Trump’s Expected Policy Toward Syria

Trump’s Expected Policy Toward Syria

Al Qabas, Kuwait, January 6

In the three administrations preceding Trump’s second term—encompassing his first term as well—US engagement in Syria was emblematic of a broader trend: decreased American involvement in the Middle East, with a strategic pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region. This entailed minimal military and diplomatic action in Middle Eastern conflicts, focusing instead on critical interests like counterterrorism, albeit with limited military involvement. Consequently, it is foreseeable that in Trump’s second term, following Assad’s ousting, there will be no substantial American intervention in Syria.

Trump has consistently advocated for reducing US involvement globally, particularly in the Middle East, adhering to an isolationist stance. His declarations immediately after Assad’s fall highlighted America’s limited role in Syria, underlining that the conflict does not align with American interests, asserting, “This is not our battle.” Furthermore, Trump publicly acknowledged Turkey’s significant role in masterminding Assad’s overthrow through its factions. According to him, Turkey emerged as the sole victor in Syria, holding all strategic advantages there.

While Trump’s policy in Syria skewed toward limited engagement, especially amid pressing global challenges like the rising Chinese threat, two key dynamics could exert significant pressure on this approach. These dynamics might prevent America’s strategy from veering toward complete abandonment and could also shape a more strategic and engaged policy, possibly with broader participation.

Firstly, influential domestic actors within Trump’s administration could play a critical role. Though the US president theoretically holds considerable power in shaping foreign policy—shared with Congress to an extent—real-world decisions are often driven by internal determinants and pressures, including the so-called deep-state policymaking bodies, particularly within the State Department and the Pentagon. Historically, these entities—focused on upholding national interests and adept at strategic maneuvering—would not endorse a full US retreat from Syria. An illustration of this is Trump’s first-term decision to retain a limited American military presence in northern Syria, largely due to their pressure. For these policymakers, even a minimal military stake serves as a strategic bargaining chip vis-à-vis Turkey, Russia, and Iran within a broader web of intertwined interests.

Secondly, and more pertinently, post-Assad developments intersect significantly with key US interests and some of Trump’s core priorities. Chief among these are considerations involving Israel, the recurring threat of ISIS resurgence, and the connections between Ukraine and Syria. Despite ongoing debates over a negotiated or conspiratorial effort to topple Assad with US backing, it is evident that Israel stands to benefit most from Assad’s fall—neutralizing Iran’s primary regional ally, securing total control over the Golan Heights, and potentially establishing a buffer zone near Damascus. It would, therefore, be illogical for Trump, a staunch supporter of Israel, to forgo an active American role in aiding Israel to dismantle any remaining Iranian presence in Syria, reorganize the regional dynamics, and exert pressure on key players, particularly Turkey, to tighten control over the Golan.

Conversely, the potential resurgence of ISIS will remain a pressing concern for Trump under a new regime potentially led by former al-Qaida and ISIS affiliates. Additionally, Syria presents a robust bargaining asset for Trump in negotiations to persuade Russia to conclude the Ukrainian conflict as part of a strategic “Syria for Ukraine” compromise.

In summary, while Trump’s approach to Syria is likely to remain circumspect, especially militarily, it will avoid total neglect. By leveraging various strategic cards and enlisting ally support, the objective will be to reconfigure the Syrian landscape in alignment with American-Israeli strategic interests. —Noura Saleh Almujeem (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

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