The 12-Day Revolution: How Syria’s Regime Collapsed After Years of War
Opposition forces exploited internal decay and shifting alliances to dismantle Assad’s regime
Opposition groups in Syria seized the capital Damascus on Sunday after nearly 13 years of conflict, declaring an end to President Bashar Assad’s government. The swift offensive—initiated on November 27 by a coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), along with various Turkish-backed factions, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Southern Operations Room, and other armed groups—quickly overwhelmed pro-government forces.
Within 12 days, fighters gained control over the country’s major cities, culminating in the fall of the capital. By the time Damascus was taken, it appeared that the Assad government, which had held power since 1971, had collapsed. Officials loyal to Assad fled, Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali offered to work with the new authorities, and freed prisoners stumbled into the streets. Syria’s political and territorial landscape had drastically realigned.
“This operation broke the enemy,” said Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the HTS leader, in an interview with The New York Times, referring to the coalition’s lightning advance and the decisive blow that spelled the end of Assad’s half-century family rule. The rapid progress came after months of quiet preparation. For years, large-scale operations had paused due to cease-fires and foreign negotiations. But as the Syrian government, entangled in corruption and dependent on alliances with Russia and Iran, weakened under domestic discontent and international strain, the opposition sensed a strategic opening.
The chain of events leading to the December 8 breakthrough began in northwestern Syria. From there, fighters pushed south toward Aleppo, swept through Idlib and Hama, secured Homs, and moved into Damascus. As pro-government units crumbled, allied Iranian militias withdrew, and Russian forces offered only limited support from the air, failing to halt the offensive. The rebels claimed the sudden collapse was a sign that after more than a decade of war, Syrians had lost patience with a government that many viewed as oppressive. Syrian forces had struggled with corruption, a narrowing support base, and an overextended military. This environment, combined with changing regional dynamics and the exhaustion of foreign allies, allowed the offensive to move forward at extraordinary speed.
A Brief Background to a Long War
The Syrian conflict began in 2011 as part of the wave of uprisings known as the Arab Spring. Initially a popular protest movement demanding reforms and democratic elections, it faced a harsh government crackdown. By late 2011 and into 2012, what began as peaceful demonstrations evolved into an armed rebellion. Various factions emerged—some nationalist, some Islamist, some Kurdish-led—fragmenting Syria. Over time, external actors shaped the battlefield. Iran provided financial and military support to Assad, Hezbollah lent fighters, and Russia’s intervention in 2015 turned the tide in favor of the government. Turkey supported certain opposition groups, seeking to limit the expansion of Kurdish-led forces near its border. The United States focused on combating the Islamic State group, partnering with the SDF but never fully committing to removing Assad.
The civil war saw some of the most brutal acts of government repression in modern history, resulting in over 600,000 deaths—about half of them civilians—along with 7 million refugees and an equal number internally displaced. Among these were the siege and bombardment of Aleppo in late 2016, which killed more than 31,000 people; the shelling of opposition-held neighborhoods in Hama and Homs from 2011 to 2012, leaving over 10,000 dead; and a bombing campaign in Idlib from 2019 to 2021, claiming at least 1,600 lives. The 2013 sarin gas attack on Damascus suburbs, which killed 1,400 people, including many children, and the August 2012 Darayya massacre, where over 500 civilians were killed in shelling and mass executions, stand out as particularly infamous incidents. These atrocities, along with countless smaller-scale attacks, left deep scars on Syrian society as it faced the regime’s ruthless methods to maintain power.
After years of fighting, a partial cease-fire in March 2020 slowed the frontlines in the northwest. Assad’s government held most populated areas, while rebels were mostly cornered in Idlib. The SDF controlled areas in the northeast. Turkey’s military presence stabilized certain zones. With this balance in place, some observers believed that the war had effectively become frozen, with no faction strong enough to achieve total victory.
Yet pressure built behind the scenes. HTS, previously linked to al-Qaida but now operating as a more localized Syrian Islamist force, reorganized. It formed a conventional army, trained specialized units, and set up night-raid teams. Quiet infiltration operations and sniper attacks against government positions resumed in late 2022. Meanwhile, corruption gnawed at government structures. Syria’s economy relied heavily on the drug trade—specifically the production and smuggling of Captagon. Critics described the Assad state as fractured and dependent on illicit profits. This criminalized economy disillusioned many within the government’s ranks and eroded its legitimacy.
By late 2024, foreign allies that once propped up Assad were distracted. Russia, entrenched in Ukraine, scaled down its involvement. Iran, facing internal unrest and regional conflicts, had less capacity to provide fresh manpower. Hezbollah, weakened by its own costly entanglements and recent conflict with Israel, could not offer the robust support it once did. Reports even suggested that Ukrainian intelligence assisted opposition factions in Idlib with training, though this remained unverified. The conditions were ripe for a major push that could uproot the government’s hold.
The Offensive Begins (November 27-29, 2024)
On November 27, 2024, HTS announced an operation it called “Deterrence of Aggression.” Rebels attacked positions of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in the western Aleppo countryside, claiming it was a direct response to government shelling that had killed civilians in Idlib. Soon, other opposition groups joined, including Turkish-backed elements of the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which controlled significant territory in the northeast. Initially, some observers doubted these disparate factions could coordinate, but they showed an unusual degree of unity.
During the first hours, HTS seized over a dozen villages and towns in western Aleppo Province. Fighters surrounded a key government base and captured it shortly thereafter. According to activists and observers, the regime’s defensive lines, stretched thin after years of attrition, began to buckle. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported heavy casualties on both sides. Government forces tried to slow the rebel advance with artillery and Russian jets conducted airstrikes. But these strikes failed to stop the coalition’s momentum.
The offensive quickly spread beyond Aleppo. On November 28, HTS-led groups moved into eastern Idlib countryside, taking villages close to the M5 highway, a strategic route previously secured by government troops. Other rebel factions, including smaller Islamist formations, joined the push. Reports indicated that Iranian-backed combatants suffered losses near Aleppo, including a high-ranking officer. Civilians suffered too, with Russian jets allegedly bombing Al Atārib, Darat Izza, and other towns.
The following day, November 29, rebels pressed forward. New territory fell at a rapid pace. By the close of the day, they had reached key nodes in both Aleppo and Idlib Provinces, causing government forces to withdraw. As one opposition spokesperson argued, the regime had built a “house of cards” that could not withstand a coordinated assault.
The Fall of Aleppo (November 29-30, 2024)
The capture of Aleppo city was the turning point. Once Syria’s commercial hub, Aleppo had experienced severe fighting over the years. Assad’s forces, assisted by Iranian and Russian support, recaptured it in 2016, dealing a devastating blow to the rebellion. For many Syrians, Aleppo’s loss back then symbolized the rebellion’s near-defeat. But eight years later, the city proved vulnerable.
On November 29, rebels launched a large-scale assault on Aleppo city itself. They infiltrated neighborhoods, used car bombs to breach defenses, and by nightfall had established footholds in several districts. Government units, already under pressure in the countryside, began to disintegrate. Some soldiers reportedly abandoned uniforms to blend into the civilian population. Others fled toward as-Safirah or Aleppo airport. Although Russian and Syrian airstrikes tried to halt the surge, they did not prevent the rebels from capturing strategic districts. One government supporter on state TV promised swift reinforcements and blamed Turkey for backing the insurgents, but such pledges proved empty.
By early morning on November 30, the rebels had taken Aleppo’s historic citadel and key government installations. The city fell almost completely into their hands as soldiers loyal to Assad retreated. Meanwhile, the SDF seized the chance to gain ground. The SDF entered neighborhoods vacated by government troops and secured areas such as Shaykh Najjar. Iranian personnel, suddenly exposed, either withdrew or surrendered. Pro-government forces struggled to regroup, leaving behind heavy weaponry: modern tanks, anti-aircraft systems, and aircraft on the ground. Video footage shared online showed rebels posing with captured war matériel.
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With Aleppo gone, Assad’s forces lost their largest foothold in northern Syria, undermining the regime’s control and morale. The once-vaunted army that had retaken the city in 2016 could not stand its ground in 2024.
Pivot to Central and Eastern Syria (November 30–December 5, 2024)
As November ended, rebels advanced southward. The coalition moved out from Idlib and Aleppo into Hama and Homs. The SDF opened a new front in the east, capturing Deir ez-Zur on December 6 after pro-government units withdrew. Simultaneously, Southern Front fighters attacked from the south, entering Suwayda and Daraa. The US-backed Syrian Free Army (SFA) took Palmyra in the southeast, exploiting the vacuum left as regime forces pulled back.
Each day brought new gains. On December 1, Russia intensified airstrikes in an attempt to slow the rebel wave, targeting areas in Hama and Idlib. But these raids did not achieve lasting results. Opposition groups kept pressing forward, taking advantage of collapsing defenses. On December 3, they pushed toward Hama city, capturing numerous towns along the way and cutting key supply lines. Civilians, caught in the crossfire, sought refuge wherever they could. Occasional rebel shelling killed people inside regime-held territories. Russian and government bombs fell on towns recently gained by the opposition, causing further civilian casualties.
By December 5, Hama, a historically significant city that witnessed early protests against Assad in the 1980s and again in 2011, fell into opposition hands. After that, rebel brigades turned their attention to Homs, an important junction city that connected Damascus to the coast. Without Homs, the government would lose its ability to supply its strongholds in Latakia and Tartus, where Russia maintained a naval base. Defenders in Homs were poorly positioned to resist. Rumors spread that Hezbollah, previously a key ally of Assad, was sending reinforcements from Lebanon. But Hezbollah itself had been weakened by its costly engagements and recent losses against Israel. It could offer only limited support.
The once formidable pro-government frontlines crumbled. Evidence suggested many units were hollow formations with limited loyalty to Assad. Corruption had led to disarray, and some enlisted men felt no cause worth dying for. By December 6, rebels took much of Homs, cutting Damascus off from Syria’s coast and the Russian bases there. Simultaneously, the SDF and others consolidated control over Deir ez-Zur and Palmyra. The regime’s presence in the east and south vanished almost overnight.
Racing Toward Damascus (December 7-8, 2024)
The final push targeted Damascus, Syria’s capital and Assad’s seat of power. On December 7, Southern Front groups advanced through Rif Dimashq from the south, reaching suburbs less than 6 miles from the city center. Opposition forces also approached from the north after capturing Homs. Reports indicated that pro-government soldiers, sensing the end, abandoned their checkpoints. The SFA entered from the southeast. By December 8, rebels had reached central neighborhoods. Sounds of gunfire filled the early morning air. Locals witnessed a surreal scene: fighters toppling statues of the Assad family and tearing down portraits of Bashar Assad.
Prime Minister al-Jalali, who remained in the country, announced that he was ready “to cooperate with any leadership chosen by Syrians” and that he hoped Syria “could be a normal country that builds good relations with its neighbors and the world.”
Meanwhile, amid the collapse, speculation swirls over Assad’s fate. His family has fled the country, reportedly to Russia.
On December 8, a Syrian Air Ilyushin Il-76 transport jet, flight 9218, disappeared from radar shortly after departing Damascus. The flight, which had no listed destination, traveled toward Syria’s Mediterranean coast before abruptly reversing course near Homs and disappearing. Some analysts suggest Assad may have been aboard the aircraft, seeking refuge abroad, presumably also in Russia, which maintains a naval base at Tartus. However, the flight’s fate remains unknown, and no confirmation has been provided regarding Assad’s location.
Prisons like Sednaya, infamous for torture and extrajudicial detentions, were opened by the rebels, allowing freed inmates to return to their communities. Emotional scenes unfolded as detainees reunited with families, friends, and neighbors.
Reaction and Strategic Implications
The SAA called the offensive “a huge and large-scale terrorist attack,” insisting that large numbers of hostile fighters, “using medium and heavy weapons,” overran positions. Yet the government’s narrative had lost credibility. Officials who remained in Syria acknowledged their isolation. Despite Russia’s initial involvement in bombing rebel areas, Moscow refrained from committing ground forces. Russian warships began leaving Tartus on December 2, signaling an unwillingness to get drawn deeper into an unwinnable situation.
Iran, for decades a key backer of Assad, began evacuating personnel and pulling out senior officials. Iranian state media shifted its language. At first it condemned the operation as “a plot orchestrated by the US and the Zionist regime.” Soon after, it stopped calling the insurgents “terrorists,” referring to them simply as armed groups. Tehran’s priorities changed. With the war’s outcome all but decided, it made little sense to invest further resources. Iranian leaders, facing regional pressures, did not want to get entangled in a lost cause.
The United States distanced itself. “The United States has nothing to do with this offensive, which is led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist organization,” said White House National Security Council spokesperson Sean Savett. President-elect Donald Trump also commented that the US should not intervene, stating it was “not our fight.” Western powers had not supported HTS, given its extremist background, but they also did not rush to prop up Assad’s regime. Washington feared the potential reemergence of extremist threats if the new power vacuum allowed radical groups to flourish. Yet officials also recognized that Assad, considered deeply repressive, had become a liability for any hope of future stability.
Israel, watching closely from the Golan Heights, deployed additional forces along the border to prevent spillover violence. It also conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah positions to stop the group’s attempts to reinforce the collapsing Syrian Army. The Israeli government wanted to prevent Iran-backed factions from seizing strategic opportunities to move arms near Israeli-controlled territory.
Turkey’s role remained somewhat ambiguous. While the opposition’s successful campaign took place during an era of Turkish influence, Ankara denied direct involvement in planning the advance. Still, Turkey benefited from a weaker Kurdish presence as the SDF became occupied fighting the government. The outcome may allow Turkey to reshuffle relationships in northern Syria and manage refugee flows better.
Moammar al-Eryani, Yemen’s minister of information, culture, and tourism, asserted on the social media platform X that Iran’s abandonment of Assad, despite significant support over the years, highlights its declining regional influence. He noted that Tehran’s failure to protect Assad underscores the fragility of its alliances and signals a shift in its ability to project power in the region. He warned Yemenis that Iran would likely abandon Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and the Houthis as well and urged unity to reclaim Yemen’s sovereignty.
Analysts debated the reasons for the regime’s sudden downfall. Some pointed to a hollowed-out army, rampant corruption, and a failing economy. Others blamed the absence of Iranian and Russian ground support. Another theory focused on timing: Rebels struck while Russia and Iran were distracted, and Assad’s government had done little to strengthen itself after the 2020 cease-fire. The fall of Damascus shook old assumptions that the regime would endure indefinitely.
A New Landscape for Syria
With Assad gone and the opposition in control, questions loom about what Syria’s governance will look like. HTS, while instrumental in toppling Assad, remains a designated terrorist organization. Its dominance in the coalition troubles many Syrians and international observers who fear a repressive Islamist rule. Yet other groups—moderate rebels, local councils, and even technocrats—may push for more inclusive governance. The presence of the SDF, which advocates a decentralized model respecting Kurdish and minority rights, could also shape the country’s political future.
In the short term, basic services and institutions remain intact. To avoid chaos, the rebels allowed Prime Minister Jalali to stay and supervise the bureaucracy temporarily. His statement—hoping Syria “could be a normal country that builds good relations with its neighbors and the world”—suggested a desire for diplomatic ties and economic recovery. Whether international recognition follows depends on how the victorious factions behave. Will they unify under a transitional body acceptable to Syrians of different ethnicities, sects, and political orientations?
For everyday Syrians, the war’s conclusion promises relief from constant shelling, sieges, and displacement. Yet families remain scarred by loss. Uncertainty prevails about the fate of minorities, the role of Shia and Alawite communities who long supported the regime, and how to address abuses committed by all sides. The question of accountability looms large. Many Syrians want trials or truth commissions for war crimes. Others just want to rebuild homes, find missing relatives, and restore normalcy. The collapse of Assad’s government ends one chapter, but healing the country after more than a decade of bloodshed is a monumental task.
International Interests and Future Alignments
Russia’s naval base in Tartus and airbase near Latakia were crucial to its Middle East ambitions. With rebels blocking access routes, Moscow may face tough negotiations to retain a presence. A weakened Russia, focused on Ukraine and wary of overextension, might strike deals with opposition leaders or withdraw personnel to avoid entanglement. Iran, similarly, must decide whether to abandon its influence or attempt to reconnect with local proxies from abroad. Hezbollah, reeling from battles elsewhere, no longer has the manpower or popular support to project power in Syria.
For the region, Syria’s transformation changes the strategic map. Turkey may seek ties with the new authorities to curb Kurdish autonomy and manage trade. Jordan and Lebanon, both hosting large Syrian refugee populations, may look for ways to facilitate returns if stability takes hold. The Gulf States might offer reconstruction funds, hoping to gain influence. The European Union and the US may link rebuilding assistance to political reforms and the inclusion of diverse communities in governance.
Fears of Extremist Resurgence
Another pressing concern is whether the rapid upheaval leaves space for extremist groups, including remnants of the Islamic State group, to reemerge. The opposition coalition included various Islamists, but its broad-based nature might limit the influence of the most hardline elements. International actors have already warned they will strike jihadist leaders if they use Syria as a base for attacks abroad. The rebels, keenly aware of the risk of international isolation, may try to marginalize extremist factions to gain legitimacy.
HTS’s leader Jolani, while stating “This operation broke the enemy,” also described the aim as freeing Syria from an “oppressive regime.” Past attempts by HTS to distance itself from transnational jihadism suggest it may now try to position itself as a local power player, not a global menace. Whether this effort convinces Western states remains uncertain.
A Turning Point in a 13-Year Crisis
The events of late November and early December 2024 will be remembered as the final act in a long, brutal conflict. The speed of the collapse stunned observers. After years of grinding attrition, shifting alliances, and foreign interventions, Syria’s fate changed in less than two weeks. The toppled regime once considered immutable fell victim to a combination of internal decay and external neglect.
As the dust settles, Syrians face a new era. They must define how to govern without descending into infighting or repressing vulnerable communities. They must rebuild cities like Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, once thriving centers of commerce and culture now lying in ruins. They must integrate refugees and displaced people, mend sectarian divides, and restore trust in public institutions.
The international community stands on the sidelines, uncertain about how to engage. While no foreign power wants a resurgence of chaos, few are eager to sink more resources into a shattered country. For Syrians, this moment offers a chance to emerge from the shadow of authoritarian rule and foreign-sponsored militarization. The path will be uneven and fraught with danger, but it also presents opportunities for reconciliation, reconstruction, and a more representative governance model.
In time, the narrative will solidify. Was the fall of Damascus a victory for a genuine grassroots movement, a takeover by hardened fighters, or a result of foreign bargains made behind closed doors? For now, Syrians step into the unknown, hoping that the bloodshed that defined more than a decade of their history has finally ended.
