spreads barely moved, and oil prices ticked up only briefly. But politically, this has shifted assumptions in a way markets don’t capture. The strike was not only on Hamas leaders; it was on the credibility of US defense guarantees,” he said.
The fallout from the Doha strike has made clear that Israel’s regional integration project faces its stiffest challenge since the Abraham Accords were signed. For Alexander, what was once seen as a potential partnership between Israel and Gulf capitals has been set back indefinitely.
Setting the normalization debate in context, Alexander added: “Qatar was one of the first Gulf states to engage with Israel, even opening a commercial office in 1996. It mediated in Gaza for years and facilitated aid with Israel’s approval, and in the recent war mediated the release of 80 hostages. Qatar, along with other Gulf states, has repeatedly indicated its willingness to fully normalize relations with Israel following the two-state solution.”
“That now looks less likely than ever. The attack in Doha broke a taboo that even its closest Arab partners cannot overlook,” he added.
For Kayaoğlu, any prospect of restoring Turkey–Israel ties requires fundamental changes.
Normalization with Netanyahu is impossible
“There is still room for recovery, but normalization with Netanyahu is impossible. The genocide in Gaza must stop. The next Israeli government would have to show real commitment to a Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, and compensate victims. Without that, relations are headed for a rupture as deep as after the Mavi Marmara,” he said.
And for Ragheb, the lesson is that peace without justice is unsustainable.
“The Doha strike confirms that Israel, in its current state, deserves a pragmatic answer. Peace must be really pursued on multiple fronts; otherwise, we only move backward. Arab leaders understood this and decided to start setting ultimatums, sending a clear message to Israel: Start to behave differently in the region or you are going to be cut off from it,” he said.
The Doha strike has exposed deep fissures in the Middle East’s security architecture. Gulf skepticism of US protection, Egyptian warnings, Turkish caution, and Emirati hesitation over keeping normalization all point to a region recalibrating its strategic choices. Whether the Arab-Muslim summit converts outrage into coordinated policy remains uncertain; what is clear is that Israel’s actions have reset regional red lines, leaving allies and adversaries alike reassessing the risks of the current path.
