‘Trump’s Attempt To Replace the UN’: Peace Board Adds New Layer to Gaza Plan, but Disarmament Questions Persist
Displaced Palestinian families living in the Jabalia area continue their daily lives under harsh conditions, in Gaza City, Gaza, on Jan. 18, 2026. (Khames Alrefi/Anadolu via Getty Images)

‘Trump’s Attempt To Replace the UN’: Peace Board Adds New Layer to Gaza Plan, but Disarmament Questions Persist

Competing views on Hamas, the role of regional mediators, and the absence of Palestinian political representation at the executive level are shaping the next phase

Palestinian and regional officials confirmed that Saturday in Cairo, a new National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was formally authorized as part of the transition to what Washington frames as “phase two” of a broader ceasefire-and-reconstruction plan. Egyptian-linked and regional reporting described the Cairo meeting as the committee’s inaugural session and pointed to the signing of its mandate and operating framework.

The committee is not being presented as a political government. It is described as a 15-member Palestinian “technocratic” body, chaired by Dr. Ali Sha’ath, a Gazan engineer and economist with previous ties to Fatah, tasked with restoring core civilian services and managing early recovery and reconstruction.

But the National Committee is only one tier. A second tier—an international Gaza Executive Board—is being assembled to oversee reconstruction and interface with security arrangements. Above that is President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace,” a wider mechanism, chaired by the US president, initially focused on Gaza and later intended to expand to other conflicts.

The three-tier structure is controversial not only because it is ambitious, but because it brings together actors with sharply different relationships to Hamas and to Israel—including Turkey and Qatar in the executive layer, and invitations reported for a broader Peace Board that may include Pakistan, a state with difficult ties to Israel. Some observers also say the layers are being conflated, blurring the lines between governance, reconstruction management, and any future security enforcement mechanism.

In an interview with The Media Line, Gershon Baskin, co-director of the Alliance for Two States and a former negotiator, described the committee as a product of regional consensus-building.

“The Palestinian National Committee for Gaza has been established. It was officially announced by the Egyptians. There was a meeting of all the Palestinian factions in Cairo to present it to them, including Hamas. All the Palestinian factions agreed to it and blessed it,” he said.

Baskin said the committee is formally presented as nonpartisan even if some members have past political associations.

“There are no current members of Fatah. There are people who might have been associated with Fatah in the past. All of them are considered independents,” he said.

All of them have been vetted by Israel, the United States, Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis, the Emiratis, and even Hamas got to comment on them

The roster, he said, was shaped by extensive external vetting.

“All of them have been vetted by Israel, the United States, Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis, the Emiratis, and even Hamas got to comment on them,” he noted.

He also cast the “technocratic” label as political shorthand, not a neutral description.

“It took three months to form it because all these different interest groups were pulling in their own directions and trying to put their own names. At the end of the day, it was an American decision,” he said.

Publicly circulating names describe portfolio-style responsibilities—education, finance, health, water, and municipalities.

For Nidal Foqaha, director-general of the Palestinian Peace Coalition, the Cairo signature matters, but only as the start of a more fragile process.

“For me, the signing of this authorization represents a significant step when it comes to the history of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis—specifically, you know, the developments of the last two years,” he told The Media Line.

“This establishment of the Technocratic Committee, or the National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip, represents opening a new chapter, given the bloody round which existed for more than two years of war in Gaza. This should give hope to the Palestinians in general, but specifically to the Gazans,” he added.

Foqaha repeatedly stressed that the committee’s ability to function depends on enforceable political and legal space.

“Yet the signature itself is not the only crucial factor. I believe there is a set of factors which should be met when it comes to a clear political and legal authorization by the Palestinian Authority, by the Palestinian factions, but most importantly also from the side of the international community,” he said.

“If Hamas and other political groups or other armed groups do not allow this committee to operate, the issue of service delivery first, and then the reconstruction, will be obstructed and complicated,” he added.

The most important thing for me as a Palestinian is legitimacy. The United States cannot give legitimacy to this committee only.

At the center of his critique is legitimacy.

“The most important thing for me as a Palestinian is legitimacy. The United States cannot give legitimacy to this committee only,” he noted.

He said the Peace Board’s durability will depend on whether invited states feel genuine buy-in rather than symbolic participation. “You need to create confidence first, but then you also need to create a sense of ownership,” Foqaha said. “If you invite people to be members of the Peace Board, then they should be full strategic members from A to Z.”

The three interviews expose a central fault line: whether Gaza’s transition can proceed while Hamas remains partially armed.

Lt. Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch, director of the Initiative for Palestinian Authority Accountability and Reform at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, argued that moving forward without full compliance rewards Hamas.

“I think it’s always been a problem when you allow the terrorists to only partially live up to their commitments. The fact that Hamas didn’t release all the hostages in the time frame set by the first agreement was already a problem,” he told The Media Line.

Hirsch warned that governance frameworks cannot replace security outcomes.

If President Trump is serious that Hamas must be disarmed … I’m sure that President Donald Trump himself will support a return to the war soon

“If President Trump is serious that Hamas must be disarmed, that Hamas must be destroyed, that all of the hostages must be released … when he realizes that those conditions are not being fulfilled … that Hamas is not only not disarming, but is rebuilding its capabilities. … I’m sure that President Donald Trump himself will support a return to the war soon,” he said.

Hamas is finished in Gaza. Hamas has been decimated in Gaza. They cannot rebuild themselves. They cannot control Gaza. They can’t govern Gaza, and they can’t threaten Israel anymore as they used to.

Baskin, by contrast, argued Hamas has already lost its ability to govern.

“Hamas is finished in Gaza. Hamas has been decimated in Gaza. They cannot rebuild themselves. They cannot control Gaza. They can’t govern Gaza, and they can’t threaten Israel anymore as they used to,” he noted.

Foqaha rejected assumptions about intent and focused on enforcement and mediation.

“First, we should not count on the good intentions of whomever, whether Israel, the United States, or Hamas. The whole process is governed where there are actual regional mediators—Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey—and the main sponsor: the United States of America,” he said.

“It’s the time now to go into a comprehensive workshop and to draw a very clear roadmap toward the future,” he added.

The National Committee is civilian by design, yet its mandate includes civil administration and internal security responsibilities, alongside stabilization. The broader framework includes an International Stabilization Force, authorized under a UN mandate and placed under the command of US Army Maj. Gen. Jasper Jeffers.

What remains unresolved is how security will be enforced in practice: which countries would contribute troops, how coordination with Israeli forces would work, and whether any Palestinian policing mechanism would be integrated. Hirsch argued that the stabilization force is the hinge for any durable transition, but questioned whether it exists beyond paper. He cited the announcement of “a force that doesn’t seem to have any soldiers at the moment.”

The executive layer overseeing Gaza’s transition includes Steve Witkoff, the US president’s special envoy to the Middle East, and Jared Kushner, President Trump’s senior adviser and son-in-law (United States), who are widely described as the central operational figures.

The Gaza Executive Board includes:

  • Hakan Fidan (Turkey)
  • Ali Al Thawadi (Qatar)
  • Hassan Rashad (Egypt)
  • Reem Al Hashimy (United Arab Emirates)
  • Tony Blair (United Kingdom)
  • Marc Rowan (United States)
  • Ajay Banga (World Bank)
  • Nikolay Mladenov (Bulgaria)
  • Sigrid Kaag (Netherlands)
  • Yakir Gabay (Israel)

No Palestinian political representative has been named at this level.

Baskin flagged this absence directly.

“There’s the executive committee now. The strangest thing in my mind about this committee is that there’s no Palestinian representative there. I think there has to be a Palestinian political agency at this level,” he noted.

On Turkey and Qatar’s inclusion, he added: “On the Executive Committee, the foreign minister of Turkey is participating. The representative of the prime minister of Qatar is participating. This is certainly not what Israel wants, but these are friends of Trump and Witkoff and Kushner, and they got what they wanted.”

Hirsch rejected their inclusion outright.

“Bringing in actors from Turkey and from Qatar is entirely destructive. These are actors that support the Muslim Brotherhood, that support the terrorism of Hamas, that have given safe haven to Hamas for many, many years, and to now have them as part of this board is, I think, just wishful thinking and not going to happen,” he said.

He also criticized the inclusion of some international officials on the executive layer, arguing that their past approaches to Hamas and Palestinian governance make them ill-suited to a postwar transition.

Foqaha framed the Peace Board itself as externally driven.

“The Peace Board is an American baby and President Trump’s invention. We Palestinians, we’ve been fighting over the last 76 years since the Nakba for national independence, sovereignty, and for our decisions to be nationally and not internationally driven,” he said.

Invitations to the Peace Board were extended generally to Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Canada, Argentina, Indonesia, and several European states. India’s invitation was reported on Sunday by the Indian media, though not formally confirmed. Saudi Arabia has been discussed but not confirmed publicly. Azerbaijan declined participation in the security component of the framework.

“The invitations have been made by Trump to several countries, but the shape is still taking form of this committee,” Baskin said.

“Without Palestinian representation, even symbolic, the Peace Board will face a very serious legitimacy challenge from day one,” Foqaha added.

Baskin argued that the Board of Peace concept itself is part of what is fueling confusion about scope and authority. “I think the Peace Board is more symbolic than anything else,” he said, calling it “Trump’s attempt to replace the United Nations.”

Amid regional tensions and speculation over an American attack on the Islamic regime in Iran, many have been wondering whether this step may change the regional spectrum.

Baskin differentiated Hamas from Iran’s Shiite-aligned proxies.

“Iran was not the major funder of Hamas. And let’s not forget that the Palestinians in Hamas are Sunnis, and the Iranian regime is Shia. It’s a big historic conflict. Supporting Syria and Hezbollah and the Houthis is in the domain of Iran within the Shiite world. So, it’s a completely different ballgame,” he said.

Hirsch warned that even regime change would not guarantee stability.

“The fall of the evil axis with its head in Tehran would be a critical change for the region. But unfortunately, there won’t be a vacuum. An evil regime’s fall will be substituted by the rise of another, and in the case of helping Hamas, the role of Turkey and Qatar will be decisive in this stage,” he said.

Foqaha stressed uncertainty.

“The fall of the Iranian regime will have cross-border repercussions, especially for us Palestinians, but I don’t know, actually, whether the Iranian regime, if it falls, will change for the best or the worst. It’s hard, actually, to judge,” he said.

He also warned against a Gaza-only trajectory that excludes the West Bank.

“Unfortunately, this progress has been made only for Gaza, where there is no place for the West Bank. I believe the West Bank dimension should be connected to the Gaza dimension; otherwise, we cannot cement any kind of breakthrough for the Palestinian issue as a whole,” he said.

This year is crucial in terms of elections within the Palestinian territories that could substantially shift the old leadership.

“In Ramallah, this year will be a year of change. We are hoping for a democratic and fair process of elections that will change our political spectrum. The old generation of leaders will be substituted by our youth after 20 years. But to speak about a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, each side has to make changes, including a new Israeli government and the cessation of annexation of the West Bank,” he said.

Baskin acknowledged political constraints.

“Abbas also made an obligation that the Palestinian Authority would go to elections in 2026. Everyone knows that if there are free, open democratic elections in the West Bank or in Gaza or both, Abbas loses,” he said.

“Any group which is part of an armed struggle and does not support the PLO line of two states will not be allowed to run in those elections. In May of 2021, there were 36 lists that registered to participate. There’s no shortage of people who want to have political agency, who want to be elected. We will see new faces for sure,” he noted.

Hirsch rejected the Oslo framework entirely.

“We have an opportunity today to recognize that the path that we’ve been on for the last 30 years—let’s call it the Oslo path—has failed colossally, and there may be no breakthrough in the short or long term,” he said.

Baskin predicted major political change on the Israeli side, too.

“There’ll be lots of changes. And I would guess that at least 30% of the members of the current Knesset will not be in the next Knesset. I truly hope Israelis won’t go for Netanyahu again after what we have endured so far, because this will show that Israel is a lost cause—and with it, the idea of the two-state solution,” he said.

Hirsch emphasized October 7 as a lasting rupture in Israeli society.

“Let’s not forget that many of the people murdered, slaughtered, raped, and tortured in the October 7 massacre were much of Israel’s peace camp. That is going to have a long-term effect on any type of potential Israeli belief in the Palestinian side,” he said.

The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza is now formally authorized, as of Saturday in Cairo. What emerges is a framework heavy on process and deliberately light on political destination.

Whether this architecture becomes a pathway to political renewal—or another externally managed layer in a still-unresolved conflict—remains an open and deeply contested question.

TheMediaLine
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