Private Military Companies Find a Role in Gaza’s Security Void
The second phase of the ceasefire is days away, sparking debate over security governance as private military contractors step in to fill a gap no one can—or wants to—take responsibility for. There is no consensus on a neutral force
The American private military company (PMC) UG Solutions, from North Carolina, has enlisted 96 former US special forces operatives to manage a checkpoint in Gaza amid the ongoing truce between Israel and Hamas. This deployment marks the entry of American private military contractors into one of the world’s most volatile conflict areas, sparking debate over their role in the region’s security landscape.
The company will oversee a passage mainly used for access to humanitarian aid. It is supposed to be able to self-defend and will have the IDF’s backup if needed. Even with PMCs’ complex track record, experts claim that Gaza’s “day-after” could benefit from them if specific conditions are met.
UG Solutions doesn’t have a publicly known track record in conflict zones, making its Gaza deployment the first for the firm established in 2023, leaving questions about its experience in high-risk environments. Without a proven track record in similar situations, uncertainties remain regarding its ability to navigate the complexities and dangers of such a volatile region.
Hamas cannot be allowed to govern Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority is too weak to assume control. The IDF does not want a long-term presence, and Israel has no trust in the United Nations after UNIFIL’s failure in Lebanon.
Dr. Eran Lerman, vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, argues that deploying PMCs results from a process of elimination. “Hamas cannot be allowed to govern Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority is too weak to assume control,” he explained in an interview. “The IDF does not want a long-term presence, and Israel has no trust in the United Nations after UNIFIL’s failure in Lebanon.”
In Iraq, a good part of US security operations were carried out by PMCs. This is a reasonable measure, but it’s not a long-term solution.
With no clear governing force willing to take responsibility, PMCs emerged as the least controversial option. “In Iraq, a good part of US security operations were carried out by PMCs. This is a reasonable measure, but it’s not a long-term solution,” Dr. Lerman emphasized.
Back in 2007 in Baghdad, PMC contractors escorting a US convoy opened fire in Nisour Square, resulting in the deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians and injuries to 20 others. Investigations concluded that the shootings were unprovoked, leading to convictions of several Blackwater employees, the PMC in this event.
No major country is willing to deploy troops there,” Dr. Lerman said, pointing to Washington’s clear reluctance under both Biden and Trump. “For now, PMCs offer a way for the US to be involved without committing boots on the ground.
Political realities also shape the arrangement to bring PMC contractors into Gaza. “No major country is willing to deploy troops there,” Dr. Lerman said, pointing to Washington’s clear reluctance under both Biden and Trump. “For now, PMCs offer a way for the US to be involved without committing boots on the ground.”
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The US, Egypt, and Qatar made the decision as part of the ceasefire deal. Hamas rejected an Israeli security presence, and this arrangement was the compromise.
Notably, this is not just an American operation. Dr. Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow at Chatham House, highlighted that Egyptian PMC contractors are also involved. “The US, Egypt, and Qatar made the decision as part of the ceasefire deal,” he explained. “Hamas rejected an Israeli security presence, and this arrangement was the compromise.”
According to Dr. Qulliam, there is a broader move to outsource military operations, which offers economic efficiencies and “provides major and middle powers with a greater degree of flexibility, deniability, and the ability to pursue objectives without deploying national forces. In the case of Gaza, though, the deployment of PMCs provided a solution to an impasse that had been reached between Israel and Hamas about deploying forces at the Netzarim checkpoint.”
The greatest threat is that these contractors could be targeted by Hamas or other armed groups and taken hostage. Their rules of engagement will be strict, but PMCs have historically had a lower threshold for engagement compared to regular military forces.
But such an arrangement is a risky one. Dr. Quilliam believes “the greatest threat is that these contractors could be targeted by Hamas or other armed groups and taken hostage. Their rules of engagement will be strict, but PMCs have historically had a lower threshold for engagement compared to regular military forces.”
Ultimately, the presence of PMCs will not determine Gaza’s future governance. “Security alone cannot stabilize Gaza. Governance is essential,” Dr. Quilliam added. “Only political negotiations can do that. PMCs are a temporary fix that may become more permanent if no better alternative emerges.”
Dr. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defence Studies, and fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, explains that PMCs are often seen as a middle ground when no country wants to put its troops at risk. “The privatization of security is a major feature of contemporary conflicts,” Krieg said. “PMCs operate globally, providing security, logistics, and maintenance. In this case, their presence offers a compromise—more neutral than Israeli or Arab forces, which neither side would accept.”
These contractors are Americans, and their presence in Gaza will be deeply unpopular among Palestinians. For Israel, it’s preferable to a UN mission that adversaries would likely infiltrate, but for Hamas, they are still foreign operators on their soil.
However, Krieg warns that this neutrality is fragile and believes Hamas could try to attack the contractors. “These contractors are Americans, and their presence in Gaza will be deeply unpopular among Palestinians,” he explained. “For Israel, it’s preferable to a UN mission that adversaries would likely infiltrate, but for Hamas, they are still foreign operators on their soil.”
Dr. Quilliam cautions that their presence could escalate tensions if they engage in combat. “If these contractors come under attack, their response could trigger a wider conflict,” he said. “There is also the risk of hostage-taking, which could be a propaganda victory for Hamas and put enormous pressure on the US and Egypt.”
They are not an independent force. They operate as an extension of the Israeli presence, with logistical support from the IDF.
Images from Gaza show these contractors equipped with automatic rifles, but their mandate remains defensive. If violence erupts at the checkpoint, they are expected to return fire—but not pursue attackers. “They are not an independent force,” Krieg added. “They operate as an extension of the Israeli presence, with logistical support from the IDF.”
Through elimination, Dr. Lerman realizes that “a multinational authority introduced in a modular way could be, if not ideal, then at least a better solution for managing Gaza during the long transition and reconstruction period ahead.”
Similar to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, which is mandated by the US, Israel, and Egypt and includes forces from multiple countries, Dr. Lerman suggests that such an approach, while politically challenging, could provide a more sustainable governance framework and allow for the use of PMCs as needed. “This would require international buy-in, but it has the advantage of being more legitimate than a purely private force,” he noted. “A multinational force could integrate regional stakeholders, reducing tensions and increasing trust among Gaza’s civilian population.”
The key issue is security governance. Countries discussing security governance in post-Hamas Gaza include Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan. However, none of them are willing to deploy their own troops inside Gaza. Even the Egyptians, who might put forces along the Philadelphi Corridor, would not move inside Gaza’s territory itself.
Dr. Krieg also agrees that “the key issue is security governance. Countries discussing security governance in post-Hamas Gaza include Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan. However, none of them are willing to deploy their own troops inside Gaza. Even the Egyptians, who might put forces along the Philadelphi Corridor, would not move inside Gaza’s territory itself.”
This presents a significant problem for Israel: if they want to withdraw further from Gaza, they will leave behind a security vacuum. The question of how to fill that vacuum remains unresolved. While private contractors could be part of the solution, Dr. Krieg notes that most PMCs prefer not to operate in dynamic security environments like this one. “Right now, their operation is static. However, the risk would skyrocket if they were tasked with securing convoys or operating in highly volatile areas without IDF backup. Most companies would not take on that kind of contract,” he explained.
Additionally, he emphasized that Hamas would not tolerate a long-term American contractor presence in such roles. “The risks would be high, and not many private military companies offer this kind of counterinsurgency and warfighting,” Dr. Krieg concluded.
