‘No One Else Could Have Handled This War Like Netanyahu’: Why Likud Keeps Leading the Polls
Despite public fatigue, protests, and calls for accountability, Israel’s prime minister remains electorally dominant — revealing a deeper pattern of loyalty and fear of change in a polarized society
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced months of public anger over the failures of October 7, mounting economic hardship, and demands for a state inquiry into his government’s conduct. Yet even after signing the Trump-backed agreement that formally ends the Gaza war — a moment that might have marked both victory and political closure — he continues to lead every major poll.
It is a paradox that baffles many observers: how can a leader with some of the lowest personal approval ratings in Israel’s history remain the country’s most likely winner in the next election? Analysts say the answer lies not in Netanyahu’s popularity but in the structure of Israeli politics itself — a system defined by identity blocs, demographic momentum, and a public unwilling to risk change in a time of uncertainty.
Under the US-brokered plan, both Israel and Hamas accepted a phased ceasefire that includes the release of all hostages and a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal to designated lines. Israeli troops have already pulled back to the first line specified in the agreement, and the next phase of withdrawal is expected in the coming weeks. Hamas has reemerged in the streets of Gaza, yet Netanyahu has avoided uttering the phrase “the war has ended.” In the national discourse, the vocabulary of wartime — unity, victory, survival — still dominates, shaping an electorate reluctant to replace its longtime leader.
“People are unhappy with the government, which they see as too right-wing or too religious,” said Prof. Eitan Shamir of Bar-Ilan University, speaking with The Media Line. “But they still see Netanyahu as someone who is more capable as a leader to lead Israel in this war and crisis.”
That distinction — discontent without defection — explains why Likud’s support, though diminished, remains structurally resilient. In the most recent surveys by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), Channel 12, Channel 13, and Maariv, Likud holds between 24 and 27 seats, consistently ahead of the new centrist movement known as The Reservists and the fractured opposition. Netanyahu’s personal approval, however, has sunk to around 2.8 on a five-point scale. The gap between his unpopularity and his party’s dominance is perhaps the most striking feature of Israeli politics in the postwar period.
Dr. Assaf Shapira, director of the Political Reform Program at the Israel Democracy Institute, explained that the phenomenon is rooted in polarization and the near impossibility of moving voters between ideological blocs. “In the current reality in Israel, it’s very, very difficult for people to move from one camp to another,” he told The Media Line. “It’s not just political; it’s emotional. The psychological attachment to your camp, to the right-wing bloc in this case, is much stronger than before. So even if you are not happy with Netanyahu, leaving the bloc feels like crossing an emotional border.”
It’s not just political; it’s emotional. The psychological attachment to your camp, to the right-wing bloc in this case, is much stronger than before
According to Shapira, most voters in Israel are now “stuck inside their camp,” with only a few seats — perhaps six or seven — truly movable between right and center. “That’s why any expectation that Likud will suddenly collapse is not realistic,” he said. “Most people who are in Likud will stay in Likud. At most, they will move to Ben-Gvir’s party, but not beyond the bloc.”
This dynamic has turned the Israeli electorate into what Shapira calls a “tribal democracy.” Political identity now overlaps with social and ethnic belonging — Mizrahi or Ashkenazi, religious or secular, military or civilian — and those identities, he said, are reinforced by social media echo chambers and a constant narrative of siege. “It’s a global trend,” he noted, “but in Israel it’s sharper. Polarization is so deep that even an event as traumatic as October 7 doesn’t change people’s political homes.”
That deep-seated loyalty explains why Netanyahu’s base remains largely intact even among those who fault him for failing to prevent Hamas’s invasion. “Everyone says there was a failure,” Shapira said. “Nobody denies that. But people will tell you: yes, there was a failure, but the main failure was the army or the intelligence. Or they’ll say: no one else could have handled this war the way Netanyahu did — not Lapid, not Gantz, not anyone. It’s not necessarily cognitive dissonance; it’s a belief that he’s still the only one who can manage it.”
Everyone says there was a failure … It’s not necessarily cognitive dissonance; it’s a belief that he’s still the only one who can manage it.
Shapira added that the lack of a credible alternative reinforces the inertia. “The opposition parties almost all disqualify Likud, certainly under Netanyahu,” he said. “That leaves no bridge, no party that can attract voters from the coalition. The Reservists movement tries to do that — and Benny Gantz also hints he doesn’t rule out Likud entirely — but it’s rare. Without that kind of centrist crossover, the blocs remain frozen.”
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Prof. Asher Cohen, a veteran political scientist at Bar-Ilan University and expert on Religious Zionism, agrees that Israel’s public space amplifies loud minorities and masks the silent majorities. “Even if seventy thousand people were shouting boo in Hostages Square, seventy thousand people are less than two Knesset seats,” he said. “Elections are decided by the hundreds of thousands who are not at any demonstration. The protests make noise, but the ballot box is full of people who never appear on the news.”
Cohen described the divide between “the noisy minority and the large silent camps” as one of the keys to understanding why Netanyahu remains viable. The demonstrations — from the judicial reform protests of 2023 to the current rallies over the hostages — shape media narratives but do not necessarily translate into electoral shifts. “Don’t mistake the streets for the polls,” he cautioned. “The media shows us the noise, but not the masses who stay home and still vote the same.”
While public anger toward ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions and economic hardship is growing, Cohen said the war’s aftermath has also produced an unexpected sociological rift inside the religious right itself. “If the war changed anything,” he said, “it created a deep crisis between Religious Zionism and the Haredi sector. One group’s leadership calls on people not to enlist; the other paid the highest price in combat, both in reserve duty and casualties. It’s a huge gap, and we don’t yet know how it will play out politically.”
That tension, he argued, could eventually reshape alliances within the right-wing bloc — a possibility that worries Likud strategists but has not yet materialized in polls. For now, he added, Likud’s natural partners — Shas (Sephardic religious party), United Torah Judaism, and Jewish Power — continue to guarantee Netanyahu around 53 to 55 seats, enough to lead any future coalition.
Cohen also noted a broader cultural shift: not toward greater religiosity but toward what he calls “traditionalization.” “The Israeli public is not becoming more religious,” he said. “It’s becoming more traditional. After October 7, many people realized that what unites us is that we are Jews. The war reminded everyone that our Jewish identity is central to our survival. People are not necessarily becoming Orthodox, but they feel more connected to tradition as part of their national identity.”
Even if seventy thousand people were shouting ‘boo’ in Hostages Square, seventy thousand people are less than two Knesset seats
This “traditionalization,” he said, reinforces the cultural foundations of Likud’s appeal, particularly among Mizrahi and working-class voters who see the party as the vessel of national pride and stability. “There’s a small secular group that fears religious influence,” Cohen said, “but the larger trend in Israeli society is the opposite — more attachment to heritage and belonging. That benefits Likud.”
Shapira sees another factor working in Netanyahu’s favor: demographics. “More right-wing voters are entering the electorate than left or center voters,” he said. “Simply put, more elderly voters from the left and center have passed away, and more 18- to 20-year-olds from the right are joining the rolls. So even if no one changes sides, the right grows demographically.”
Still, the professor cautioned that Likud’s apparent strength hides vulnerabilities. “In many polls that are not from Channel 14,” he said, “Likud actually loses seats compared to the current Knesset. It’s still the biggest party, yes, but it can’t form a coalition on its own. In several polls, the opposition bloc can almost reach 61 seats, and in others, neither side can.”
Shamir offered a similar structural warning. “In Israel, it’s not about who is leading the polls,” he said. “It’s about who can form a coalition. The president doesn’t give the mandate to the biggest party but to whoever has the best chance to assemble 61 seats. So even if Likud comes first, if Netanyahu’s bloc cannot pass 61, another party leader could get the first attempt.”
That mathematical fragility, however, is masked by the lack of unity on the other side. “In the opposition, you have six or seven people all claiming to be the alternative — Lapid, Gantz, Lieberman, Yair Golan, even Bennett,” Shamir said. “They are draining each other. Netanyahu sits on the sidelines enjoying the mud wrestling competition. He is, in his words, the king of the right, and there’s no one to challenge him.”
For now, the polls reflect that reality: a weary electorate, skeptical of everyone but familiar with one face. Netanyahu’s political survival, like much of his career, depends on timing and narrative. Shamir believes that if the ceasefire deal translates into a tangible sense of victory, the prime minister could even strengthen his position. “If the conditions of the agreement are implemented — hostages released, Hamas no longer in power, normalization with Saudi Arabia, economic recovery — he will stand on the podium and say: I brought you peace and prosperity,” he said. “He will say: yes, we had a terrible war, but I led Israel to victory over Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. I changed the Middle East. Now I must finish the job.”
Such a scenario, Shamir added, could reset the political mood entirely. “Imagine one year from now, when the next election approaches, if Israelis feel the war ended successfully and the economy is reviving,” he said. “He’ll say: look what I’ve delivered — security and normalization. In that case, his chances improve dramatically.”
They are draining each other. Netanyahu sits on the sidelines enjoying the mud wrestling competition. He is, in his words, the king of the right, and there’s no one to challenge him.
But the opposite is equally possible. If implementation falters or economic strain deepens, accountability for October 7 could resurface with renewed force. Both Shapira and Cohen warn that once the war narrative fades, questions of responsibility will return — and with them, public demand for a state inquiry. “Almost everyone supports the idea of a commission of inquiry,” Shapira said, “but when you ask when it should happen and who should appoint it, people say: yes, but not now. Or: yes, but not if it’s run by the left. Polls miss that nuance.”
For now, Netanyahu’s strategy is to blur the line between war and aftermath. “He has an interest in presenting the situation as if the war is not truly over,” Shapira said. “Once it’s officially declared finished, all the questions will come — the investigations, the responsibility. So he will delay that moment as long as possible.”
The persistence of Likud’s dominance, then, reflects not only Netanyahu’s personal endurance but the structure of Israeli society itself — fragmented, fearful, and fiercely tribal. As Shamir put it, “Voting patterns in Israel today are very identity-driven. People don’t vote only for what they think; they vote for who they are.”
In a country where politics is inseparable from belonging, Netanyahu’s unpopularity may matter less than the absence of someone else who feels familiar enough to replace him.
