Turkey and Saudi Arabia: ‘Walking Side by Side but Not Necessarily Toward the Same Destination’
Ankara and Riyadh deepen economic ties while quietly diverging on foreign policy and regional leadership
Saudi-Turkish relations in the years since the diplomatic rupture over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi have shifted from estrangement to cautious recalibration. The brutal murder of the Saudi journalist inside Riyadh’s consulate in Istanbul in 2018 left a deep scar on bilateral ties, prompting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to adopt an unusually confrontational stance.
“Erdoğan was openly critical, but he also stressed that the crime took place on Turkish soil, and that couldn’t be ignored,” Jean Marcou, associate researcher at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, told The Media Line.
The Khashoggi affair represented more than a diplomatic breakdown; it revealed underlying tensions over regional leadership, the role of political Islam, and Ankara’s efforts to position itself as a moral actor at a time when the Gulf was projecting consolidation.
“This crisis deteriorated the relationship significantly, especially given that Khashoggi went to the consulate to marry a Turkish woman—it wasn’t just political; it became personal in Turkish public opinion,” Marcou noted.
Today, the two countries appear to have moved well beyond that moment. In the lead-up to Erdoğan’s reelection in 2023, Ankara worked to mend ties across the Gulf, driven largely by a weakening domestic economy and the urgent need to attract foreign investment.
Erdoğan’s early post-election trip to Riyadh signaled the seriousness of this rapprochement.
“Turkey needed new investment—and fast,” Marcou explained, noting that normalization with Gulf states, starting with the United Arab Emirates and followed by Saudi Arabia, was part of a broader regional realignment.
“The Turkish economy was in a delicate phase. Gulf investment was not just welcomed—it was needed,” he added.
For Saudi Arabia, the shift was driven by shared opportunity.
There’s a growing recognition in both capitals that they need each other
“There’s a growing recognition in both capitals that they need each other,” said Abdulaziz Alshaabani, a Riyadh-based Saudi political analyst, to The Media Line.
“Economically, the investment potential is substantial; tourism, energy, and logistics are all on the table. Turkish companies are deeply involved in Gulf infrastructure, and Saudi funds are beginning to flow into Turkey again,” he added.
Despite renewed warmth in high-level visits and expanding economic ties, the two governments appear to be pursuing increasingly distinct trajectories in the region. Syria offers one such example.
Following the fall of Bashar Assad, a transitional period led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa has opened new diplomatic avenues across the region. In an effort to reestablish Syria’s standing, al-Sharaa has made successive visits to Gulf and regional capitals—first Riyadh, then Ankara—demonstrating both Saudi and Turkish influence in shaping Syria’s future.
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“This wasn’t random,” Marcou said. “It signaled Saudi Arabia’s lead role in normalization efforts, with Turkey seen as a necessary but secondary actor,” he added.
Both countries remain deeply engaged on the ground. Turkey continues to support opposition structures in northern Syria and plays a central role in state reconstruction, while Saudi Arabia is advancing diplomatic and economic frameworks from the Gulf.
“Turkey and Saudi Arabia are two of the main external players shaping Syria’s future right now,” Marcou noted. “They’re aligned in posture for the moment. But this could evolve into rivalry, especially when it comes to political leverage and reconstruction,” he added.
During US President Donald Trump’s recent visit to the Gulf, the evolving picture became even clearer.
Under Saudi leadership, Washington formally lifted sanctions on Syria—an unexpected move that marked a turning point in regional diplomacy. Riyadh followed by paying off part of Syria’s international debt, positioning itself not only as a mediator but also as a principal financial backer of Syria’s reintegration.
The gesture did not go unnoticed in Ankara. President Erdoğan publicly thanked the US president for lifting the sanctions, signaling Turkish approval of the process even if it was not orchestrated by Ankara.
“The fact that Erdoğan publicly acknowledged Trump’s move shows Turkey’s willingness to be part of the broader effort, but not necessarily to lead it,” Marcou observed. “Saudi Arabia clearly set the pace,” he added.
For now, both governments are favoring coordination over competition, though their long-term goals in Syria remain unsynchronized.
“There’s cautious cooperation when it comes to regional crises like Syria or Sudan. Neither side wants more instability,” Alshaabani said. “What we’re seeing is a move toward strategic coordination, even if not full alignment,” he added.
That divergence becomes sharper when viewed through the lens of each country’s relationship with the United States.
Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain strong working ties with Washington despite occasional political friction. The Trump visit, during which major commercial agreements were signed alongside the Syrian sanctions move, reinforced Riyadh’s position as a key partner for US interests in the region.
Turkey, by contrast, faces a more complex dynamic. Ankara’s acquisition of Russian S-400 missile systems led to its exclusion from the F-35 program in 2019, pushing it to explore alternatives such as the Eurofighter Typhoon.
“This program is very important for Turkey to modernize its air force,” Marcou explained. “There are rumors that Turkey could be reintegrated, and that would be a real test for the US-Turkey relationship,” he added.
The contrast is also evident in the two countries’ respective approaches to the Gaza conflict and normalization with Israel.
While Riyadh continues a slow, quiet process of diplomatic outreach—insisting it will act on its own terms—Turkey has taken a far more confrontational stance. Erdoğan has vocally condemned Israeli military operations in Gaza and maintains strong ties with Hamas.
Turkey wants to appear as the regional champion of the Palestinian cause
“Turkey wants to appear as the regional champion of the Palestinian cause,” Marcou said. “This is not just about religion—it’s a strategic decision. Saudi Arabia, by comparison, is suspected by the Arab street of being too close to Israel and too passive on Palestine,” he said.
Speculation around Syria possibly joining the Abraham Accords—fueled by remarks from President Trump and reports of quiet meetings involving Turkish and Israeli officials in recent weeks—has raised further questions.
Marcou remained cautious. “It’s too early to say whether this is realistic,” he said. “If true, it would go against Turkey’s policy of isolating Israel regionally. And it would mark a significant departure from Erdoğan’s current posture,” he added.
While the tone between Ankara and Riyadh has markedly improved and economic cooperation continues to deepen, the political visions guiding each capital are increasingly distinct.
Saudi Arabia is embracing its role as a regional stabilizer and global investor, maintaining ties with Washington and expanding its influence through economic diplomacy.
Turkey, by contrast, is asserting itself as an independent actor—one that engages with the West on its own terms and often through alternative alliances.
“We’re not going back to the past,” Alshaabani observed. “This is a pragmatic relationship anchored in shared interests—but also marked by clear differences in worldview and foreign policy.”
They may be walking side by side, but not necessarily toward the same destination
Marcou added, “They may be walking side by side, but not necessarily toward the same destination.”
