Why Did the Assad Regime Collapse So Quickly?
Al Qabas, Kuwait, December 14
At 9 pm on Saturday, December 7, I reached out to Dr. Radwan Ziadeh, the founder and director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies and a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights. My purpose was to gain insights into the military and political landscape in Syria. To my surprise, Dr. Ziadeh expressed astonishment at the rapid disintegration of regime forces. He assured me that the opposition had a firm grip on Aleppo, handling it even more effectively than American forces had managed Baghdad after Saddam’s fall. When I inquired about the safety of minorities in Aleppo, he offered reassuring anecdotes, saying that on Sunday, November 30, fighters from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) attended a church service and assisted in setting up a Christmas tree. Although he predicted that these forces would soon enter Damascus, I chose not to contest his optimism, ending our conversation on that note. On the morning of Sunday, December 8, I awoke expecting to hear reports of heavy combat near Homs. Instead, the news was that HTS had indeed breached Damascus. This revelation caught not only me but also American intelligence off guard. As reported by The New York Times on December 9, US intelligence services, until the evening of December 6, had assessed a 50% likelihood that Assad could fend off opposition forces and suspected he might resort to using chemical weapons. The unexpected collapse of Syrian forces prompted a flurry of articles and research efforts aimed at explaining it. Seeking answers, I ventured to contact friends in Damascus—something I previously avoided due to the political sensitivity. On December 9, I reached Engineer Yasser, a renowned architect from Damascus University specializing in restoring historic homes near the Umayyad Mosque. Yasser recounted his decision to flee to Beirut with his family on Saturday, December 7, to avoid potential violence in Damascus. Ironically, he learned of his city’s “liberation” only after arriving in Beirut. He remarked that he had anticipated his children might grow up under the presidency of Hafez Bashar Assad, the eldest son of Bashar Assad. Many observers, including myself, misjudged the Assad regime’s resilience, but analyzing the factors behind its swift collapse is somewhat straightforward and can be attributed to several key elements: the collapse of the Syrian economy, the events of October 7, the plight of the Alawite sect, Turkish support for the opposition, Russian disillusionment with Assad, and Iranian disappointment. The Syrian economy plummeted by 84% between 2010 and 2023. While precise statistics are elusive, given Syria’s international isolation, the World Bank estimated the economic decline using satellite imagery of nighttime lighting in Syrian urban areas. Even the lucrative Captagon factories, operated by Maher Assad and his associates, do not count toward the official economy. The events of October 7, which saw the deaths of approximately 50,000 Palestinians from Gaza and the displacement of two million others, inadvertently contributed to the liberation of the Syrian people from Assad’s grip. Israeli strikes incapacitated Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, limiting their ability to assist Assad. While Israel may not have targeted Assad intentionally, seeing him as a stabilizing force on the Golan front, the unpredictable consequences of war played out. The regime relied heavily on Alawites for key military and intelligence roles, yet only a select few benefited materially, primarily the Assad and Makhlouf families, alongside Asma Assad, the president’s wife. Despite the Alawite community losing around 100,000 members defending Assad between 2011 and 2016, their economic conditions did not improve. In a poignant letter reported by Zaman Alwasl, a notable Syrian news outlet, on December 4, 2024, an Alawite citizen criticized Assad’s policies, accusing them of posing an existential threat to Alawites despite Assad’s own Alawite heritage. The letter underscores the disparity between ordinary Alawites and the elite families. Despite Alawites representing about 10% of Turkey’s population, relations with Syria soured under the Assads and worsened with the ascension of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party. The 2011–2016 Syrian revolution and the influx of millions of Syrian refugees into Turkey emphasized the interdependence of Syrian and Turkish stability. With roughly 4 million displaced Syrians in Turkey, most without substantial resources, President Erdogan unsuccessfully invited Assad for discussions, leading Turkey to support the opposition through logistical and intelligence means. Rooted in the late-1950s arms trade, and maturing over decades, Russian-Syrian relations deepened through military, cultural, and social exchanges. Russia, aware of the Syrian army’s poor state and low morale, implored Assad to negotiate seriously with the opposition. Yet Assad remained defiant, ignoring repeated Russian urgings. Despite Russia’s military interventions during 2013–2016, the diminished intensity signaled Moscow’s recognition of Assad’s doomed prospects. Ultimately, Russia extricated him by relocating him and his family to Moscow. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei involved Iran and Hezbollah heavily in Syria, a decision seen as strategically flawed given their “revolutionary” stance juxtaposed against backing a dictator. Early in the conflict, as revolutionaries neared Damascus, even Iranian leaders like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged Assad’s end was likely. Financial and military burdens on Iran and its allies could not be sustained, as declared by Revolutionary Guards Commander Hossein Salami. These six points largely illuminate the factors behind the Assad regime’s unexpected downfall. Although Syria faces a challenging road to stability and development, the collapse of the regime signifies the end of a pervasive climate of fear. The fear that isolated people from each other and from the world has begun to erode, fostering a new sense of hope. —Dr. Hamed Al-Hamoud (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)
This holiday season, give to:
Truth and understanding
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