Suspended Legitimacy: Has al-Sharaa Lost the Trust of His Backers?
Once the hope of the post-Assad era, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership has faltered because of sectarian violence, political divisions, and loss of credibility.
At the beginning of 2025, Syria witnessed a pivotal political moment in its modern history: the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime after more than a decade since the outbreak of the revolution.
Despite the chaos and division that characterized the previous years, the fall of Assad’s regime seemed like a true glimmer of hope, opening the door to a transitional phase that could lead the country toward rebuilding itself as a democratic civil state.
The appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa, a technocrat and independent figure with a civilian background, as head of the transitional phase received unusually broad international support. This backing came from the United States, Britain and France, along with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, all of whom viewed him as a consensus figure capable of steering Syria toward stability.
However, the hope was short-lived. Within months of forming the transitional government, signs of disorder reemerged. Violence broke out along the Syrian coast, and unprecedented protests erupted in As-Suwayda. These events coincided with a direct and uncharacteristic Israeli airstrike targeting Syria’s Ministry of Defense in the heart of Damascus—a blow that shattered the image of the new state and left the government exposed to growing questions of legitimacy, sovereignty and governability.
Ahmed al-Sharaa was neither a prominent figure in the opposition nor a remnant of the previous regime. He emerged as a consensus choice dictated by circumstance and was embraced due to his calm, nonconfrontational demeanor, relatively clean record, especially after publicly cutting ties with al-Qaida and declaring war on the Islamic State (IS) and his ability to communicate pragmatically with both domestic and international audiences.
His name was well known in academic and legal circles, and he had previously contributed to local reconciliation initiatives during moments of civil escalation.
It was clear from the outset that the international bet on al-Sharaa was not on a transformative political leader but on a transitional figure, one who could manage fragility, not resolve it.
Still, the support he received was fragile and conditional, tied to expectations of swift performance and visible results. When those failed to materialize, support began to recede.
The Syrian coastal regions, deeply entwined with the former regime through sectarian, security and economic ties, became one of the most complex arenas post-Assad. When the transitional government attempted to assert authority by dismantling local militias once aligned with the defunct Ministry of Defense, violent clashes erupted. These quickly escalated into what many described as an armed rebellion, implicitly supported by remnants of Assad’s security apparatus.
Reports confirmed that factions of the “Popular Committees” loyal to the old regime refused to disarm, viewing the transitional government as a threat to their sectarian identity.
The government failed to gauge the sensitivity of the situation. It lacked a coherent negotiation strategy and imposed centralized decisions without recognizing the deeply rooted fears within the Alawite community. These moves were seen by many as a veiled political purge.
Israel and Iran both closely monitored the unfolding events, each with its own agenda. Tehran provided indirect support to the rebellion, while Moscow attempted mediation—without success.
The result: hundreds killed and widespread displacement in a region once seen as Assad’s strongest base. More importantly, the coastal crisis exposed the inability of the transitional government to project authority—not even symbolically.
In southern Syria, As-Suwayda, home to a Druze majority, witnessed a resurgence of civil protests. Initially peaceful, the movement transformed into open defiance after the military’s aggressive efforts to enforce conscription and security.
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These protests were not sudden; they reflected years of accumulated frustration—first with the Assad regime, which failed to protect the region from IS, and then with an opposition that never truly represented the Druze community.
The transitional government, perceived as disconnected from local realities, became the new target of public outrage. Civilian casualties during the protests only deepened public resentment. Videos circulated showing government troops beating demonstrators, reinforcing fears that the new state retained the repressive practices of its predecessor.
As a result, several Druze political figures withdrew from the transition process, and calls for local self-rule or autonomy began to surface.
The Israeli airstrike on the Ministry of Defense in central Damascus was not just military—it was deeply political. It signaled that Tel Aviv did not recognize the transitional government as a reliable partner and believed the core structure of Syria’s military and intelligence apparatus remained unchanged.
The al-Sharaa administration’s muted response revealed its political fragility and sparked renewed doubts among Western powers about its capacity to uphold Syrian sovereignty.
The United States—an early supporter of al-Sharaa—issued no clear condemnation. Observers interpreted Washington’s silence as a signal that Syria had been downgraded as a priority.
The withdrawal of support for al-Sharaa wasn’t merely the result of his government’s shortcomings. It reflected a broader geopolitical recalibration.
In Washington, shifting priorities—particularly in the Red Sea and East Asia—pushed Syria down the agenda.
In the Gulf, interest in engaging the new regime clashed with fears of hidden Iranian influence, despite Syria having cut ties with Tehran.
Turkey, consumed by domestic challenges and its careful balancing act with Moscow, chose cautious disengagement.
All of this rendered support for the transitional government unstable and easily eroded.
International support alone is insufficient if it is not translated into practical tools that address the deep social fractures left by decades of autocratic rule
Dr. Samer al-Hassan, a Damascus-based expert in political transitions, told The Media Line:
“What happened in Syria after the fall of the regime is not unusual for transitions from authoritarian systems. A figure like Ahmed al-Sharaa, despite his civilian symbolism, was not backed by an institutional framework or genuine consensus among internal forces. International support alone is insufficient if it is not translated into practical tools that address the deep social fractures left by decades of autocratic rule.”
Al-Sharaa’s experience exposed the fragility of international consensus regarding Syria
Meanwhile, Dr. Nadine al-Shawa, a Beirut-based researcher in regional security and international relations, offered a similar perspective:
“Al-Sharaa’s experience exposed the fragility of international consensus regarding Syria. The withdrawal of Washington and the hesitation of Gulf capitals stem from the lack of a shared vision for post-Assad Syria. The unrest in the coastal region and the south is a dangerous indicator of central authority disintegration, and it suggests that no transitional process can succeed without genuine decentralization and clear regional agreements.”
The failure cannot be attributed to al-Sharaa’s government alone
A March 2025 report by the International Crisis Group framed Syria’s transitional crisis in stark terms:
“The transitional phase in Syria is undergoing a severe test of legitimacy. The failure cannot be attributed to al-Sharaa’s government alone; the absence of real international agreements on the future of the military institution, along with limited economic support, has created an ungovernable environment. It appears that the time has come for a shift in the international community’s approach—from supporting individuals to rebuilding institutions.”
Given the current landscape, Syria appears incapable of overcoming its crisis without a new national project—one that transcends the zero-sum logic of winners and losers. What is required is not merely a set of political deals between elites but a deeper reconciliation between the state and its fractured local communities.
This must begin with a recognition of Syria’s pluralism and the creation of a decentralized state model—potentially federal in nature—granting broad autonomy to regions.
Secondly, a high-level transitional justice committee, overseen by the United Nations, should be established to address the fate of detainees and the missing, and to administer symbolic accountability of former regime officials while avoiding political vendettas.
On the security front, Syria’s military must be rebuilt from the ground up: professional, national and inclusive—integrating former factions into a unified institution monitored and supported by an international oversight mission.
And regionally, there will be no peace in Syria without a comprehensive framework involving Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia alongside a renewed understanding between Washington and Moscow over the future structure of the Syrian state.
Syria now stands at a historic crossroads. It can either move toward a long-awaited political settlement that lifts it from decades of bloodshed and fragmentation, or it may descend into even more brutal and chaotic conflict.
The experience of Ahmed al-Sharaa has made one truth clear: Good intentions are not enough. Political transitions require real governing frameworks, strong domestic consensus and unwavering international support. Without this triad, Syria will remain trapped between the wreckage of its authoritarian past and the broken promises of its revolution.
