Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett Reviews His Time in Office
Addressing the foreign press in Israel, ex-PM Bennett discusses his administration's key issues, judicial reform, his involvement in Russia-Ukraine negotiations, reducing conflict in the region, and sharing the military service burden
Born in Haifa to American Jewish immigrants, Naftali Bennett was a high-tech entrepreneur before he entered Israeli politics in 2006, serving as chief of staff for then-Opposition Leader Binyamin Netanyahu. Bennett entered the Knesset in 2013 as the leader of the right-wing Jewish Home party. He held several ministerial positions, serving as education minister from 2015, and as defense minister from 2019. He also served as a member of the Security Cabinet and was known for his hard-line stance on security issues. Parts of his Jewish Home party went through several incarnations, divisions, and realignments, at times being known as Tzalash, the New Right, Yamina, the State Camp, and Beyahad.
Yamina won seven seats in the 2021 elections. Following negotiations to form a coalition government, Bennett was appointed as the 13th prime minister of Israel in June 2021, leading a diverse coalition government. He resigned from the premiership in June 2022 and was succeeded by his coalition partner, Yair Lapid. Bennett chose not to run for re-election to the Knesset in the subsequent elections, which were held in November 2022.
On Wednesday, Bennett addressed the foreign press at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and reviewed the key issues of his administration. Here The Media Line presents a synopsis of the press conference.
On the current judicial reform controversy:
“The crisis, the judicial reform crisis, which is not an unsolvable one, is putting many dimensions of Israel on hold. Our economy, to some degree, is on hold. Investors are wary. They are concerned with uncertainty.
“I do not think it [the reform] is going to happen. I think there is a great realization, not only on the protest side and not even in the center. You saw that there is a major change in public opinion. We need some degree of reform, but it has to be moderate, incremental, slow.
“I think, for political reasons, only political reasons, it is going to be very tough, because materially a compromise is incredibly easy, but the issue is saving face. The government does not want to be seen as losing, especially vis-à-vis their base, and the opposition does not trust the government. They think that the government just wants to lull them into a sort of calming down, and then they will break out.”
On the war between Russia and Ukraine:
“Regarding [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin, indeed I believe the war started on February 24, [2022], the day after one of my calls with [Ukrainian] President [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy. He asked me to begin … that was February 25. President Zelenskyy asked if I could try to put him in touch…. Keep in mind that we are talking about the very first 24 hours. Things looked very different then than they look now.
“Previously, I had met President Putin in Sochi [Russia] for a very long discussion, about five hours, and then we sort of formed a relationship. We had a bunch of interfaces. We have Syria as an issue [and] Iran.
“In parallel, I had urged both sides to move forward with on-the-ground negotiations, which began in Gomel, in Belarus. Among the things I raised with him was indeed President Zelenskyy’s personal security and the fact that it is hard to negotiate when your life is at risk.
“Ukraine made a huge concession, which was no longer to demand to join NATO. Russia made two major concessions. One was the giving up the replacement of leadership, which was one of the demands, and the other was the disarmament. They conceded the disarmament of Ukraine, which also was one of the preliminary objectives.
“Then there were the land issues of Donbass [and] Crimea. There were a bunch of other issues, and an issue of guarantees, of international guarantees, which they were negotiating, what international guarantees they would be willing to take or accept.
“And what I said and suggested was adopted was, let us drop this model, [and] use the Israeli model. Israel does not have guarantees from anyone. No one will come and fight for us. What do we have? We have an army.”
On Israel’s security:
“Very few people in Israel, in the region, right now believe in the two-state solution as a realistic approach for the near future. I said something else. I said, let us reduce the degree of friction. Let us reduce the conflict. That was my policy, de facto.
“What I did on almost my first day, first week certainly, I told the military and Civil Administration, bring in an à la carte menu of everything that we can to help every request there is, and I want to go through it. And out of those 40 things, I think I approved on the spot about 15 of them, or 17 of them.
“For about 15 years, not one Gazan employee could enter and work in Israel, and I thought that was a mistake. Now, there was a considerable resistance in some of our security organizations. There was a fear that some of those workers would conduct terror attacks in Israel, which I am not dismissing. I am not ignoring it, but I told the Shin Bet, OK, that is your job.
“It sounds not as exciting as a big conference is in Oslo and all that, but I believe what I did as prime minister de facto was reduce the degree of conflict, reduce the degree of friction, and reduce the degree of problems. And basically, the principle should be yes, unless there is a security reason to say no.
On sharing the burden of military service
“If you are a Haredi [ultra-Orthodox] young man, and you want to go out and work or study a vocation and get a job, you have to go to the army first. And if you are not willing to go to the army, you have to stay in yeshiva until the age of 26. That law exists because it is unfair to have a young Haredi go out and learn and work while my son or me, for that matter, are out serving while risking our lives.
“What we need to do is to decouple those two things. There is an issue of army service, and there is an issue of economy and work, and my suggestion is to shelve [it] for a while. Let us call it a decade or eight years, the issue of military service or national service, and exempt them. I would go down to the age of 21, perhaps even more.
“Right now, pass a law that says any Haredi at the age of 21 is free to go. I believe that using this vision ultimately, if we are a bit more patient, [and] a bit more incrementalist, in 20 to 25 years Haredim are going to work, pay taxes, not be a burden on society, and guess what, they are going to want to serve in the army.”
