10 Years of Houthi-Iranian Presence in Yemen
Al Rai, Kuwait, September 13
It is astonishing to think that the Houthis have maintained control over parts of Yemen, including the capital Sana’a, for an entire decade. This situation has become an unavoidable reality requiring acknowledgment and response. It also highlights a facet of American foreign policy failure, rooted in a historical underestimation of the Houthi movement’s growth in Yemen and its close ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This failure further underscores Iran’s adeptness at capitalizing on the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab region to further its own ambitions. Yemen, where the Muslim Brotherhood orchestrated a coup against Ali Abdullah Saleh, stands as a prime example of Iran’s strategic manipulation and exploitation of opportunities to infiltrate crucial Arab nations like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, with the intent of destabilizing them from within. This political entity now serves as a strategic foothold for Iran in the Arabian Peninsula, functioning as an Iranian military base in one of the ongoing conflicts prosecuted by the Islamic Republic. Through its maneuvers in the Yemen conflict and its involvement in Gaza, Iran aims to demonstrate to the world, especially the United States, that it holds the decisive influence in the region. On this day in 2014, the Houthis were advancing on Sana’a after conquering the ‘Amran Governorate, a region where the remnants of the Yemeni army were expected to make a stand. They successfully dismantled the influence of the Al-Ahmar family, leaders of the Hashid—a once-significant Yemeni tribe whose importance waned after the death of Sheikh Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar in 2007. Subsequently, the Houthis neutralized the 310th Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Hameed Al-Qushaibi, reputedly one of the best-equipped units in the Yemeni army. This occurred with the tacit approval of the interim president at the time, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Hadi made a point to visit the 310th Brigade’s headquarters immediately following its defeat by Ansar Allah, mistakenly believing he could rally their support to stabilize his precarious position. He failed to grasp that the Houthis, backed by Iranian strategy, had long-range plans dating back to the overthrow Saleh’s regime, culminating in his resignation in February 2012 and the subsequent accession of his deputy to the presidency. Long before the coup against Ali Abdullah Saleh, US policy in Yemen exhibited a persistent underestimation of the Houthi threat, which is intrinsically an Iranian threat. The American focus remained on al-Qaida, which, while undeniably dangerous, was not a threat of greater magnitude than the evolving Houthi movement—especially from the moment Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted until the fall of Sana’a and the concurrent takeover of Al Hudaydah Port on the Red Sea. American policy, particularly since the October 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Aden port, orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, concentrated on al-Qaida’s activities and their links with Yemeni political and security factions. From the Cole bombing to the current Houthi disruptions of Red Sea navigation, American policy towards the Houthis has been overly simplistic, if not downright foolish. The US failed to recognize the Houthi menace, even when they engaged in direct conflict with Ali Abdullah Saleh in late 2004 or eventually killed him in late 2017. American leniency towards the Houthis contributed to their ascendancy in Sana’a and their subsequent endorsement by the United Nations. The date September 14, 2014, will remain a pivotal one in modern Yemeni history. On that day, a new regime emerged over part of Yemeni territory, controlled by the Islamic Republic. The future trajectory for the residents of these controlled areas remains uncertain. Over the past decade, however, this regime has effectively eradicated more than one generation of Yemeni youths, conditioning them to bear arms instead of pursuing education. The United States, alongside the Muslim Brotherhood—whose actions led to the ousting of Ali Abdullah Saleh without fully grasping the consequences—shares considerable responsibility. This is not to exonerate the former Yemeni president from his numerous mistakes. Notably, the actions of the Brotherhood have inadvertently benefited the Houthis—and by extension, Iran. Through all this, the United States remains a passive observer, undervaluing Yemen’s strategic significance, seemingly indifferent to the prospect of northern Yemen transforming into an Iranian military outpost, staffed predominantly by teenagers armed with Kalashnikovs, ignorant of their own homeland’s heritage. A fundamental question lingers after 10 years of Houthi rule in Sana’a: Have they succeeded in completely dismantling Yemen’s tribal structure, or does the tribe still retain a role that might resurface in a society far more resilient to change than Iran anticipates? —Kheirallah Kheirallah (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)
This holiday season, give to:
Truth and understanding
The Media Line's intrepid correspondents are in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Pakistan providing first-person reporting.
They all said they cover it.
We see it.
We report with just one agenda: the truth.
